Foreign Affairs Committee on Sept. 23rd, 2025

[Ian Myles]

It's a difficult situation to summarize briefly, but, as I mentioned earlier, the origins of the gangs are that they are essentially private armies that were developed, working at the behest of and paid for by different members of the political and economic elite. When the government fell and there was this gap, what changed was that those different gangs, who normally had been fighting each other, formed an alliance to have a common enemy, both in the Haitian National Police and the multinational security support mission, and in the transitional authorities that are in place.

In April 2024, a negotiation was had, in this vacuum, to establish a transitional government with a mandate to restore security and prepare the ground for national elections by the end of their mandate in February. They have become the main focus of attention from these gangs, but, ultimately, our understanding is there's no political motivation whatsoever. It's essentially a criminal one, so the status quo is actually working quite well for the gangs, because they have almost full range to carry out extortion—

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

I appreciate what you're saying. I'm sorry for interrupting, but in the interest of time, when gangs subvert the legitimacy of a government and end up diverting billions in aid, at some point, new tools need to be used to confront them. We watch, in Washington, a lot of movement toward using the same instruments and tools to confront terrorism being applied to international crime. We know there is a human trafficking operation, from Haiti to Canada, of people who are abused horribly. Do you think it is time for us to bring new tools and focus to dismantling the gangs that have been denying the Haitian people their representation and legitimacy for well over a decade now?

[Mark Richardson]

As I alluded to in my opening remarks, we are at an inflection point. Just by the fact that the mandate of the MSSM comes to an end on October 2, we are at a point when we have to think about what the next step and successor to that mission will be.

In terms of the U.S. approach, they have announced both the gang suppression force—so a real focus on that element, as the member has noted—as well as putting in place logistical support to help support that.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you.

The economic elite, whom Mr. Myles described, was created by the aid diversion of the last decade. In many ways, people who have been profiting and maintaining their positions of power have done so at the behest of the gangs that supply them. I don't think that's an intelligence report issue. However, in my mind, has the international system, which has been focusing on Haiti for 10 years, failed? Is it not now time to start rethinking exactly how these violent groups can be confronted, using the same tools that we use to confront terrorism and international crime?

[Mark Richardson]

I think we all agree that we are at a point where the situation is horrible for Haitians on the ground. We need to be focused on solutions that seek to address the very real security and humanitarian crises they face, as well as on ensuring that we are advancing our national interests.

In terms of using the same tools that we use, or that the Americans use, to address terrorism, in this particular instance that's not something I'm able to comment on, as that has not been part of our discussions thus far. The focus really has been on trying to support this resolution and to put in place the gang suppression force and the UN support office.

I would note that the gang suppression force is meant to be quite a step up in terms of size and scale compared to the MSSM.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We'll now turn to Mr. Blair.

[Bill Blair, Liberal, Scarborough Southwest, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Richardson, we're aware that since 2022 the United Nations and then Canada, through its own autonomous sanctions regime, established certain regulations to create an arms embargo, a travel ban and asset forfeiture and seizure regimes, naming now, as you said, 34 individuals. I'm aware as well that in March of this year, by a Governor in Council order, the Government of Canada brought forward additional regulations naming additional individuals. At the time, it was stated that these “Additional sanctions...are necessary to exert immediate pressure on persons who, either directly or indirectly, engage in activities that undermine the peace, security and stability of Haiti, have participated in gross and systematic human rights violations...or are associated with someone who has committed such acts.”

I wonder if you're able to provide us with any update as to how these new regulations have perhaps created greater authority for the Government of Canada to deal with these criminal individuals.

[Mark Richardson]

On that specific question, I'll turn to my colleague, Ian Myles.

[Ian Myles]

Again, the use of sanctions by Canada is not done in a vacuum in the sense that an important part of it is trying to build critical momentum with others. The UN sanctions tend to be the most powerful ones, because, by law, they have to be implemented by all member states. Certainly, that's important to us. Some countries have their own autonomous sanctions regimes, so we work closely with them, notably the U.S. The European Union tends to be the mechanism for members of the European Union. We share information; we share our plans; and we speak in advance, to try to determine what will be the most effective way to implement the sanctions.

Enforcing them takes different shapes in different places, and it's not straightforward. One of the most powerful dimensions is making it harder for the people who have been sanctioned to move around or to move their resources around. In terms of the immediate impacts of those, we are aware, from the responses of those who have been sanctioned by Canada, that the complaints are about the impacts on their political careers as well as on their businesses. That, to me, tells us that the sanctions are having the desired impact.

The intention is at least to make initial steps at combatting impunity and making sure that, not just for gang leaders but also those who finance and support them and cause disruption in the country, there are going to be consequences for them and their families for carrying out those types of acts, holding their country's interests in contempt, essentially, in favour of their own personal interests.

[Bill Blair, Liberal, Scarborough Southwest, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Myles.

We are aware of the transitional presidential council and the work that it's undertaking. I think, ultimately, the goal would be to create a politically stable Haiti, with functional military police and with other social services in that country. I think it's a long way off. It's a multi-dimensional crisis, and we speak primarily about the humanitarian crisis and the security concerns. Ultimately, if we are going to be able to support democratic governance and institution building in Haiti beyond the immediate crisis, could you perhaps share with us a bit of what you see as Canada's role in helping to support the development of those supporting democratic governance and institution-building initiatives?

[Mark Richardson]

I would simply recognize that this is getting at the heart of the matter in terms of long-term efforts to try to improve the situation in Haiti.

In terms of the transitional presidential council itself, it is mandated to restore security and organized elections by February 2026.

Our view of its legitimacy will be based on the concrete actions that it takes in terms of restoring security, organizing credible elections, fighting corruption and delivering basic services. In terms of how we see that and how that fits into our specific programming, which is all wrapped up around that, I would defer to my colleague, Ian.

[Ian Myles]

Addressing the root issues is critical. We can't focus just on the short term. I think we have to have clear eyes to know that we won't overcome an entrenched culture of corruption overnight. The corruption happens at many different levels.

Part of the work we're doing now to increase the ability of relevant organizations to conduct investigations and then prosecute them is a key part of that, as is reinforcing the institutions that have those mandates. It's not easy to do. It's not an easy country in which to stick your head up in favour of transparency or justice.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you.

Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe, you have 2.5 minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We know many things, including that the main problem in Haiti is the safety of Haitians who are living under the yoke of gangs. We also know that Canada wants to play a leading role in Haiti through its foreign affairs strategy.

As you said earlier, there are proven ties between the gangs in Haiti and people present in Canada.

Knowing all that, shouldn't the Department of Foreign Affairs logically put in place a foreign affairs strategy to intervene in the situation in Haiti, more specifically as regards the ties between Haitian gangs and the people helping them from Canada?

Earlier, you told us that we had to turn to the RCMP, but if gangs are the problem, and if we want to play a role…. You understood my question.

[Ian Myles]

I can answer that question, Mr. Chair.

Since the beginning of the crisis, we've taken a “departmental” approach, shall we say. We work closely with the RCMP, the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence.

There are always RCMP members who work on the ground at our embassy as liaison officers. They work closely with us, but also with local police and security forces. They can't tell us about all the possible solutions they are following, but we are very aware that they are actively working on this.

Obviously, these officers aren't just interested in the problems in Haiti; they work on the ground precisely to find out and understand potential ties with Canada.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Do I have time for a quick question?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

You have 30 seconds.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Witnesses, I want to thank you for the clarifications you've provided us today.

I'll give you the opportunity to tell us first about what Ms. Anand is going to tell us this afternoon. Go ahead.

[Mark Richardson]

Mr. Chair, I would like to talk to you about it, but the truth is that I can't tell you exactly what the minister will say this afternoon during the meeting she will co-chair with her Haitian counterpart.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

Next we have MP Kramp-Neuman.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Thank you.

I'm following up on your comments suggesting that the efforts are focused on the resolution right now.

As we're aware, Canada is the second-largest contributor of cash to Haiti, after the U.S., of course. Is there coordination of efforts with the Americans?

[Mark Richardson]

We do coordinate our efforts closely with the Americans in terms of the international assistance we have been providing traditionally. As this resolution itself has been presented by them, we are coordinating our efforts with them in terms of trying to support its passage.

I would like to go back to something the member said. Our efforts are not focused solely on passing the resolution at this time. Obviously, our programming on the international assistance realm continues alongside.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Are we aware of why the U.S. excluded Canada in favour of Panama when they were developing and submitting their plan to the Security Council?

[Mark Richardson]

That's simply because we're not a member of the UN Security Council at this time.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Okay. That's fair.

I'll change lanes. Has the dynamic shifted between the gangs themselves? Is there still infighting, or has there been a cohesion of certain gangs? Is it all one or the other? Has there been coordination with any of the politicals or elites?