Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 12th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 22 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, September 23, 2025, the committee is resuming its study of Canada's Arctic strategy.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders.

I'd like to now welcome the witnesses for our meeting today. From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have René Ouellette, director general, and Paul Lynd, assistant director.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions from colleagues.

I now invite Mr. Lynd to make an opening statement.

Welcome.

[Paul Lynd, Assistant Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Paul Lynd, and I am the assistant deputy minister responsible for intelligence collection at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS for short. I am responsible for the management and oversight of all regional collection activities and operational capabilities, both foreign and domestic. I am joined today by René Ouellette, director general of engagement.

CSIS investigates threats to the security of Canada in order to protect Canada's prosperity and national security and the safety of Canadians. Our work in the Arctic is guided by and informed through co-operation with federal, indigenous and territorial partners. The economic and strategic importance of the region has been steadily increasing, along with the diversity and tempo of threats to Canada's national security. Protecting Canada's Arctic sovereignty and security is more critical than ever to Canada's prosperity and national interests, as well as to North American, continental and maritime security.

Contemporary threats to the Arctic stem not only from growing militarization and the effects of climate change but also, increasingly, from espionage and foreign interference activities, including through cyber means. CSIS seeks to help enhance Canada's resilience against various threats in the region. Our mandate with respect to the Arctic includes but is not limited to investigating activities in the Arctic and the north that are suspected to be threats to the security of Canada, taking steps to mitigate or reduce these threats where possible, advising the government and partners in the region on these threats, and engaging with indigenous governments and organizations, the private sector and the public, among others.

Contacts and relationships built over time with Arctic communities and different orders of government have resulted in valuable threat-related information being shared proactively with CSIS. The unique insights and experiences that Arctic and northern partners bring to CSIS help us better understand the threat landscape as it relates to the region and its people.

As commercial and international interests in the Arctic grow, the number and diversity of threats to Canada's security and sovereignty in the region have also increased. CSIS has intensified its focus and efforts to investigate these threats. Canada's Arctic sovereignty is long-standing and well established. This includes the waters of Canada's Arctic Archipelago and the various waterways often referred to as the Northwest Passage, which are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title. Governments, indigenous people and local communities across Canada exercise Canada's enduring sovereignty over its Arctic lands, ice and waters every day.

CSIS is building on strong, trusted relationships with key partners within and outside the government, and with like-minded Arctic states, sharing information and coordinating efforts with respect to the Arctic. This includes providing relevant information to help inform decision-making, and to build and maintain resiliency against threats to the region. We have been sharing information on the threat landscape with territorial and indigenous governments and partner organizations across the Canadian Arctic and the north. We will continue to work closely with first nations, Inuit and Métis organizations and governments to support decision-making in relation to resource development on indigenous peoples' land. For example, we have provided multiple briefings on critical minerals, economic security and the activities of hostile foreign state actors to empower partners with relevant national security insights so these can be considered as part of decision-making processes.

Our engagement with indigenous partners is aligned with the commitment CSIS made in the action plan for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act: to share information with indigenous partners, and to support informed decision-making and self-determination.

As CSIS pursues its mandate in a complex, dynamic and challenging environment, it remains committed to doing so in a way that aligns with the government's Arctic and northern policy framework and Arctic foreign policy. As part of these efforts, CSIS maintains an evergreen internal Arctic and northern framework that aims to ensure a strategic and coordinated approach to CSIS's engagement in the Arctic and the north, underscoring our commitment to collaboration with government and indigenous partners, especially those who make their home in the region.

While CSIS was not involved in the 2019 FAAE study on the Arctic, we are glad to contribute to the new study and very much appreciate the invitation today.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much, Mr. Lynd, for your remarks.

I will now open the floor to questions, beginning with my colleague and member of Parliament Ziad Aboultaif.

You have six minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Lynd and Mr. Ouellette, for attending the committee today.

The Department of National Defence's October 2024 report, entitled “Evaluation of Arctic Operations”, found that there was no military threat to Canada's territorial sovereignty. However, we know that state actors, primarily Russia and China, are trying to gain a foothold in the Arctic.

China is known to use research vessels for scientific activities and espionage. How does CSIS monitor, evaluate and respond to these activities?

[Paul Lynd]

When it comes to threats to the security of Canada, particularly in relation to the Arctic, CSIS is focused on espionage, sabotage and foreign-influenced activities that are clandestine or deceptive. When it comes to the research vessels, the threat you mentioned is multi-faceted, so we use a number of methods and approaches to collect that information.

Our primary focus of engagement in the Arctic recently has been to try to build resiliency and co-operate with indigenous partners, territorial governments and local communities to forge those connections so they can be aware of all the threat-related information that we're aware of and, more importantly, so they have more visibility on these threats and activities and are in a position to inform us when they see something.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

How have Russia's operations, specifically in the circumpolar Arctic, developed over the past few years, especially since the invasion of Ukraine?

[Paul Lynd]

From a CSIS perspective, the activities of Russia are still a concern. Russia has a tremendous interest and focus in the Arctic. However, they are of less concern than, say, the activities of China and other hostile state actors at this time.

That's not to say they're not of concern. As you mentioned, since the invasion of Ukraine, there have been a number of international sanctions against Russia, which have limited their ability to be as effective in their intelligence collection activities as they were in the past.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Is that because of a previous understanding of our position as Canada in the Arctic and our interests versus Russia's, since, as we know, the Chinese do not own any part of the Arctic? Could the differences in the situation with Russia compared to China be due to a previous understanding or agreement of some kind, let's say, between Canada and Russia on the Arctic?

[Paul Lynd]

I'm not sure if I understand the question completely, but what I would say in response is that the concern with Russia is more of a military-focused threat in terms of intelligence collection to support military efforts as opposed to other hostile state actors, where the concern would be more about economic security.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

The sovereignty of Canada's Arctic waters is of paramount importance. What attempts have been made by ships affiliated with China, Russia and other countries to enter Canadian waters illegally, and how have we responded?

[Paul Lynd]

That question might be better answered by other government departments, such as National Defence.

From a CSIS perspective, we are focused on espionage, sabotage and foreign interference activities as they relate to the Arctic. The tracking of ships would be one element of that, but it wouldn't be the primary focus or element from a CSIS perspective.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

I agree with part of your answer, but in the meantime, how do you measure your activities when it comes to changes in operations and circumstances, such as the development in the last few years where we have started to see and feel that the threat to the Arctic from Russia and China is larger than ever?

How does CSIS react to such a thing? Are you prepared enough to cover the areas and the information needed so we are well aware?

[Paul Lynd]

I would say that the vast size of the landscape is absolutely a challenge, which I believe is what you are alluding to as well.

CSIS is regularly travelling to the region. We are regularly collecting information on threats to the security of Canada. We are regularly conducting investigations in the Arctic and outside of the Arctic, because not all threats to the Arctic need to be investigated within the Arctic. I would say that the service is regularly engaged on these threats and is regularly collecting.

Part of your question was, how do we evaluate and measure our success? I would say that one of our primary focuses over the last couple of years has been this enhanced engagement. Our legislation changed about two years ago, which now allows us to share more information more widely with partners, and not just with federal government partners but with territorial governments, local communities and indigenous partners.

There are two objectives to that. One is to make sure these partners have all the relevant threat-related information that we're aware of so they can build resiliency and protect themselves against the threat, but it's also so that they can be our eyes and ears as well and can provide us with that information. One way of measuring our success is that we have had these partners proactively contact us with information of concern about the behaviour and activities of threat-related actors, so I would say there's a positive development right there.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

The United States is a partner in that fashion. What does the degree of collaboration with the United States look like now when compared to before President Trump took over a year ago?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Please provide a very brief response, if possible, because we've just run out of time.

[Paul Lynd]

You're correct that the United States is still a partner. We have been partners for decades. Despite some of the unpredictable behaviour, I'd say, at the political level at this time, at the intelligence department level we still work in lockstep and hand in hand with each other, and it's in our interests to continue to do so, on both sides.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

Next is MP Steven Guilbeault.

You have six minutes.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Mr. Lynd and Mr. Ouellette. We're very pleased to have you here.

Mr. Lynd, in your presentation, you said that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service did not participate in the committee's study in 2019. You're part of it now.

You touched on this a bit, but I would like you to tell us a little more about the changes in the threats observed in the Arctic in recent years, and particularly in recent months.

[Paul Lynd]

Thank you. I believe the changes since the 2019 study are the focus of your question.

I would say that now our primary concern about the threat in the Arctic falls under economic security. It's about foreign interference in our economic sector. It's attempted manipulation, in a clandestine or deceptive nature, of our economic policies and attempts to disrupt, interfere with or control our economic decision-making. This is where we've seen an increase in at least our concern, and the threat-related activity would be from an economic security perspective.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Earlier, in a response to questions from Mr. Aboultaif, you referred to collaboration with other federal government departments, including the Department of National Defence. You didn't mention Natural Resources Canada, but I think you referred to it without naming it.

Can you elaborate on the type of collaboration our intelligence services have with various federal government departments on intelligence and security matters?

[Paul Lynd]

Absolutely. Thank you for the question.

We take an all-of-government approach to protecting the Arctic. We are engaging with a number of other government departments—all of the government departments that are operating in the region as well—in order to share the threat-related information I mentioned earlier. We're trying to build resiliency in the local communities, but to also share our awareness and understanding of the threat with as many of our federal partners as possible and look for ways to both support and amplify each other's mandates.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

You also mentioned several times the collaboration with industry, indigenous communities and local governments. Without going into details that are confidential, can you give us an example of how this collaboration with these various entities works? I'm thinking in particular of stewards and conservationists, the rangers, who occupy the territory where it's more difficult for us to do so. Can you give us some examples of that collaboration?

[Paul Lynd]

Some examples would include sharing with those that operate critical infrastructure in the north and the Arctic. It's about ensuring that they have an awareness of the threats, the ways they can protect themselves and the ways they can be more resilient against those threats, and also ensuring that those pathways of communication are open and strong so they can report back their concerns and their insights as well.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

That means, for example, that they can communicate with you and that you will also communicate with them at certain times when you determine that there is a potential threat.

[Paul Lynd]

Effectively, yes. We have a pathway for communication. From our perspective, it's to make sure that they're aware of the threats being directed against them and to help provide advice or awareness so that they can better protect themselves and mitigate those threats.