Good afternoon, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen of the committee.
It is a great honour to appear before you to present my views on this thorny question of the transition in Syria. I will be brief. I will then be ready for discussion, on the heels of the valuable presentations of my two colleagues.
Above all, I have to say that the Islamic government, which took the place of the Bashar al‑Assad regime, is redoubling its efforts internationally to help the country out of deep isolation. The overall climate is less oppressive in Damascus today, and civil society is relatively active.
However, the political transition in Syria is experiencing serious setbacks. We could mention the hasty and not-at-all transparent process of national dialogue and of the elections that were held in 2025. The process did not meet expectations. The need for internal political dialogue sustained over time must be emphasized, as must the implementation of transitional justice, without which the rule of law cannot take root in a state. The Syrian economy must be further improved, given that it is still degraded. Social conditions cannot be forgotten, especially the conditions faced by the more vulnerable and the internally displaced. The country is in need of major rebuilding. Most in need of rebuilding are its people. Syrians' confidence needs to be restored.
Syria is a social and ethnic mosaic, a country of distinctiveness. Unfortunately, after the regime with roots in al‑Qaeda came to power—they were previously linked to the terrorist group al‑Qaeda—there were terrible incidents of murder in the Sahel and massacres of Alawites in March 2025. Between May and July 2025, there were also deadly confrontations in Damascus province and in the south. Another community, the Druze, was hugely targeted in those confrontations. We also must not forget the executions of Christians that are still being carried out, the attacks against the Kurds, the continuing acts of foreign interference—principally from Turkey and from Israel in the other direction—or the extremist practices of the authorities targeting moderate and secular citizens. All this to demonstrate the fragility and flaws of the transition in Syria.
Building an inclusive Syrian identity will require concerted efforts from the provisional Syrian government, from civil society and from international players. The new transitional power, basically dominated by the interim president, Ahmed al‑Sharaa, is under the control of the HTS, the Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham, which has its roots in al‑Nusra and al‑Qaeda. The HTS is behaving as if it is the only party in Syria and has infiltrated the state as it rebuilds. In addition, corruption continues to gnaw at the entire Syrian system in a number of ways. Imposing a single narrative on Syrians seems impossible to us because it's a country of various components and origins. The solution we seek is a state under the rule of law, a state with institutions. Given that it is not a secular society, a viable approach to the primacy of its citizens seems to be through partisan participation in religious and ethnic organizations.
In addition, a process of democratization in sequential, well-defined steps is needed. In order to preserve Syria's national unity and regional integrity, a federal system, a confederation, if you will, must be built.
Finally, international commitment to the success of the transition in Syria should have as a priority the protection of all the facets of Syrian society, human rights in general and women's rights in particular.
Canada has welcomed a major Syrian diaspora and many refugees. It has a clear, respected position in that part of the world. It could play a role in supporting civil society, in protecting Syrian minorities and in the country's evolution.
Thank you.