Mr. Chair, honourable members, thank you for the invitation to contribute to your review of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.
I will be giving my introductory remarks in English. I would be pleased to answer your questions in French or English.
My central message this afternoon is straightforward. The global geopolitical context has evolved significantly since the strategy's launch in 2022. Today, the resilience of Canada's economy more than ever depends on its ability to reduce overreliance on major economic powers, especially China and the United States, through deliberate and strategic trade diversification. The Indo-Pacific strategy can be a powerful vehicle to help achieve this objective, but it must be deployed more deliberately and more assertively as an instrument of economic statecraft.
Let me be clear. This is not to diminish the strategy's early achievements. Over the past four years, Canada has meaningfully strengthened its trade and investment presence in the world's most dynamic economic region through an expanded diplomatic footprint, new trade agreements and deeper political engagements.
Notwithstanding these gains, the strategy would benefit from a sharper and more disciplined articulation of the national-interest outcomes it seeks to achieve—one that is more tightly aligned with Canada's trade diversification strategy and broader economic security priorities. In my view, advancing this perspective requires three fundamental shifts in thinking.
First, we need to go from export expansion to value chain positioning. Rather than treating export growth to the Indo-Pacific as an end in itself, the strategy should focus on securing more resilient and strategically anchored positions within global value chains. The objective is not simply to export more, but to reduce Canada's critical dependencies on both the import and the export side. This shift requires asking more targeted questions: Which trade dependencies expose Canada to the greatest economic security risks, and how can a more focused Indo-Pacific engagement help build resilient value chain positions?
The second shift is from broad-based engagement to sector-selective focus. Rather than engaging equally across all industries, the strategy should prioritize sectors that are central to Canada's economic security. Not all sectors carry the same economic security risks. Industries such as defence, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors are far more exposed to disruption and coercion than non-strategic sectors like Christmas lights, and they therefore require more coordinated state intervention. This implies a more selective industrial policy posture in the Indo-Pacific strategy and raises two questions: Which sectors should Canada designate as strategic, and how can Indo-Pacific engagement be leveraged to reinforce domestic capabilities and international collaboration in these sectors?
The third shift is from diffuse regional engagement to targeted strategic partnerships. Rather than treating the Indo-Pacific as a single, uniform region, the strategy should focus on building deeper partnerships with a limited number of countries that are most aligned with Canada's economic security objectives.
Not all partners offer the same level of reliability or strategic complementarity. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, India and key ASEAN members each bring distinct strengths in areas like critical minerals, advanced manufacturing and clean technologies. These partnerships should therefore be tailored, sector-specific and strategically prioritized. This, again, leads to two questions: Which partners are best positioned to support Canada's objectives in strategic sectors, and how can we deepen these relationships to build trusted and resilient economic ties?
Let me briefly conclude with implementation. To operationalize these shifts, in recent work I've proposed a simple 5P framework. The five Ps are, one, pursue trade expansion in non-strategic sectors; two, protect against choke points in strategic sectors; three, promote domestic strong points in sectors that are strategic for other countries; four, partner with trusted Indo-Pacific allies to build shared economic security; and, five, pinpoint emerging risks through strong economic intelligence.
To conclude, revisiting Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy requires a more security-driven approach—a whole-of-government strategy that aligns trade diversification toward the Indo-Pacific region with economic security and industrial policy goals.
Thank you.
I look forward to your questions.