Mr. Chair, China's interest in this is the fundamental position on Taiwan, since the establishment of our diplomatic relations in 1970, via joint communiqué. That's when we established our one China policy. I think that's the important piece here.
It's very similar to the majority of countries around the world in terms of how they approach and engage with China. Basically, our one China policy “has recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, noting”—and this is the important part—“but not endorsing or challenging” the Chinese government’s position on Taiwan.
The Chinese government has a very clear position on Taiwan. We note it, as do a lot of—I'd say, most—countries in the world, but we haven't agreed to it. I guess I'd classify that as what we call strategic ambiguity. That has allowed us to maintain official relations with China and at the same time have unofficial relations with Taiwan. Our relations with Taiwan are deep across many areas. It allows us to basically agree to disagree.
The cases of the strait transits are another example of that. We'll disagree with positions. The major and colleagues here have talked about our view in terms of international waterways. The Chinese position is different. They will démarche us. They'll give their position, we'll give our position and we'll move on.
I think the most important thing to the Chinese now is that we.... They understand that we'll agree to disagree. They just want us to reaffirm our commitment to our one China policy—and we do that. We've been reaffirming our position since 1970. Then we move on and we're able to have relations with China and we're able to have unofficial relations with Taiwan.