Foreign Affairs Committee on May 26th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 35 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 12, 2026, the committee is meeting for its review of Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

I would ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines on the cards on the table. These measures are put in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. You will notice a QR code on the card, which links to a short awareness video.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking.

For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute yourself when you are not speaking.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first hour.

We have Dr. Scott Simon, full professor at the school of sociological and anthropological studies in the faculty of social sciences at the University of Ottawa. We have Jonathan Berkshire Miller, senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. From the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, we have Vina Nadjibulla, vice-president of research and strategy.

Up to five minutes will be provided for opening remarks, after which we will proceed to rounds of questions from members.

I now invite Dr. Simon to make an opening statement of no more than five minutes. Welcome.

[Scott Simon, Full Professor, School of Sociological and Anthropological Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University Of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

I am thankful for this chance to come here today.

The geopolitical context has changed drastically since the Indo-Pacific strategy was written, but fundamental realities remain, including challenges related to China, as evidenced by China's external aggression and internal oppression of minorities.

Japan, Canada's close partner, is very clear about the source of threats, as documented in its annual defence report. Canada's strategy prioritizes Japan. In March, our prime ministers announced a comprehensive strategic partnership. One result is Canada's participation with Japan, the Philippines and other partners in the BALIKATAN maritime exercise this spring. This is not unrelated to Taiwan, which is 111 kilometres from Japan's Yonaguni Island.

The IPS promised to “grow...ties with Taiwan while supporting its resilience.” Taiwan is crucial to our economic security as a supplier of advanced semiconductors, contributing to industries from AI in Vancouver to automobiles in Ontario. Canada and Taiwan signed a foreign investment arrangement in 2023, and a bilateral trade agreement awaits final signature.

Since 2022, China has conducted six large-scale military exercises around Taiwan, including missiles launched into Japan's EEZ. China's military now repeatedly crosses the median line between China and Taiwan. China has also escalated incursions into Japanese waters and airspace. China is conducting a global campaign accusing Japan of resurrecting neo-militarism and threatening regional security.

This year, China implemented new sanctions against Japan, including export controls on rare earth minerals. It sanctioned Keiji Furuya, the head of a parliamentary friendship association, for visiting Taiwan. Last month, China denounced Japan at the UN Security Council for a Taiwan Strait transit.

China dismisses international appeals for peace and threatens countries that provide even moral support to democratic Taiwan. China coerces Canada. Last month, envoy Wang Di warned that our strategic partnership would be damaged if Canada keeps sending warships through the Taiwan Strait and parliamentarians to Taiwan. China wants Canada to treat Taiwan as a red line that should never be crossed, but if we obey this new request, we would diverge from our own policy, which has taken note of China's claim since 1970 while neither endorsing it nor challenging it. Compliance would make Canada complicit in suppressing Taiwan.

The Taiwan Strait, which is 126 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, is an international waterway. Canadian warships have transited 11 times since 2018. To put that into perspective, Chinese warships regularly pass through the Tsugaru Strait, which is 20 kilometres at its narrowest point, between Hokkaido and Honshu.

Parliamentary visits from Canada to Taiwan began in 1974, and a friendship group was established in 1982. Because legislators represent their constituents, parliamentary visits are people-to-people ties that neither endorse nor challenge China's claims.

China is not a market economy, and its non-market policies and practices undermine the foundation of a global free trade system. China's strategy is to flood the world's markets with cheap products, enabled by heavy subsidies, and dominate strategic industrial sectors. We must protect our industries and jobs for Canadians if we are to prosper for the rest of the century.

Canada's Indo-Pacific presence requires pragmatic realism and clarity about which states uphold our freedom, prosperity and shared values versus those that threaten our collective security. We must choose between a free, open Pacific and great power coercion.

I have four suggestions to present today.

Number one is that Canada should publicly support Japan, pushing back against China's unfounded accusations while addressing sanctions by strengthening supply chains.

Number two is that Canada should continue and strengthen defence and security collaboration with Japan, informing our own population about its importance to Canada.

Number three is that Canada should strengthen its commitment to supporting Taiwan's resilience. We must continue both Taiwan Strait transits and interparliamentary diplomacy. We should not delay the completion of the bilateral trade co-operation framework agreement.

Finally, number four is that Canada should work with allies and friends to address the non-market policies and practices of China and avoid becoming an economic enabler for China, even as it pursues its own export interests.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I now invite Mr. Berkshire Miller to make an opening statement.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you.

At its launch in 2022, Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy was a necessary and, in my view, overdue step, aligning Canadian foreign policy with the world's most consequential region. The task now is not to rewrite the IPS but to refresh it, building on its strengths while adapting it to a more complex and interconnected strategic environment.

One area for refinement is the strategy's framing of that environment. The IPS was designed at a time when it was still possible, at least conceptually, to think of regions and policy domains as more distinct than they are today. That is simply no longer the case. Geographically, the threats that Canada faces are increasingly interconnected across the Indo-Pacific, the transatlantic and the Arctic.

Russia's war in Ukraine is not confined to Europe. It is sustained by Chinese economic support and North Korean materiel while Moscow continues to project power in the Pacific and the Arctic. China, for its part, is now a self-declared near-Arctic state, investing in infrastructure, research and dual-use capabilities that have direct implications for Canada's northern security. Meanwhile, Indo-Pacific partners, such as Japan and South Korea, are more deeply engaged in NATO discussions than ever before. These are not separate theatres. They are part of a single, evolving strategic system.

Canada is uniquely positioned at the intersection of these spaces, but that position requires a more integrated approach. The IPS and a refresh of the IPS should more explicitly connect Canada's Indo-Pacific engagement with its transatlantic and Arctic regions, ensuring that policy, planning and resource allocation reflect the reality of these linkages.

Equally important is the need to move beyond the long-standing and increasingly outdated distinction between economic and security policy. For too long, Canadian policy has operated on the assumption that trade, investment and economic engagement can be pursued largely in isolation from national security considerations. That assumption is no longer tenable.

Economic relations are now a primary vector of strategic competition. Supply chains can be leveraged for coercion. Investment flows can create dependencies with security implications. Critical technologies, whether in telecommunications, artificial intelligence or critical minerals, sit at the intersection of economic opportunity and national security risk. The idea that Canada can engage economically without accounting for these dynamics is not simply outdated. It is strategically unsound.

A refreshed IPS should explicitly reject this false bifurcation. Economic policy must be understood as security policy. This does not, of course, mean disengagement. It means discipline. It means ensuring that diversification strategies enhance resilience rather than simply shifting exposure. It means aligning investment screening, export controls and industrial policy with trusted partners, and it means being clear-eyed about the risks inherent in deeper economic integration with actors whose strategic interests may diverge from our own.

Within this broader context, the IPS would also benefit from greater clarity in its approach to China. The strategy rightly adopted a balanced framework, in my view, recognizing China as a disruptive actor but also one that we need to engage with through dialogue and confined co-operation.

China's actions—from coercive behaviour in maritime domains, as Dr. Simon mentioned, to economic retaliation and growing military pressure in the Taiwan Strait—have become defining features of the regional security landscape. Canada should and must respond with a posture that is steady, principled and predictable, competing when necessary, co-operating when possible and defending its interests without hesitation.

This is particularly important in the context of Taiwan. Canada's long-standing position in support of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is sound, but it is too often implemented with excessive caution. There remains a tendency to self-censor engagement with Taiwan in an effort to pre-empt negative reactions from Beijing. Over time, this risks creating a pattern of incremental concession that is neither required by policy nor aligned with Canada's interests.

In closing, I'll give a few recommendations.

Canada should reinforce the IPS's continuity across political cycles through formal mechanisms and signal long-term commitment. In addition, Canada should continue to focus its security contributions on areas of comparative advantage, including maritime domain awareness, cyber-capabilities and specialized training.

There is also economic diversification, and this is an important one. Efforts should be deepened with an emphasis on resilience and shared interests, ensuring that new partnerships are structured with security considerations in mind.

In closing, the IPS remains a strong foundation for Canada's engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The next stage is about refinement and action—ensuring that the strategy reflects the interconnected nature of today's threats, the inseparability of economic and security policies, and the need for a consistent approach.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We'll go next to Ms. Nadjibulla.

[Vina Nadjibulla, Vice-President, Research and Strategy, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today.

I have submitted a longer written statement with 13 recommendations, so I will use my opening remarks to make five broad points.

First, the Indo-Pacific strategy on balance has delivered real progress. Canada is more present, more visible and more connected to regional networks than at any time in recent memory, but presence is a means, not an end. The test now is whether Canada can turn its expanded presence in the region into real gains for Canadian prosperity, security and influence.

Second, the strategy has made a real difference, but the world has changed substantially since its launch. The government should therefore move quickly towards an Indo-Pacific strategy phase two, and this should be an evolution, not a reinvention. We should not be starting from scratch, but the next phase of the strategy should be revised to have fewer priorities, additional dedicated resources and clearer, measurable outcomes.

Economic resilience should be its organizing logic. Diversification in particular should not simply mean more trade or more exports. It should mean deeper and more resilient Canadian positions in critical supply chains such as around energy, critical minerals, clean technology, AI and quantum.

Third, the China and Taiwan chapters need to be updated. We've heard a lot about that already, but let me note that the IPS identified China as an increasingly disruptive global power and that assessment holds true today. While the diagnosis remains relevant, Canada's approach to managing relations with China must evolve to reflect the broader shifts in the global order and our priority on independence and room for manoeuvre.

The government's recalibration towards selective engagement with China is necessary, but selective engagement cannot become quiet accommodation. It must not mean political acquiescence, self-censorship or softening of Canada's own values, rules and laws. It must be interest-based, disciplined and bounded by clear guardrails. The guardrails have to be specific and deal with issues of foreign interference, transnational repression, forced labour, cyber-threats, investment screening, research security, sensitive technologies, critical infrastructure, data governance and supply chain integrity. We need that level of disaggregated guardrails.

Canada's substantive relationship with Taiwan should not be reduced or treated as a bargaining chip in our recalibration with China. Canada's one China policy provides ample room for practical engagement with Taiwan, and that space should be used with confidence. Canada should move forward with practical co-operation, including by signing the long-negotiated trade facilitation arrangement, and continue Taiwan's trade transit with allies and partners as part of our broader commitment to international law, freedom of navigation and regional stability. We should make such transits public.

Fourth, the next phase of the strategy needs much stronger language around the energy, technology and services agendas. Canada can be more relevant to the Indo-Pacific if it is seen as a reliable provider of both conventional and clean energy. LNG, LPG, uranium and critical minerals should all be treated not only as commercial opportunities but as strategic assets. Energy security can be a lever of Canadian influence and relevance in the region.

The strategy should also elevate digital trade and services, as well as university partnerships and research and technology partnerships. Too much of Canada's Indo-Pacific economic conversation still focuses on exports of goods. These are essential, but many of the fastest-growing opportunities are in services, digital infrastructure, AI, quantum, education, research partnerships and talent mobility. Canada's university and colleges are strategic assets in the region and should be treated that way.

Fifth, the Indo-Pacific strategy must be linked to a broader Canadian foreign policy strategy, national security strategy and Canada's domestic economic resilience. Canada's regional and thematic strategies cannot sit as separate boxes. The Indo-Pacific strategy, the Arctic policy, the Africa strategy and various development policies all need to serve a common purpose.

Finally, implementation should be measured by outcomes, not activity. Meetings, missions and announcements matter only if they produce results. The government should publish an annual IPS scorecard that measures market access secured, investments attracted, supply chains strengthened, security capabilities delivered, partnerships institutionalized and regulatory barriers removed.

In conclusion, Mr. Chair, Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy helped Canada show up in the region. The next phase must ensure that Canada matters—as a relevant, effective and consequential partner in the region that will shape Canada's prosperity, security and sovereignty for decades to come.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your statement.

We will go next to questions from members.

We will begin with MP Michael Chong for six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today.

I have taken note of all of your opening comments about the fact that Japan has been prioritized in the Indo-Pacific strategy, about the need for more interconnectivity between the different pillars in the Indo-Pacific strategy and about the need not to engage in quiet accommodation but to robustly indicate what we stand for as a country.

I want to focus on the importance of peace and security in the region as a foundation for trade and investment. The Government of Canada has talked a lot about the need to diversify trade and investment in the region. It would be interesting to hear your perspectives on how important it is to maintain peace and stability in the region and to ensure that the PRC does not take unilateral action, in whatever form it takes, against Taiwan.

Go ahead, Ms. Nadjibulla.

[Vina Nadjibulla]

I'm happy to start. Thank you.

It's absolutely critical for Canada to be seen as a stakeholder in the stability of the region and not just as a distant actor interested in trade and exports of goods. Right now, especially given the questions around the U.S.'s continued presence in the region, it's even more important for Canada, along with Japan, Australia and many Southeast Asian countries such as South Korea, to do more together.

Canada, of course, cannot be the major provider of hardware and a lot of resources, but it can be a very consequential provider of niche technologies, especially when it comes to such things as maritime domain awareness. For instance, our dark vessel detection program, which has been much celebrated, is something we're bringing to the region. That needs to continue.

In addition to providing those niche technologies, Canada can also be an important actor in defence diplomacy, in standing firm on principles that matter to us in terms of freedom of navigation and in terms of calling out actions that are violating our partners and allies in the region.

My answer would be that there is no way for us to engage economically without also being seen as a stakeholder in the stability of the region.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Would you say that your recommendation that Canada not engage in quiet accommodation is reflected in the actions of heads of government such as those of Japan and the Philippines?

I take note that in November, Prime Minister Takaichi of Japan said very plainly that if the PRC were to take unilateral action against Taiwan, such as a naval blockade or a military action, this could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” and an existential crisis for Japan. What she was essentially saying is that under Japanese law, Japan's military would be activated to respond to the PRC threat against Taiwan.

Last week, the Philippine President made similar comments.

Do you see that as an embodiment or an example of clearly stating a country's position in the Indo-Pacific region as a way to ensure peace and stability in the region and to make it clear to the PRC about the high cost of any unilateral action?

[Vina Nadjibulla]

I'll start, but I'll invite my colleagues to reply as well.

Both the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of Philippines are stating facts, Mr. Chair. They are essentially observing what's happening in the region, and they are calling out those developments.

It so happens that the PRC sees this as an escalation, and there is coercion in response to that.

In the face of this kind of coercion and bullying, we have two choices. We can back down, or we can continue to speak truth and continue to mobilize. The domestic audience is important here. I was in Philippines at the time that President Marcos made that comment. It speaks to the domestic audience even more so than to the international audience. It's recognizing the actual threat environment and what's at stake, and it's making sure that the population is not naive about the security environment.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I will reframe the question.

Do you believe, paradoxically, that public comments—rather than quiet accommodation—made by the Prime Minister of Japan and by the President of the Philippines actually increase the long-term chances of peace and stability in the region? Through your recommendation, you would seem to suggest that there not be quiet accommodation.

[Vina Nadjibulla]

I think there's a balance for both. There is room for diplomacy and making sure there are channels for communication and building as much trust as possible. Certainly, Japan and the Philippines and others, being much closer to China, have spent decades developing those mechanisms. Sometimes, there's also an important role for democratically elected leaders to speak honestly in their own parliaments with their own populations. Both have to happen. Sometimes that creates friction, and we have to manage that.

There is a line between making performative statements that arguably can be seen as escalatory—for instance, high-profile individuals visiting Taiwan—and making statements within your own parliament or to your own population that are simply factual. They should not be seen in the same way. There is a balance between megaphone diplomacy and trust-building.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

Can I respond to that?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Yes.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

Very quickly, I would agree with everything Vina mentioned, but I would say that China in particular took advantage of the opportunity in Prime Minister Takaichi's comments. This was not a change in Japan's policy. This comment that was made was not about intervening in a Taiwan contingency, to potentially get involved with the PRC, but was actually to protect its alliance and its alliance structure with the United States. In Japan's laws, it has to protect its alliance. This is called collective self-defence. China knows this very well and took advantage of those comments for its own purposes.

As for your first question, on peace and security and where that falls, I think it's a prerequisite. Think of a poker game and putting your ante in: You have to be talking about peace and security in this part of the world. That's why I mentioned in my opening comments that you can't bifurcate this. It doesn't mean securitizing everything, but you cannot walk into Seoul, Hanoi, Tokyo, Taipei or wherever and talk about the economy anymore. Security is baseline. That is a baseline understanding. It's been that way for a while. If we expect economic dividends and trade dividends, I think we have to be there for the national security side. We don't have the same size military as the United States, but there are other ways we can do that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you.

We go next to Rob Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

What was the time on that last round?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

We were over by 50 seconds.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Okay. I thought it was about a minute.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

He was ahead of schedule.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I want to make sure we share the minute.

I need an hour of my own.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I want to cut through the coded language that all three of you used. It was guarded and coded. You all mentioned geopolitical changes and a new environment. What are you talking about? Please, I would invite each of you three to name the changes you see since the IPS was launched. Name names, if you need to.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

I can go first.

The first and most principal thing is Russia's revisionism and its war in Ukraine. Of course, the war started before the launch of the IPS, but we've seen a deepening of that conflict. We've seen a deepening of the relationship between Russia and the PRC, not only with China supporting Russia's invasion in Ukraine but also with joint exercises on the Pacific side of it. That's one side. It's just the deteriorating security environment in the transatlantic and how that impacts the Indo-Pacific partners.

The second part of this is that when we talk about Asia, it seems that we're talking only about China, but we also have other disruptive actors. We have North Korea, which I mentioned in my opening statement. We're seeing a greater convergence there between Russia, China and North Korea. We're seeing a very troubling sign in the relationship between Russia, which is still a Pacific state, and North Korea. We're seeing multiple vectors of a challenging security environment. While there may not be a great conflict in the Indo-Pacific right now, the tensions are quite significant across the spectrum.