Foreign Affairs Committee on June 6th, 2023

[Zaw Kyaw, Spokesperson, Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and standing committee members, my name is Zaw Kyaw. I am a Myanmar Canadian living in Canada since 1991.

During Myanmar's brief democratization period, I worked as a CEO in the most successful special economic zone in Myanmar. Currently I am acting as a spokesperson for the national unity government of Myanmar.

I am honoured to have this opportunity to appear as a witness in view of the committee's study of Canada's sanctions regime, particularly on Burma/Myanmar.

On the morning of February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military launched an attempted coup against the democratically elected government, halting the country's fragile transition towards democracy.

Following the coup, the people of Myanmar took to the streets for mass peaceful protests. The military responded with deadly violence, killed many people and imposed a campaign of terror, raiding homes and arresting anyone suspected of supporting democracy.

Faced with defiant and widespread resistance to date, the military has been unable to consolidate its control of the country. It has deployed increasingly brutal violence to crush opposition, but the people's resistance is still strong and growing.

Since the military coup, over 3,600 civilians have been killed, nearly 23,000 have been arbitrarily detained, and over 60,000 properties, including religious facilities, hospitals and schools, have been burned down. Over 1.7 million internally displaced people have been reported across the country.

Canada has shown no hesitation in taking action against the Myanmar military. In December 2007, the special economic measures (Burma) regulations came into force in response to the humanitarian and human rights crisis situation in Myanmar/Burma. Canada's sanctions were one of the toughest sanctions regimes at that time.

Following positive developments in Myanmar, Canada eased its economic sanctions in April 2012; however, Canada still maintained sanctions against certain listed individuals and entities, as well as an arms embargo.

The regulations were amended in 2018 to add seven senior military officials who occupied positions of authority during the military clearance operations against the Rohingya in Rakhine state.

Canada was among the first countries to impose new sanctions in light of the February 1, 2021 coup. Since then, Canada has imposed additional sanctions six times, resulting in sanctions on a total of 95 individuals and 63 entities. Canada is the first country to impose sanctions on Myanmar military jet fuel suppliers.

Despite the sanctions from Canada and the west, the Myanmar military is still capable of increasing its terror acts against civilians. Their foreign partners and new corporate fronts are easily able to skirt the existing sanctions.

In September 2022, the Myanmar junta shut down public access to the Myanmar Companies Online, or MyCO, corporate registry in order to shield the shareholders' information and to hide newly established front companies. This demonstrates the need to strengthen the current sanctions regime.

While I believe the sanctions are a useful tool to pressure the brutal military, there is also room to improve Canada's sanctions regimes on Myanmar to make it more robust and effective.

Yesterday, Nikkei issued a report that Russian repurchased parts for tanks and missiles, which had been exported to Myanmar and India, would be used by Russia in Ukraine. The Myanmar military is now a threat to global security. Canada and the west must coordinate to target arms suppliers and brokers.

Canada has to target aviation fuel suppliers. Canada needs to coordinate with allies to plan protection and indemnity clubs, or P and I clubs, from providing insurance to any vessels carrying aviation fuel to Myanmar ports.

Canada and democratic countries could strengthen sanctions to choke off dollars to the military by targeting the junta's foreign revenue flows, such as the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank, or MFTB, and the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, or MOGE.

I am very much concerned about the purchase of Chevron's stake in Yadana offshore gas, of which Chevron owns 41%, by the Canadian entity MTI Energy's subsidiary, a little-known company called Et Martem Holdings. By the way, the Yadana gas field is the largest gas field in Myanmar.

I would be happy to discuss it further. Thank you so much for giving me the opportunity.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Kyaw.

You will have ample opportunity to respond to questions by the members.

We now go to Ms. Moret.

Ms. Moret, you have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Dr. Erica Moret, Senior Researcher and Coordinator, Sanctions and Sustainable Peace Hub, Geneva Graduate Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

Chair and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

I've been working on multilateral and autonomous sanctions for 20 years or so. During this time I've explored questions of the impacts, effectiveness and coordination of sanctions regimes, such as those targeting Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea and so on.

I've also researched sanctions in relation to areas such as chemical weapons abuses, nuclear non-proliferation, cybersecurity, modern slavery and human trafficking, and humanitarian considerations. I also coordinate several multi-stakeholder initiatives on sanctions on behalf of the European Union, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations. In recent years, I've also provided testimony on sanctions to the U.S. Congress, both U.K. Houses of Parliament, the Canadian Senate and the European Parliament.

In 2020, I provided research and strategic policy advice to Global Affairs Canada's new sanctions unit, including a suggested checklist for sanctions design and a blueprint for areas where Canada could play a positive leadership role in global sanctions fora, drawing on its unique position in the world. I'll draw on this work today, as well as the testimony I provided to the Canadian Senate in December 2022.

I'd like to share reflections today on just two key areas that I feel most qualified to talk about and that relate to recommendations this committee made in April 2017 as part of Canada's parliamentary review on Canadian sanctions, which led to Global Affairs Canada being afforded stronger capabilities and more flexibility in the area of autonomous sanctions.

The first area is the recommendation to “properly resource and reform the structures responsible for [Canada's] sanctions regimes”.

An earlier criticism was that the Canadian government didn't have adequate resources to implement and enforce an effective sanctions regime or to allow for independent oversight of Canada's sanctions procedures. Important steps appear to have happened in the right direction in recent years through the establishment of the sanctions policy and operations coordination division, with stepped-up resourcing and legislative reforms. From my experience, this is staffed by extremely dedicated, expert and hard-working officials, who have adapted well to the fast-changing global sanctions landscape.

In response to earlier critiques over difficulties in navigating sanctions lists, Global Affairs Canada now has consolidated autonomous and UN sanctions lists on its website, and other sites also provide useful information on sanctions resources, such as that contained on the Parliament of Canada site. As I understand it, regular reviews are conducted, and Canada has also contributed to a number of detailed studies and tools that help aid sanctions design, both within Canada and globally.

Another notable change has been the rise in Canada's prominence in autonomous sanctions practice, in close coordination with the EU, the U.K. and the U.S. in particular, alongside others. I see this as something of a positive step that responds to recommendations that closer collaboration was warranted. The formalization and streamlining of these types of collaboration, I would say, is a merit of Canada's involvement.

In light of this close work with international partners, I'd say that Canada's sanctions use is increasingly “plurilateral”, to borrow the term from the World Trade Organization, and really not particularly unilateral—as per some critiques of autonomous sanctions—with between 30 and 40 countries working together. Given the impasse we see today on sanctions at the UN Security Council, this allows Canada to join allies in addressing breaches of international law and to play something of a leadership role in international foreign and security policy. This also serves, of course, as a force multiplier by working together.

We also see formalization and other types of collaboration, such as through the Russian elites, proxies and oligarchs task force, which is a multilateral effort that has used information sharing and coordination to identify and exert pressure on sanctioned Russian individuals and entities. Canada is, of course, a member, alongside a number of other different countries and the European Commission.

An expansion in terms of staffing, training, capacity and resourcing appears to be warranted, in my view at least, not only in Canada but also elsewhere, considering the very steep rise in prominence of sanctions we're seeing across the world today, and particularly following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

If we take a couple of examples from elsewhere, the U.K. sanctions unit has grown dramatically in recent times and is now sitting at around 160 individuals. The Netherlands has just seen the creation of and growth in its own sanctions unit. This has been happening elsewhere as well. This gives a kind of context in terms of the need for proper resourcing across the board of different areas.

I will make a very quick point to conclude in terms of the recommendation for Global Affairs Canada to provide comprehensive, publicly available written guidance to the public and private sectors regarding the interpretation of sanctions regulations in order to maximize compliance.

Canada, of course, lacks an investigative or enforcement body like OFAC in the U.S. Treasury. Alongside this, we know that Russia and other actors are using sophisticated evasion and circumvention techniques in coordination with other sanctions targets, particularly DPRK, Iran and so on, so enforcement has now become the name of the game. I think we can learn some lessons from what other countries are doing.

We have seen the U.S. Treasury working together with the U.K. Treasury to develop common approaches in terms of enforcement and investigative powers. We also see the EU and U.S.—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Ms. Moret, I would ask you to conclude in the next 20 seconds or so.

[Dr. Erica Moret]

Sure.

We see stepped-up outreach by the U.S. and European Union, and that's also to reduce overcompliance, which has become a growing problem, particularly in relation to financial sector de-risking, but in order to do so, again, it really does require proper resourcing and capacity.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Ms. Moret.

We will now open it to questions from the members. We start off with Mr. Genuis.

Mr. Genuis, you have four minutes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

I want to share a brief notice of motion that follows our discussions in the last hour:

That the committee report to the House that it wishes to see the awarding of honorary Canadian citizenship to Vladimir Kara-Murza, and that it calls for Mr. Kara-Murza's immediate release.

I know there will be further discussions among the parties, but I want to put that on notice to give options.

Ms. Kadian, we have talked at this committee about the importance of reopening the Lachin corridor. We have called for that. The committee is waiting for the government to respond to a report to the House on that. Hopefully, that response will be forthcoming very soon.

What kinds of targeted sanctions specifically do you think would affect or increase the chances of bringing about the reopening of the Lachin corridor?

[Anaïs Kadian]

The types of targeted sanctions that would be useful, I think, would be towards regime officials who are implicated in the blockade, those who are directing these acts, those who are operating on these acts. These types of sanctions can be on individuals. They can be very specific. They can also, I think, send a very strong message, because—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I'm sorry, but maybe I can jump in. My understanding is that there's a bit of a Mickey Mouse game that has gone on, in that people have said that these are environmental activists and they have nothing to do with the regime. Obviously that's not credible, but does that complicate your proposal to target regime officials, or can we know externally who the people directing these things are?

[Anaïs Kadian]

I think there is open-source information from different organizations and different partners. There is an order from the International Court of Justice to the Azerbaijani regime to open the corridor.

The Lemkin Institute and Genocide Watch NGOs have also called upon this regime to open the corridor. If there's information muddying the waters, I believe it is coming from sources that are not credible.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you.

I want to move on to another witness, but perhaps you could provide some follow-up written information with specific names, specific individuals and specific institutions that you think should be sanctioned with that particular goal in mind.

Mr. Kyaw, it seems clear from your testimony that the sanctions that have thus far been implemented against Burma have been ineffective.

I wonder if you would agree with that characterization and if you can share a bit more, specifically about how we can close the gaps through our sanctions regime.

Also, if there's time, could you also speak to collaboration between the military junta and Russia, and how gaps in sanctions may be a mechanism by which certain materials are making their way to Russia and being used in the invasion of Ukraine?

[Zaw Kyaw]

The military junta is increasing attacks on civilians—for example, using fighter jets and helicopter gunships to attack civilians. Last year alone, there were almost 600 air strikes against civilian targets. The planes were supported by China and Russia. Like Mr. Genuis mentioned, Canada sanctioned the aviation fuel supplies, but they skirt around the sanctions. Canada and its allies should use the protection and indemnity clubs to ban insurance for the vessels supplying aviation fuel to Myanmar. The Myanmar military relies 100% on imported jet fuels. If you cut that off, it will protect civilian lives.

I know that Russia is in trouble because of the global sanctions against its arms purchases, so it uses Myanmar to purchase the arms—the parts and rounds—and repurchase the parts for the tanks and the missiles, and then Myanmar re-exports them to Russia. Then the Russians can use them in Ukraine.

That's a recently released report, but it's been doing it for months now. That's why Canada and allies should close the gap and place sanctions against the arms brokers. We have the arms brokers list that we can provide. Then, also, for the military regime, the biggest single source of revenue comes from the oil and gas sector. Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise alone is $1.5 billion, so Canada and the west could sanction MOGE.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We now go to Mr. Zuberi.

You have four minutes.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

Mr. Kyaw, I'll ask you most of my questions. I know that you are the spokesperson for the national unity government, in exile, for Myanmar and that you are responding to the military junta in Myanmar. I think that's important, what we're hearing from you—that response.

I'd like to ask a few things around some policies of the national unity government, which I know includes Aung San Suu Kyi's party and other ethnic minority groups and minority parties. With respect to the Rohingya, what is the position of the national unity government?

[Zaw Kyaw]

I just want to point out that the national unity government is not an exiled government. Actually, the acting president, the prime minister and many of the ministers are working inside Myanmar. Also, the national unity government...even though NUG members are included, NUG members are minorities. About 46% are NUG members, and over 50% are representing different ethnic groups. There are the NGO groups, as well.

The acting president is a Kachin ethnic minority, a Christian, and then also the prime minister is a Karen ethnic.

To answer your questions, the national unity government's minister of human rights presented a paper to the UN Human Rights Council. Also, the national unity government released a Rohingya policy paper that clearly sets out recognition of the citizenship rights of the Rohingya and their dignified return to their villages and homes.

Rohingya representation in the NUG is a work in progress. Another thing is the indiscriminate citizenship law. That's a law that discriminates against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities. The NUG made the decision to repeal and replace it with a more democratic and internationally acceptable law.

Those are the biggest things that the national unity government is working on. For example, right now, cyclone Mocha landed in Rakhine state. Most of the casualties are Rohingya refugees. Also, we are supporting those refugees through the local civil society, and this is how our government works for equality and self-determination, including for the Rohingya.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you.

As a follow-up to that, I guess you have answered how you'll look to include diverse groups into future governments. Do you have any further comments on that particular point of how to include groups into a future government, including the Rohingya?

[Zaw Kyaw]

Now it's that the NUG will be the interim government, and that will be the transitional government as well, to be formed after the transition of the constitution is approved by the People's Assembly.

Even this NUG, interim government...we will begin to work towards the Rohingya communities. We will include the Rohingyas in our cabinet. Also, in the future, the transitional government will be more inclusive.

By the way, this government is the most inclusive government in Burmese history. The Bamar are the majority ethnic group in Burma, with about 70% of the population, but in the NUG, Bamar ethnic people make up only about 40%. Over 60%—almost 70%—are of non-Bamar ethnicity, but we still need to include Rohingya people in the cabinet. That's what we are working towards with the Rohingya communities as well.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

With respect to the refugee crisis—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm afraid you're out of time.

We will now go to the next member, who is Mr. Garon.

You have four minutes.

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to put my questions to Ms. Moret.

Ms. Moret, in December 2022, you told the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that the methodologies and tools used to measure the impact and effectiveness of Canada's autonomous sanctions still did not exist.

For example, I asked a witness earlier today if they've been able to quantify capital flight caused by unilateral sanctions.

Do these kinds of impact measures exist elsewhere? Where is Canada in that regard? If Canada is not far enough along, what kind of mechanism do we need to think about concretely?

[Dr. Erica Moret]

Thank you very much for the question.

This is a challenge that's faced by all those who are making use of sanctions autonomously, and also in the United Nations as well. Mechanisms or tools to assess the effectiveness and impacts are not very well developed yet.

Nevertheless, there are methodologies out there that could be adapted, should those states wish to do so. In the absence of this, it's quite hard, with any confidence, to make an accurate assessment of the impacts of the sanctions.

As an aside, it's also incredibly difficult to do, methodologically, when it comes to proving causation over correlation, because there are so many complicated factors going on in any one context, particularly those where there is an armed conflict under way, or in the context of humanitarian emergencies as well.

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

I understand that this may be methodologically complex, but could improving our ability to measure the impact of sanctions also help a country like Canada avoid unforeseen and probably undesirable impacts of sanctions, particularly on civilians, for example, or on financial flows?

[Dr. Erica Moret]

Yes. There are certainly lots of things that could be done and that could draw on methods that have been developed elsewhere.

In parallel to that, I think there are really important things that Canada could be doing and I believe has already started to do. The first is to create something of a trisector group within the country. That would typically be between the governments, those designing the sanctions, regulators and so on, but also NGOs, the banking sector, the wider private sector and so on—and would meet regularly. That has been very important in other countries to allow for regular exchanges with relevant stakeholders that can be flexible, respond to changing situations on the ground, and also allow for policy change where needed.

Also, engaging in international fora is really critical here. We have now 10 or more years of really excellent studies and multisectoral dialogues, which have generated recommendations. Some of them—

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

Ms. Moret, I'm sorry to interrupt, but we have limited time.

You kind of paved the way for my last question. When it comes to sanctions, Canada rarely acts alone, as it still favours multilateralism. You have already suggested that Canada should formalize its coordination and strategic planning channels.

What would formalizing these channels look like at the institutional level?

[Dr. Erica Moret]

To an extent, this has already begun with some of the coordination that's happening on the Russia sanctions. My understanding is that a lot of the time, some of the relationships or mechanisms are quite informal in nature and perhaps depend on individuals who are in certain positions. Then, when they move on, some of those links need to be recreated.

I understand that now, the exchanges and interactions are particularly regular and much more coordinated than they used to be. However, given the fact that in all likelihood the sanctions we see coming out of Canada moving forward are going to be planned in very close collaboration with the three actors I mentioned already—the U.K., the U.S. and the EU, and likely a host of others, as well, such as Australia—the more mechanisms and formal processes that can be in place to allow for joint planning, monitoring and so on—sovereignty concerns notwithstanding—the better when it comes to the effectiveness of the measures.