The one that I would particularly highlight is scam centres. In November last year, both the United States and the United Kingdom, at the same time, issued sanctions under their human rights legislation, essentially, or their human rights sanctions regimes against an organization called the Prince Group, which is located in Cambodia. It's involved in abductions and doing scams within the area and more internationally. Later on—this year, in fact—South Korea did the same thing for the first time. It had autonomous sanctions against that same group.
We, in Canada, could not put sanctions on that group without doing sanctions against Cambodia, because the trigger for doing sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act requires a link to the country.
Another example is cybercrime. For example, we listed a group in Kyrgyzstan called A7. It was a conduit for Russian funding. We were able to link it to Russia and Russia's support of the war against Ukraine, but had we wanted to go against a unit that was not directly linked to the war against Ukraine or to the Russian government, we would have had challenges.
The United Kingdom, for example, has sanctioned cybercrime actors in Russia that are not necessarily linked to the regime or activities in Ukraine, but linked to activities against the United Kingdom directly.
Those are the sorts of areas in which our allies have flexibility, and we think it would be helpful if we had it as well.