Thank you very much.
Thank you very much for the chance to speak with you today.
To begin, I want to specify that I'm not an expert on sanctions in the technical sense, but what I will do is share with you six lessons I've drawn from watching sanctions on Iran from Canada, from the U.S. and from allies for more than 15 years, first at the Department of National Defence and now at the University of Ottawa.
Lesson number one is that sanctions are easy to announce but hard to implement. I see that's an issue that was discussed before. Monitoring and enforcing sanctions is very labour-intensive, and Canada has a reputation among our friends, but also among rivals, for not enforcing sanctions well. Part of the reason is a lack of resources; part of the reason is a lack of political will.
While in many cases I share the intent of the government or opposition parties to impose more sanctions on Iran, Russia or others, whether through SEMA, Magnitsky or other tools, I do invite the committee to reflect on the reality that we already cannot fulfill our current commitments, let alone new ones. This irritates our allies, a point that I think we vastly underestimate, and it sends a message to the bad actors that we are not serious about penalizing them. This is a message they hear loud and clear.
The bottom line is that we need resources. There is just no way around that. The $76 million that was announced last fall as part of the package of sanctions on Iran was a positive first step, but keep in mind that it takes years to generate the necessary capabilities. You need to hire people; you need to give them security clearances in a context in which we already have massive backlogs; you need to train them for highly specialized positions and so on.
Lesson number two is that sanctions are easy to announce, again, but hard to stop. They take on a life of their own bureaucratically, politically, legally and socially. Sometimes the day comes when the cost on us—not on the target but on us—exceeds the benefits, but removing the sanctions can be very difficult. So as you reflect on the future of sanctions, I also urge you to think about processes to remove sanctions, when doing so is in our interest, to avoid tying the hands of future governments, even though sometimes that may be tempting.
Lesson number three is that sanctions, especially the sweeping kind, often have negative unintended consequences. In particular, as in the Iranian case, they can entrench authoritarianism and corruption. In Iran, the IRGC has been able to build a massive economic empire and therefore become more powerful as part of the regime's efforts to evade sanctions. So, yes, as intended, sanctions have hurt the regime, but they have also come with a major cost. At the very least, we need to think about this more transparently when we design sanctions.
Lesson number four is that for these first three reasons, in many cases I find that targeted sanctions can be much more effective than the sweeping or blunt kind. They are less resource-intensive—keep in mind point number one about our overstretched capacity—and they're also more surgical in their impact—keep in mind point number two about the blunt impact they may have. They can minimize broader unintended negative costs, including humanitarian suffering. That is why, in the case of Iran again, the idea of listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code—something that a number of people in opposition and civil society support—is appealing in principle and it's an idea that I don't disagree with in theory, but in practice it is not practical, for the first three reasons I have given.
Lesson number five is that public discourse on sanctions in Canada tends to focus very much on the foreign policy angle. In a way that's normal, and that's the focus of your work, but usually Canadian sanctions have little or no direct impact from a foreign policy perspective. Where sanctions do serve our interests much more and can actually have a positive outcome for us is more on the national security side. Again, in the case of Iran, we are not going to change Iranian foreign policy with our sanctions. Where we can make a difference is in the case of Iranian regime officials and their families, for example, parking financial assets in Canada or Iranian regime officials and affiliated thugs intimidating the Iranian-Canadian diaspora. That's a problem, but it is a national security problem, not a foreign policy problem. Here again, targeted sanctions, not the sweeping kind, can actually have a chance of success—full success probably not, but some success, yes.
My concluding point—and I will finish on this—is a plea for more transparency, something I also heard a bit about in the previous session. It is transparency regarding the objectives of sanctions, “What are we actually trying to do?”, but also their successes and failures: “What are they doing?” There is very little publicly available information in Canada on these questions, and that's a problem. This lack of transparency prevents a more informed public debate, which is a problem on its own, but it also makes the work of civil society, the media and academia more difficult as they try to hold the government to account on what sanctions are achieving and not achieving.
Thank you.