Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 12th, 2026

[Paul Lynd]

As I mentioned before, one of CSIS's roles is providing advice to government on all the economic security considerations, so that government can make the best-informed decision possible. On mitigating risk, you get down to the level where you have residual risk and decide whether you can accept it or need to further mitigate. This is a decision more for government decision-makers.

What the service does is investigate, provide advice on the threat and the activity, and allow government to use that information to make the best decision possible about the way forward.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

We touched on critical minerals. We know that there's an abundance of them in the Arctic. In your opinion, is this currently the main target not only for China, but also for any hostile state seeking to undermine the security of the Arctic territory, which is under Canadian sovereignty?

[Paul Lynd]

I would say that it's an important factor for us to consider and keep in mind in terms of Canada's Arctic security. We need investment. I'm sure this committee has heard a lot about the infrastructure up there and the desire for investment.

From a CSIS perspective, again, we conduct investigations, identify threats, advise government and allow decision-makers to use that information to make the best decision for the way forward.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

I will go next to MP Kramp-Neuman.

You have five minutes.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

In earlier testimony, you mentioned that Russia is not as much of a military threat as other actors.

Aside from China, who are those other actors?

[Paul Lynd]

Unfortunately, I'm not able to get into specifics.

I don't want to leave the impression that Russia is not a threat. I will just say that the concern about Russia is from more of a military perspective than an economic one.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Okay.

I'll draw on my recent visit to Greenland, my many conversations with Arctic partners and my experience with the Joint Arctic Command centre: I'm curious as to whether CSIS is concerned about and aware of the message that working with authoritarian regimes like China, the U.A.E. and Qatar sends to our security partners, particularly our Five Eyes allies.

How could that perception affect intelligence sharing, trust and co-operation?

[Paul Lynd]

We work very closely with a number of international partners. We have robust information-sharing policies that respect all of our international obligations.

From an intelligence perspective, our focus still remains on threats to the security of Canada, and this is how we engage other partners. We have not run into any issues or concerns in terms of those engagements with foreign allies on any of our intelligence matters.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Thank you.

Are Canada's Arctic early warning systems fully modernized?

[Paul Lynd]

I'm sorry. I don't believe I'm the best-placed person to answer that question.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Okay.

Do you believe Canada's current Arctic strategy achieves deterrence of Chinese and Russian ambitions?

[Paul Lynd]

From a CSIS perspective, again, I would say that all of our activities are completely aligned with the Arctic foreign policy and Arctic strategy.

As per the intentions and effects of the Arctic strategy, I don't believe CSIS is best placed to answer that question.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Okay.

Was CSIS consulted at all, specifically on the security risks of closer economic integration with authoritarian regimes, prior to any agreements made with China?

[Paul Lynd]

One of CSIS's roles is to provide security advice to government, so it would be natural to do so. I'm not informed on that specific question. I'm unable to give you a proper, informed response.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Okay. Thank you.

Is there a danger of authoritarian regimes like China using current public sentiment toward the trade dispute with the United States to whitewash their public image?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I would encourage the member to focus her questions on the Arctic, because broader trade relations and the public image of a particular country is not what we're looking at today.

Let's get back to it.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Okay. I was drawing into the economic security.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I gave you some leeway. Sure. Go ahead.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Okay. Thank you.

Could you please speak to the actions that you think, or CSIS thinks, the Canadian government can take specifically to protect our economic sovereignty in the north?

[Paul Lynd]

CSIS's contribution to this, as I mentioned before, is that we investigate threats to the security of Canada: espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. We take the findings from those investigations and provide that information to government, but also to territorial governments, municipal governments and local partners.

What CSIS is doing to protect and contribute to the sovereignty is exactly that. It's the resiliency. It's sharing this information more widely than we've done in the past and building and fostering that trust and helping to build resiliency in the Arctic communities.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Are there any further protections, plans or processes currently in place to mitigate any threats that closer economic integration with China may present?

[Paul Lynd]

Well, CSIS will continue to investigate these threats where they surface. Part of our act allows us to undertake threat reduction activities and mitigate the threats where appropriate and where possible, and the service will continue to do so. We'll continue to share the information on these threats with local communities and territorial governments, which will help to contribute to mitigating the threat.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

In earlier testimony, you spoke about IP theft. There were questions about economic espionage and infiltration by agents of governments and commercial institutions. Can you speak further to that? How do Beijing and Moscow pose these threats to Canada outside of straight military threats? Can you expand on that?

[Paul Lynd]

Yes. It's multi-faceted. They pose these threats in a number of ways.

Foreign interference is a good example. It's an attempt that could be manipulating public opinion or manipulating people who aspire to higher office through coercion as well, through covert financing. From an economic security perspective, it's also investing using proxies or using disinformation or economic coercion. As long as there's a clandestine and deceptive nature to it, it would trigger under our mandate and allow us to investigate.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Thank you.