Thank you very much, Chair.
It's a great pleasure to share some ideas with this committee on Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy going forward. I'd like to break down my ideas into four points that focus on Canada's national interests in the Indo-Pacific and five points in terms of our strategic approaches to be able to achieve these national interests.
First, in terms of national interests, I think our Prime Minister said it very well. Maybe he quoted me, from one of my earlier papers, but we need to be “at the table, not on the menu” in terms of being on every single agreement within the region. I say that in good humour, but we need to be at that regulatory table for AI development; for technology and energy security; for how we deal with sea lines of communication, defence, regional security and disinformation; as well as for economic security.
Second—and I think this is really important—as we think about where Canada should be, we are clearly interested in preventing traditional and non-traditional security issues from emerging. Traditional securities could be a Taiwan contingency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula or some kind of incident in the South China Sea. All of these have severe implications for Canada in terms of the economy. In the previous panel, when we talked about the Taiwan Strait, most estimates are between $10 trillion U.S. and $15 trillion U.S. in damage to the global economy in the case of some kind of contingency. I'll come back to that. In terms of non-traditional security issues, they're quite clear. They're about climate change. If we think about the Pacific Islands, about the maritime environment in the South China Sea and how this could affect food security in Southeast Asia, this will have spillover effects in Canada.
Third, I want to talk about preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon. In this case, there's only one country that would like to be the regional hegemon, and that's China. If China is the regional hegemon, this is going to affect Canada's access to trade agreements. It's going to affect Canada's access to sea lines of communication, and it's going to affect how regional agreements emerge, whether they're trade, AI or technology.
Fourth, and most importantly in the Canadian context, we need to plan beyond political cycles. When I come to Canada, I see this fixation on the United States, but in the next four or five years, we're going to see a change of power in Russia, China and India, as well as the United States. In Russia, we expect a more ultra-nationalist country. In China, when Xi Jinping steps down—or we don't know what will happen to him—we will see a blank in leadership from China. This has happened in the past. We have seen China disappear for three or four years.
What does this mean for our engagement within this region? What does it mean for those traditional and non-traditional security issues? Most importantly, what does it mean for Taiwan? I want to reassert this.
When we think about India, Prime Minister Modi has brought stability, but he has also brought Hindu nationalist behaviour. We know that India killed a Canadian of Sikh background in Canada. What happens if a more nationalist India emerges?
Last, of course, is the United States. We don't know how the MAGA movement will mutate in the future, but we need to think beyond the news cycles of today and what our southern neighbour's president will be saying. I can't emphasize this enough. This is Canada's national interest.
In terms of our strategic approach—and this will be controversial—I believe that we need to anchor our Indo-Pacific strategy within the region by having the strongest relationship with the United States, meaning that means we are the indispensable partner for the United States. We are an asset economically, technologically and strategically. We need to continue to invest in the United States, despite the difficulties. As I mentioned, Trump will be gone and MAGA will change, but the United States' geographic, institutional and legal realities that connect Canada to the United States will remain.
Secondly, we need to develop bilateral and minilateral relationships. Both of the previous witnesses mentioned this, and I'm so glad they talked about Japan and South Korea as dependable partners, as well as Singapore. We need to develop new dependable partners. They may not look like us politically, but I think Vietnam and Indonesia are important partners to invest in as we think about how to cultivate strong and enduring relationships with trade partners in Southeast Asia that also share our interests in the region.
I know one of the committee members talked about values. I appreciate the emphasis on values, but if we focus only on values, we're going to alienate key partners that I think are really important, such as Vietnam, Indonesia and, frankly, India. This is going to be important.
We also need to think about minilateral relationships. This echoes a little bit our Prime Minister's comments about middle power coalitions, although I think about this very differently. We need to have functional partnerships that are focused on problem-solving. Our efforts in terms of illegal, unregulated and undocumented fishing are a very good example of that.
We need to leverage—
