Foreign Affairs Committee on March 12th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Colleagues, I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 26 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on February 12, 2026, the committee is meeting on the situation in Venezuela.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I've spoken about the logistics around this, so I'll skip that.

For the benefit of witnesses and members, please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking.

For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your microphone, and please mute yourself when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses. We have, as an individual, Daniel Di Martino, fellow, Manhattan Institute, who is joining us today by video conference; and Dr. Robert Johnston, director of energy and natural resources policy, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, by video conference. We have, from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Kristin Halvorsen, acting representative in Venezuela, by video conference; and from the International Crisis Group, Elizabeth Dickinson, deputy director, Latin America, by video conference.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for their availability and flexibility.

Earlier today, a decision was made to bring all the witnesses together in a single panel for the full two hours of the meeting, but we understand that some of you may need to leave before the end of the meeting due to prior commitments—for example, Dr. Johnston around 4:30 p.m. and Ms. Dickinson around 4:45 p.m. I also understand that there is consensus among colleagues that we'll probably proceed for up to an hour and a half, as opposed to the full two hours.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions from members of the committee.

I now invite Ms. Halvorsen to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

[Kristin Halvorsen, Acting Representative in Venezuela, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]

Thank you.

I would like to start by saying that UNHCR has worked in Venezuela for more than 35 years, earning the trust of communities and accompanying them through major shifts in the country's recent history. Venezuela has long been a host country for refugees and migrants. Currently, a significant number of individuals are returning with the intention of reintegrating. This trend requires tailored support.

Throughout these changes, UNHCR has continued working directly with people on the move and with communities that are exposed to protection risks. The office supports access to essential services and strengthens community coping capacities, complementing the efforts of local authorities. Through community-based approaches, UNHCR works with communities and stakeholders to identify barriers, promote inclusion and facilitate referral to state services.

In this dialogue with the committee, UNHCR would like to present needs and risks. Current dynamics are marked by contrasts. Communities continue to face ongoing socio-economic constraints. This influences their access to health care, education, documentation and social programs, even as some areas experience economic recovery. Other challenges include situations described as pressure or restrictive practices by various groups. Youth, small traders and those without documentation are particularly affected. Community structures also identify a high demand for psychosocial support, and 93% refer to this as a priority need in their community.

Despite these pressures, the situation remains relatively calm. No major new outward movements have been observed. Monitoring instead shows a steady trend of returns, internal relocations and short-term cross-border mobility. In 2025-26, 59% of monitored individuals were returning to Venezuela and 41% were departing.

The returnees that UNHCR engages with in Venezuela express a combination of hope and caution regarding their reintegration process. The drivers of return include family reunification, reduced opportunities and integration barriers in their host countries. There are also expectations of improving conditions in Venezuela. Although most returnees wish to remain in the country, they do encounter some challenges, especially in areas that have been very much affected by issues of mobility.

Returns are an area where UNHCR seeks to collaborate with states and support the initiatives of the government, in line with its mandate. The organization is preparing to support voluntary returns from host countries, as well as reception and reintegration inside of Venezuela. At the same time, it should be noted that many Venezuelans abroad are likely to remain in their country of asylum or host country. Therefore, it will be necessary to support regularization, residency pathways, naturalization and access to national protection systems. The regional efforts for protection assistance and integration are supported through the regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, or R4V. This initiative is co-led by IOM and UNHCR.

Overall, Venezuela's protection environment continues to be influenced by diverse overlapping dynamics. UNHCR's response prioritizes protection services, legal assistance and strengthened referral pathways. This is done through multiservice spaces in key locations. UNHCR stands ready to scale up activities as part of a state-led response.

Finally, in this context, UNHCR deeply appreciates the long-standing support of the Government of Canada and members of Parliament from all parties who have consistently advocated for meeting the humanitarian needs of Venezuelans. Continued Canadian humanitarian leadership remains vital. UNHCR recognizes Canada's critical role as a donor in sustaining protection assistance and integration efforts for Venezuelans throughout the region, and possibly for the reception and reintegration of those who want to return to the country. Therefore, UNHCR encourages Canada to maintain and, wherever possible, expand its support.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

I now invite Ms. Dickinson to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

[Elizabeth Dickinson, Deputy Director, Latin America, International Crisis Group]

Thank you very much for the invitation, and good afternoon from Bogotá. I am the deputy director for Latin America here at International Crisis Group, a field-based organization focusing on investigations into conflict and armed violence. I would like to focus my comments specifically on risks in that regard in Venezuela going forward in the months ahead.

I want to start with a message that I hope I can leave you with here today: Essentially, what has happened since January 3 is a pivot in the existing regime in Venezuela toward U.S. alignment without changing the fundamentals of the system behind it. Interestingly, there have been, for example, no apparent fractures in the security apparatus. It has so far avoided some of the risks many of us feared in terms of a regime change situation leading to devastating instability and conflict. However, there is still a fundamental conflict at the heart of the situation in Venezuela between the government and other sectors of civil society. This political space will have to be resolved in order to move towards a transition, ultimately through much-needed security sector reform.

I want to focus now, in particular, on one of the specific security threats we see as a possible challenge going forward. This has to do with the presence of armed criminal groups throughout Venezuela, particularly in the extractive sectors—for example, the control and utilization of the mining sector for illicit enrichment. Here, I will speak specifically about the Colombian insurgent group National Liberation Army, also known as ELN, which for some time now, really up to a decade, has been establishing a very significant presence on both sides of the Colombia-Venezuela border.

We understand today that ELN's fighters may have up to half of their capacity in Venezuela. Prior to the January 3 operation, the ELN enjoyed a bit of political cover from Caracas. It was, essentially, a “live and let live” relationship in which the presence of both supported each other. This meant that the ELN enjoyed safe haven in Venezuela and the capability to arm offensive operations against the Colombian state.

It also had access to key illicit income through, for example, the trafficking of not only drugs but also legal products, as well as the exploitation of mines. Those relationships with the Venezuelan government were fundamental to facilitating that business at a high level and, more importantly, at a lower level, where security forces from the Venezuelan state were complicit and enriched themselves through payments from an illicit economy as products moved through Venezuelan territory.

Let me talk specifically about those dynamics. The ELN has positioned itself as the de facto control authority, particularly in rural and southern communities in Venezuela and the Amazonas state, and in the mineral arc that is home to not only gold deposits but also rare earth minerals.

In this context, the ELN employs a number of human rights violations, like forced labour, including of children, and exercises quite brutal control over communities in mining areas. This also contributes to significant environmental damage—for example, through the use of mercury to extract gold. A key facilitating factor of the ELN's ability to operate in mining areas and benefit from them is the complicity of Venezuelan security forces, whose members receive a percentage of the income extracted from these industries.

I think a question for all of us is how, and if, this will change in the new, current political context. What we have seen so far are a few things.

First of all, potentially, there could be a repositioning at a high level. The relationships that existed between Caracas and criminal groups, including the ELN, may start to see a decoupling, primarily because of the risks the armed groups see in terms of the relationship between Washington and Caracas.

At a low level, the dynamics are likely to continue for some time in a sort of “business as usual” way. Here I want to make a key point: It is fundamental for the cohesion of the security forces that this illicit income continues to flow. One of the reasons I believe we have not seen fractures in the security forces is that the illicit income continues to grease the wheels of this chain of command, incentivizing members of the security forces to remain in their positions and benefit from the illicit income still happening.

The ELN and other armed criminal groups will, I think, try to carve out their interests strategically in Venezuela. In the case of the ELN, we can expect this to involve three geographic areas.

The first is the border between Colombia and Venezuela, which is for them a fundamental trafficking corridor and safe haven.

The second is the mining areas in the mineral arc, which could pose a challenge, particularly if there are western interests in entering the mining sector there.

The third is potentially in the southern areas of the Venezuelan Amazon, where armed and criminal groups are increasingly seeking refuge.

The last point I want to make is that I think the operation in January is likely to radicalize these organizations, empower their recruiting potential by drawing on narratives of anti-imperialism and limit the possibilities for peace negotiations in the short term.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your remarks.

I now invite Dr. Robert Johnston to make an opening statement.

[Robert Johnston, Director of Energy and Natural Resources Policy, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in the hearing this afternoon.

I'm pleased to represent the University of Calgary School of Public Policy and the Haskayne School of Business. I have 25 years of experience as an analyst of global energy geopolitics at Eurasia Group and at the Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy. Venezuelan energy has been a consistent area of focus throughout this time.

My perspective and expertise focus on the energy market, particularly the oil market and the refined petroleum products market, which are very significant factors in the outlook for Venezuela. I would like to make three points in my opening comments today.

The first point is that Venezuela's oil sector recovery is very closely linked to global oil market conditions. This involves the overall level of spending across all oil and gas investment and where Venezuela sits from a competitiveness perspective versus other upstream opportunities around the world, including Canada, the U.S. and elsewhere. This is important because the Venezuelan government and its national oil company lack the financial and technical resources that countries like Saudi Arabia or Norway have to develop their own resources directly without reliance on international investors.

Despite the current situation with high oil prices and uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz, overall, the upstream oil and gas investment is much weaker now than it was 25 years ago during the high-water period of Venezuelan oil production around the time the Hugo Chávez government took office. Industry's appetite for frontier-type, high-risk investments is much lower, and there's a preference for U.S. shale and other projects like the oil sands and deep water that are a bit lower-risk. This reduces the possibility that Venezuela will be able to increase its production from the current one million barrels a day or so up to the 3.5 million barrels a day level that it had in the late 1990s.

The second major point is that the private sector and capital markets are not the only factor here. There's also the question of the U.S. government's commitment to rebuilding Venezuela's oil sector, which is linked closely not just to a strategy for Venezuela but to its larger national security strategy towards the western hemisphere. The point is that Venezuela's oil sector recovery is unlikely to be left to the free market alone. The Trump administration will likely provide risk guarantees, low-cost capital and even some form of physical security to oil companies re-entering Venezuela. Whether that's enough to trigger new foreign investment remains to be seen.

The Trump administration likely views Venezuela as a long-term oil resource for U.S. markets. They will also see oil as the key to consolidating a new U.S.-friendly successor government to Maduro. They certainly want to avoid a scenario where Russia and China regain influence or, as other experts have discussed here, the country descends into some kind of unrest due to a lack of basic services. Oil is a factor that can help mitigate all those risks from a U.S. perspective.

Notwithstanding geopolitical entanglements in other parts of the world, the Trump administration will try to deliver the necessary conditions for an oil recovery in Venezuela—capital, security, labour, materials—and, importantly, try to create a stable, recognized government that can both implement and uphold the rule of law around petroleum. It's a very tall order overall, but one that Canada should watch closely.

Lastly, for Canada specifically, a potential uplift in Venezuelan production is significant. An additional 500,000 to one million barrels a day of oil production from Venezuela would change the prices we receive for our oil on the U.S. gulf coast. It would also change the business case for a project like Keystone XL, which would build deeper links between Alberta and the U.S. gulf coast. It would not eliminate the case for that project entirely, but it would change the economics.

At the same time, a reduced flow of Venezuelan barrels to Asia would also increase demand in that market for Canadian heavy oil, and that would be further exacerbated by disruptions in heavy oil from countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq right now. As such, efforts by the provincial and federal governments to pursue additional west coast pipeline and export capacity appear well founded.

Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thanks for your remarks.

We'll next go to Mr. Di Martino for his opening statement.

[Daniel Di Martino, Fellow, Manhattan Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members, for the invitation to appear before your committee.

My name is Daniel Di Martino. I was born in Venezuela in 1999, the same year that Hugo Chávez came to power. I left Venezuela in 2016 for the United States, where I now work as a fellow at the Manhattan Institute. I am also a Ph.D. candidate in economics at Columbia University.

Venezuela's crisis was caused by an ideological project: the destruction of economic liberty, private property, and democratic institutions brought about by socialism. That project began when Hugo Chávez took office in 1999. He promised dignity for the poor and sovereignty for our nation by redistributing wealth from the rich and the oil industry. To do this, he concentrated power in the executive branch and the federal government. He imposed price controls and nationalized private companies, large and small, from farms to banks to manufacturing. He took over the central bank to expand the money supply and finance his excessive welfare programs. Under Chávez and his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the state expanded by hiring hundreds of thousands of additional public workers, pulling them out of the private economy and making more people dependent on the state, which was the goal.

When their popularity sank, the elections were rigged. Democratic socialism was voted into power but could not be voted out of power. These socialist policies caused hyperinflation, shortages, crime, blackouts and water shortages, things that I experienced myself. Now, nearly nine million Venezuelans have left the country. This is the largest refugee crisis on the planet. It's larger than Syria's or Ukraine's, and it's the largest peacetime refugee crisis in human history. Socialism forced more people to flee than most wars in human history.

Venezuela, though, was not destined to fail but to succeed. It was, for much of the 20th century, a country of immigrants and opportunity, with freedom and the largest oil reserves in the world. My own grandparents went there from Europe in 1956 because Venezuela had freedom and opportunity with upward mobility. That history is one reason the Venezuelan tragedy is so important to us. It was not a desperate and uneducated failed state; it was a functioning society dismantled by socialism.

When the regime destroyed the oil industry, it turned to the sure source of revenue of every criminal: drug trafficking. Now Venezuela is not just a socialist regime but a narco-regime that finances its client structure to keep power through drug trafficking and other illicit activities. After the rigged 2024 presidential election, my friend María Oropeza, who was scheduled to appear at this committee, was unjustly imprisoned for 18 months in a torture centre, only to be released this year thanks to the U.S. arrest of Nicolás Maduro.

This is just one of the many reasons I strongly supported President Donald Trump's January 3 military law enforcement operation that led to the arrest of Nicolás Maduro. This was not just a lawful operation; it was a just one. Maduro was not a head of state presiding over a legitimate order, and the Canadian government didn't recognize him either. He was the head of a narco regime that destroyed Venezuela's democracy and turned it into a source of drugs for Europe, Canada and the United States and into an ally of the enemies of freedom, including China, Russia and Iran. Most Venezuelans, according to all credible polls, supported the U.S. intervention, are hopeful for the future and want the rest of the regime out of power.

Several positive things have happened since Maduro's removal. First, the regime's aura of permanence has been shattered. For years, Venezuelans were told that this could never end. With force, it did. That psychological barrier was broken. Second, political prisoners have begun to be released. Though the process is incomplete, it is ongoing. Third, there is increased media freedom, with private channels, such as Venevision, airing criticism of the regime and praise for the United States. Finally, the economy is improving, thanks to the renewed interest of foreign investors brought about by the deregulation and privatization that the Trump administration is forcing on the remnants of the regime.

I want to finish by saying that there are still risks. The first and most important risk is that the regime survives without Maduro. Their goal is to lengthen the transition enough to outlast the Trump administration in the United States. This is because they know that only this American president is willing to use force against them. That is why I encourage you, as Canada's government, to insist on full political liberalization and on preparations for free general elections, as well as on the release of all political prisoners. You should even try to be observers in those elections.

I want to finish by thanking you and letting you know that Venezuela is a warning to all free nations that socialism can be voted in but not voted out. I pray that once Venezuela becomes a free country again and is a beacon of freedom, countries like Canada and Venezuela can prosper through trade and exchange together.

Thank you so much. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you for your remarks.

I will now open the floor for questions, beginning with MP Michael Chong.

You have six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

My first question concerns the democratic...the transition, I should say. As we understand it, the U.S. administration is looking at eventually a three-part plan, the third of which is a transition to democracy. What are your views on the role that Mr. González and Ms. Machado should play in that democratic transition?

Why don't we start with Ms. Halvorsen?

[Kristin Halvorsen]

As I am here representing UNHCR, which is a humanitarian organization, and we are both humanitarian and apolitical—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

That's fine. I understand.

[Kristin Halvorsen]

—I would rather not comment on this and would invite the rest of the panel to.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you.

Would the other panellists care to comment, if they can?

[Daniel Di Martino]

I would be happy to comment.

Look, María Corina Machado is indisputably a great woman, an admired leader and somebody I support. If there were elections today, as a Venezuelan I would vote for her.

I think that's her role. The role should be that we should make preparations for a free election. That's going to take time, because it turns out that most of the country is not even registered to vote. The voter rolls are all tainted. All that preparation needs to happen. I think she should run for president, and I think she would win in a landslide. That's the role.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I appreciate that answer.

Do either of the two of you have a view on this?

Go ahead, Ms. Dickinson.

[Elizabeth Dickinson]

One of the fundamental issues that would be necessary for securing the conditions for a transition is the political dialogue, really, between the government and all sectors of the opposition and civil society. We are very concerned that a rapid transition to democracy or a rapid-fire shift from one ruling regime to another could really destabilize the system and unravel the stability of the country in a way that would undermine democracy going forward.

Our view is that we need to begin with dialogue to establish the conditions for what it would look like to have a transition. For example, as to the members of the security forces who are implicated in human rights violations, how would we eliminate those individuals and give them a chance to be investigated fairly and also provide witnesses and testimony of their own crimes in a way that would allow the institutions to persist while a transition would be taking place?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you. I appreciate that.

Dr. Johnston, do you have any view on this?

[Robert Johnston]

I would agree with Elizabeth. I think she summed it up very well. Rapid transition has gone off the rails in other countries, so it's worth watching here.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I have a question, Dr. Johnston, for you specifically.

In our last meeting, we were talking about whether or not Canadian expertise could be used to help Venezuela rebuild its oil industry, and there's the whole issue of the sanctions that are presently in place, which make it impossible for some people to work with other people in Venezuela.

I want to ask you more broadly about something else that came up about geopolitics. You mentioned that one of the consequences of the U.S. action in Venezuela is that it likely will diminish the price that Canadian oil exporters get on the southern gulf coast of the United States, but it will mean increased demand from the west coast because of Chinese demand. Could you elaborate a bit more on how that dynamic might play out?

[Robert Johnston]

Sure. As you can imagine, many variables go into that assessment. Starting with the gulf coast, right now we would expect maybe up to 500,000 or 600,000 barrels a day of supply that used to go to China to start showing up more consistently in the U.S. That would be larger than the amount of Canadian oil that currently goes to the gulf coast, as opposed to the Midwest. It's not that we'd lose market share. It's just that prices might weaken a bit for Canada in that scenario.

In a high case for Venezuela, there's a risk that we could lose market share on the gulf coast and that our barrels would need to go to other markets, such as Asia. On the Asian side, the events in Venezuela and the events in Iran certainly reinforce appetite for oil diversity and market hedging in the Asian markets, particularly in China, India and Korea, because those are the three countries that have heavy conversion refineries—similar to what exists on the U.S. gulf coast—that can process Canadian heavy oil or Venezuelan heavy oil. All three countries have fairly strong demand growth, particularly China and India.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I have a quick question for you, as I have little time left.

If Chinese demand for Canadian oil increases substantially over the coming years, would that give us net leverage in our relationship with the People's Republic of China, or would it expose us to net vulnerabilities?

[Robert Johnston]

I think both sides, China and Canada, would have a strong incentive to maintain diversification. We would not want to replace our current dependence on the U.S. with new dependence on China. Similarly, the Chinese would not want to become overly dependent on Canada in the case that there was some disruption with the U.S. However, that still leaves plenty of room for us to send them, say, half a million barrels a day in the context of a market where they consume 16 million barrels and we produce five million barrels.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We will go next to MP Mona Fortier.

You have six minutes.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you all for coming today to our committee.

My questions will mostly be for Kristin Halvorsen, as the representative for the UNHCR.

I want to start by saying that I am pretty impressed by the work you've been doing, and the wealth of experience and expertise you have that I believe you can bring to the committee.

I'm going to go with different questions. Feel free to answer if you can.

Have you noticed a difference in migration patterns since the U.S. intervention?