Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 6th, 2025

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

That’s okay, go ahead.

[Caoilfhionn Gallagher]

Thank you.

I want to support what was said by Michael Kovrig so powerfully just now. Having done 25 years of political prisoner cases—including very difficult cases involving Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and so on—my experience is that, ultimately, at its core—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Madam Gallagher, your microphone is too low. Could you bring it up a little bit? Thank you.

[Caoilfhionn Gallagher]

I hope that works.

My experience is that in every single case, what you need to work out is the hassle factor—how it's more trouble for the detaining state to continue detaining the prisoner than to release them.

Ultimately, that's what we know works with China. It's what worked, ultimately, in the case of the two Michaels. It's what worked in the case of Australian journalist Cheng Lei, and it's what worked very recently when the U.S. secured the release of Pastor David Lin, and then three further Americans last autumn. It's also what worked for Ireland—a minnow of a state internationally, in many ways—in securing the release of businessman Richard O'Halloran. In every single case, it was working out what the leverage was and then acting accordingly.

I very strongly agree with the example of the European Parliament, because a critical issue is sequencing. Using language about a pragmatic reset and a turning point in relations and so on—language that we've seen a number of states use in recent months—before you've actually secured the right outcome in Jimmy Lai's case is the wrong way around, in my view.

We know from Cheng Lei's case or the case of the European Parliament that your sequencing should be conditionality: “We'd like to have more engagement. We'd like to, for example, have a state visit.” You have what the prize is, but you make it clear that they're not getting the prize unless and until they do the right thing in relation to securing the release of the prisoner or lifting the sanctions or whatever the issue may be. Here, the issue is securing the release of Jimmy Lai.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We'll go to MP Rood for five minutes.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Kovrig, based on your experience, what are the warning signs of hostage diplomacy that Canadians should watch for? What specific policies would deter the Chinese Communist Party from detaining Canadians again?

[Michael Kovrig]

How long do I have for that?

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[Michael Kovrig]

I don't think there are necessarily specific warning signs. It varies from country to country.

There are particular states that engage in that behaviour, but I think the way to look at hostage diplomacy is not as a consular issue exclusively or as simply that kind of hostage-taking. It is one tool in a coercive kit that authoritarian states that are less respectful of norms and laws are willing to use, and they will use whatever tool in the kit they think is going to get what they want in a given case.

To some extent, they like reciprocity. One warning sign is a person being held in a western-government country, as with Meng Wanzhou, for example. Then they are more likely to use hostage-taking than to use other tools of coercion.

Let's remember that in the case that involved me, there were also trade sanctions and other forms of leverage used. Again, they are using asymmetric forms of leverage against democracies, and hostage-taking is one of them simply because they don't have any ethical barrier against doing so.

The warning signs are that there is a dispute in which they would consider that tool an effective way to accomplish their ends. Deterring it needs to be done by demonstrating costs and consequences for engaging in that behaviour. As long as they can get away with it and there is no cost imposed on them, they will continue to do so.

There are two ways, essentially, to deter: deterrence by denial, which we do by discouraging Canadian citizens from going to countries like Iran or North Korea, and deterrence through punishment and consequences. Unless they are imposed on the individuals perpetrating it and on the countries, they will continue doing it as long as costs are not imposed.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

That said, what training and protocol should Global Affairs Canada adopt immediately for Canadians travelling or working in high-risk jurisdictions to reduce vulnerability to arbitrary arrest and exit bans?

[Michael Kovrig]

Briefly, I think some of those are already expressed in our travel warnings for those countries, but there's a lot that could be done to make those travel warnings more obvious and apparent to anyone proposing to travel to such a country.

The first is denial. If there is a risk and the government does not want to incur the burden of having to rescue someone from a country like that, the easiest thing to do, first of all, is to not allow the situation to happen in the first place.

Even in a democratic open society, there are various ways to deter our own citizens from putting themselves at risk—for example, creating processes so that when you're buying plane tickets, let's say, you are obliged to register with the relevant embassy and also to go through some kind of checklist and travel preparation forms that oblige you to consider the risks to yourself and whether you really understand what you're doing in going to a place like that. It's going through a number of steps that would not only deter people from going to places where they're at risk but would also set up more protocols to ensure that if they are there, there are better means of trying to provide care and protection to them.

Another crucial one, frankly, would be creating a legal framework in which the government has a legal obligation to provide that consular assistance, rather than just a more generalized bureaucratic responsibility.

There are many others, but for the sake of brevity, I'll stop there.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Stivers, what has worked best in Washington to counter Chinese Communist Party coercion, sanctions, export controls, visa bans or coordinated statements, and how can Canada plug into those tools without hurting our own economy? If Beijing ignores allied pressure with regard to Jimmy Lai, what next-step measures should Canada champion at multilateral associations to raise real repercussion costs without isolating our allies?

[Jonathan N. Stivers]

First, I would say that the U.S. definitely needs to do a better job.

I think it's important that there are consequences. The Chinese government is like any other government. It's always weighing the consequences of its actions. When it knows that there might be something negative that would occur because of an action, it takes that into account.

Appeasement is dangerous. Showing weakness is dangerous. This is not some “tough guy” thing. This is how the Chinese Communist Party operates. It takes advantage when it sees weakness. When it knows that there will be a strong response—and I would argue that the United States has not taken strong enough responses—then it definitely calibrates its actions.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Thank you very much.

I really appreciate those remarks. Thank you so much for being here today.

[Jonathan N. Stivers]

If you have a few seconds—

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Sure.

[Jonathan N. Stivers]

—I would just say that the biggest fear of the Chinese government is that there is a multilateral effort—that it's not just Canada, that it's not just the United States and that it's not just the U.K., but that there's a multilateral response of all of these allies and partners saying the same thing and being on the same page. That is its worst fear diplomatically. It takes a lot of work for our countries to get together, but they should do so.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

I will go next to MP Bill Blair.

You have five minutes.

[Bill Blair, Liberal, Scarborough Southwest, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Again, thank you very much to all of our witnesses. All of your testimonies have been, quite frankly, quite compelling and informative.

I've actually had some direct relations and engagement with Chinese government officials. I find that in many of those conversations we démarche each other about all the things that are outrageous, but at the same time, it does not achieve an effective outcome in many respects.

I've reflected on the number of times, listed in our documents, that we have made this point to the Chinese government without the outcome that we seek. I think the advice that you're providing in all of your comments has been very helpful to this committee. I want to acknowledge that.

I also would like to ask some questions about our national security, the safety of our citizens and the implications of the extrajudicial application of, for example, the national security law and the activities that you've already mentioned, such as the Hong Kong trade offices that exist in some of our cities. In my experience, that can have a very chilling effect on Canadians, particularly Chinese Canadians, not only with regard to their activities here in this country but also with regard to their very legitimate and understandable concerns for their families at home. That chilling effect can take a number of different forms.

Perhaps you could offer some advice. I think it's useful for our government to be able to say that we are standing up not only for a champion of human rights and journalistic freedom but also for ourselves. We're standing up for our interests. Do you have any advice—I might start with you, Mr. Silver—on things that we should be doing in this country to protect our national security and our national interests against the threats that the extrajudicial application of those laws could represent to our people?

[Brandon Silver]

Thank you very much, MP Blair, for that very timely and important question.

As I referenced in my opening remarks, the perceived impunity surrounding the persecution and prosecution of Mr. Lai emboldened the Chinese Communist Party and authorities in Hong Kong to engage in that transnational repression and to issue bounties targeting Canadians on Canadian soil.

Mass domestic repression often morphs into external aggression. Mitigating that sense of impunity, ensuring justice and accountability, and marshalling public opprobrium, diplomatic efforts and coordination with allies can create that tipping point that Caoilfhionn so eloquently and aptly described. Whether it's the Hong Kong authorities or the Chinese Communist Party that controls them, they feel and understand that there are repercussions for these actions and that it is not worth the cost of pursuing them.

Again, some of these put Canada in a particularly unique position to lead. We are a founding member of the United Nations. We are a member of both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie. We are active in the OSCE. All of these forums provide platforms and opportunities to push back against this sort of transnational repression and to highlight the emblematic cases that could mitigate it, such as Mr. Lai's case.

Again, I think it's publicly, prominently and persistently raising these cases not only directly at a high level with the Chinese but multilaterally with our allies in every forum possible and where Canada is uniquely placed to do so.

[Jonathan N. Stivers]

Thank you. That's an excellent question.

I've negotiated with the Chinese government on a number of occasions on a lot of issues throughout Asia, and I will say the first thing is that we need strong leadership at the top of our countries in order to make change and have skilled diplomacy. The Chinese don't give in easily. There is no doubt about that.

There are ways to flip the script. One way, especially when we're talking about the case of Jimmy Lai, is to make expectations very clear: If there is a verdict that does not go well or there is a long sentence, then Canada will take these actions. You make that clear to them before it happens and then be ready, of course, to follow through with that.

The HKETOs are a great example. The Canadian government can say that they are under review now and if the Jimmy Lai case does not go well or he is not released, then we will start moving to close those down in response.

I think that changing the dynamic there to be on an active defence as opposed to always responding later to the Chinese will increase the chances of a better outcome.

[Michael Kovrig]

If I can just say briefly, to address your question about national security, this is a changed world where if we want to have greater interaction and economic opportunities with challenging states such as China, that needs to move in lockstep with security measures to protect our society and our national security.

That means things like raising the capacity. Canada is already engaging in a China capacity uplift at the federal government and provincial government levels. It needs to be across society, including local police, for example, to raise their understanding and capability of addressing transnational repression and those issues. We need to educate communities and the entire population about the nature of these challenges and how to address them at a whole-of-society level.

A specific measure that I think is critically important is a foreign agent registry, which I know this government is working on. That is a critical measure to ensure that greater contact and interaction with Chinese actors does not become undue political interference or influence.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We'll go next to MP Baldinelli for five minutes.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON]

Thank you to the witnesses for being with us this afternoon.

Sebastien, it is good to see you again.

Your father is recognized as a global leader in advancing democracy and freedom of the press. Sadly, for that he is being jailed. What is not widely known among Canadians, however, is that your father and your family have significant ties and connections to Canada and to Niagara, including my riding of Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake.

In fact, Niagara-on-the-Lake is widely known as one of the prettiest towns in all of Canada. A big reason for that prestigious reputation is because of the incredible and impactful investments your father has made in a number of our local hotels and accommodations through his companies, such as Vintage inns and Niagara's Finest. Those include the Pillar and Post, Prince of Wales, Queen's Landing, the Moffat Inn and Shaw Club, just to name a few. In total, there are eight hotels in Niagara-on-the-Lake.

Could you please share with us your family's story of coming to Canada and investing so much in our small town?