Evidence of meeting #37 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was region.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Director General, Arctic, Eurasian and European Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
This is a level of detail I'm not sure I'd be able to provide from my vantage point, but, of course, organized crime flourishes where institutions are weak. I talked earlier about corruption, which is not unheard of in the region. To the degree that you have corruption, you usually have some partial elements of state capture, I imagine, but I wouldn't be able to give you a detailed answer to that question.
Liberal
Braedon Clark Liberal Sackville—Bedford—Preston, NS
You talked about NATO membership for states in the region as well as EU accession. As all of you would know very well, when you look at the map of Europe and EU membership, there's a blank spot essentially hovering over the region, although the countries are in different states of play.
I'm curious. In the last minute or so—and I know it's hard to put you on the spot in a minute—give us the highlights of where you see work towards EU membership in the region and what that tells you in general about the stability of the region.
Director General, Arctic, Eurasian and European Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Do you mean where we are on the path to EU accession?
Director General, Arctic, Eurasian and European Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
It goes without saying that Montenegro is the next closest. It has, as I mentioned earlier, opened up all of those chapters and closed some of them already, which is really encouraging. The fact that the President of the European Council is in town this week and is joining the leaders of the Balkans in a summit is a really strong signal that the European Union is committed to the accession path and bringing on board Balkan countries. It's really encouraging.
Certain countries in the region still have far to go and need to resolve some of the disagreements among themselves as well as the security situations before they can become EU members, but Canada is playing an important role through some of the programming that I spoke about earlier, contributing to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. These are all important facets of accession. Overall, we're optimistic.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Thank you very much.
I really want to thank the witnesses for coming in, sharing their statements and answering all of our questions.
We will briefly suspend now to prepare for the next panel.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
I call this meeting back to order.
Before I introduce our witnesses, I would like to get a number of brief committee items out of the way so we can get to the panel.
Number one, there is a budget for the subcommittee on international human rights in the amount of $11,700 for its study on the human rights of children around the world. It was distributed to all members.
Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt this budget?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Second, there are two budgets for the committee to consider: the security situation in the Balkans study at $10,850, and the supplementary budget of $1,000 for the study of Bill C-219.
Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt these budgets?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Finally, I'd like to inform members that we're still working on organizing an informal meeting with the Speaker of the Parliament of Greenland on June 9 at 9 a.m. A confirmation email will be sent from the clerk as soon as those details are confirmed.
In the meantime, do members authorize the clerk to incur the necessary hospitality and logistical expenses for the proper conduct of this meeting with the Speaker of the Parliament of Greenland?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the second hour.
We have Maria Berishaj-Sylejmani, a gender equality and social inclusion specialist, joining us by video conference. We have Valerie Percival, professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. We also have Krenare Recaj, Ph.D. candidate, Carleton University.
Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions.
I now invite Ms. Percival to make an opening statement of no more than five minutes.
Valerie Percival Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, I really appreciate this invitation to speak to you today on the security situation in the Balkans. I'm going to take a slightly more historical perspective, but I was very interested in the questions that were asked, and I am happy to address more contemporary concerns.
As a vital crossroads between east and west, the Balkans have always served as a bellwether for global peace and security. From the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which sparked World War I, to the wars that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and killed tens of thousands of civilians, geopolitical transitions clearly reveal themselves in the Balkans. The history of the region serves as a reminder that preventing conflict is far less costly than fighting wars and that what happens thousands of miles away can deeply impact Canada.
We are currently living through another such geopolitical transition. The number of conflicts worldwide is at its highest level since the end of World War II. The scaffolding of the liberal international order, long underpinned by the United States, is under stress and at risk of collapse.
Canadian foreign policy is still finding its footing in this shifting landscape. The government's stated objective is to build Canada strong by expanding export markets and by building our military strength, but we cannot ensure our security in a more divisive and violent world through military means alone. While the Prime Minister has discussed working together with other middle powers to provide new mechanisms to bolster our economic security, he has provided less clarity on what this means for our foreign policy in places like the Balkans.
Earlier in my career, I worked in Kosovo, first for the Canadian government and later as director of the International Crisis Group's office in Priština. This was a time when Canada punched above its weight internationally, making significant contributions to building stability and peace in the region.
During the current time of global uncertainty and upheaval, I've been reflecting on what Canadian foreign policy can learn from that era of engagement. What can our experience teach us about how to advance our interests in a complex world? Today, I will share some of those reflections to outline three lessons for Canadian policy born from both our successes and our mistakes in the Balkans.
First, Canadian foreign policy is at its best when the government provides a clear sense of direction or purpose, which I refer to as a “foreign policy compass”. Such a compass should not only reflect Canadian values and interests. It must also advance our reputation as a country that contributes to peace and stability, while being realistic about Canada's value-add as a middle power.
During the Balkan conflicts, our foreign policy compass was the human security agenda, centred on the protection of civilians. This compass enabled Canada to quickly respond to the rapidly changing situation on the ground, an environment where our objectives of protecting human rights and promoting security sometimes appear contradictory. While we must adapt that compass to our new geopolitical realities, we cannot forget our value-add and our principles.
Second, Canada's contributions to peace and stability in places like Bosnia and Kosovo can have a cascading effect, elevating our global standing and benefiting our broader foreign policy objectives. However, this requires Canada to deliver tangible results rather than rhetorical platitudes. Canada deployed a broad range of coordinated and complementary foreign policy tools in the region. This integrated approach included diplomatic assets, peacekeeping troops, police, civilian experts and the rapid disbursement of development assistance to promote security, as well as social and economic recovery.
Recognizing our limitations as a middle power, we worked through regional and international institutions such as NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations, while supporting the critically important role of the European Union as the key guarantor for future economic prosperity and stability. Given that preventing conflicts is far less costly than responding to them, we also supported research and advocacy for good governance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
Third, a narrow focus on national security is insufficient for managing complex global crises. National security approaches focus on the symptoms rather than the root drivers of conflict and often underestimate the strategic importance of civilian protection, expert diplomacy and development and humanitarian assistance.
In the Balkans, Canada did not shy away from using our military assets, deploying approximately 40,000 troops to the region over the course of our engagement. These deployments strengthened our armed forces by providing them with vital real-world training. Crucially, however, the military was not the only voice at the decision-making table. The deployment of military assets was one tool in Canada's broader foreign policy tool box.
What does this mean for Canada's ability to contribute to the fragile peace in the Balkans today? When promoting the foreign policy objective of “Canada Strong”, we must be keenly aware that our own security relies on our ability to contribute to a more stable and peaceful world in the Balkans and elsewhere.
While security in the Balkans is largely in the hands of our European partners, we can and should provide support where it's needed. We can do more than just sit at the table. We can put forward a clear and coherent agenda. Ultimately, we must carry the lessons of the Balkans forward as we navigate an increasingly complex and conflict-affected global landscape.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Thank you for your statement.
Krenare Recaj, I now invite you to make your opening statement.
Krenare Recaj Ph.D. Candidate, Carleton University, As an Individual
Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the invitation to speak.
My name is Krenare Recaj, and I am a doctoral candidate at Carleton University and junior fellow at the Bill Graham Centre at the University of Toronto.
Today, I will be discussing what I and numerous experts have identified as one of the most serious security concerns in the Balkans: the lack of normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. I will argue that the west's current approach to this problem is flawed and conclude with recommendations for what Canada's role should be.
Since 2013, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo have been engaged in EU-mediated talks backed by the U.S., which led to what's known informally as the Brussels Agreement. This agreement ties the Euro-Atlantic integration of both countries to the normalization of relations between them. The pressure for normalization has intensified since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as western leaders seek to prevent another flashpoint in Europe. The most problematic aspect of this renewed push for normalization between these two countries is the extent to which western actors have accommodated President Vučić's government, treating him as the guarantor of regional stability.
Using the example of the Banjska terrorist attack of 2023, I argue that this approach of tying Kosovo's European future to normalization with Serbia does not produce stability. It produces the opposite, while unjustly tying the future of the citizens of Kosovo to the co-operation of a government that continues to perpetuate dangerous nationalist myths and inflame tensions.
To understand this example, some context is necessary. Serbia's approach to Kosovo is shaped by nationalist mythology rooted in long-standing history that has been weaponized to justify violence against Albanians, most devastatingly by Milošević in the 1990s. Crucially, as experts have pointed out, this mythology continues to be perpetuated by Vučić's government today.
In September 2023, more than two dozen heavily armed Serbian nationalist militants attacked Kosovo police officers in northern Kosovo, killing one. Although Serbia denied any involvement and continues to do so, the government declared a day of national mourning for the three attackers who were killed. State-aligned Serbian media portrayed them as martyrs, explicitly invoking anti-Albanian rhetoric and nationalist mythologies. The response by both the government and state-aligned media reflects the continuation of nationalist rhetoric directed at Albanians and defiance towards the international community.
Following this incident, the United States condemned the violence in general terms but called on both parties equally to refrain from actions that inflamed tensions. In doing so, it created a false equivalency. The EU's language was admittedly stronger, with a resolution explicitly stating that Serbian authorities were heavily involved and condemning the use of the attack to spread hostility toward Kosovo Albanians, yet none of this translated to policy change. The framework tying Kosovo's future to normalization with Belgrade remained intact.
Meanwhile, Kosovo has historically been one of the most pro-western countries in the world. Although this continues to be the case, there is growing frustration among both Kosovo's government and its citizens towards the EU and the United States. It is important to note that this frustration for the most part has not been directed at Canada, which has remained largely on the sidelines of the question of normalization between Serbia and Kosovo.
This brings me to my two recommendations.
First, Canada should use its voice within NATO and multilateral forums to advocate for decoupling Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic integration from normalization with Serbia. Kosovo's citizens, the vast majority of whom simply want security, economic opportunity and participation in the international community, should not have their future depend on the co-operation of a government that glorifies those who attack them.
Second, Canada should capitalize on the goodwill it has already earned among the government and people of Kosovo and take concrete steps to deepen its influence and presence in the region so that it's positioned to play a greater and more constructive role.
I'm out of time to go into the concrete steps, but I'm happy to address them in questions.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Thank you very much.
I now invite Ms. Berishaj-Sylejmani to make an opening statement.
Maria Berishaj-Sylejmani Gender equality and social inclusion specialist, As an Individual
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thanks to everybody for inviting me to speak today.
My name is Maria Berishaj-Sylejmani. I'm a gender and social inclusion specialist. I have worked for more than 15 years on the issue of women, peace and security. I'm also a board member of the Kosovo Women's Network, the largest umbrella organization of women NGOs in Kosovo.
Among the other issues that have been mentioned, which are very important and tied to security, today I would like to speak about the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda in Kosovo and why it remains relevant to this day.
The wars in the western Balkans during the nineties, including the war in Kosovo, caused immense human suffering and had a profound impact on women and girls. While women were disproportionately affected by the conflict, they also played a critical role in supporting their communities, rebuilding social ties and contributing to peace and recovery in the whole region, yet women were largely absent from formal peace negotiations and post-conflict decision-making processes. This exclusion is precisely what United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 seeks to address. It focuses on and addresses it through participation, protection, prevention and recovery, which are the four pillars of the resolution.
More than 20 years later, Kosovo has made important progress, as we heard from the previous speakers, in many fields, but significant implementation challenges remain regarding Resolution 1325. Women in Kosovo not only support this agenda through institutions; they live it every day. They also lived it during the war and after the war. Through community mediation, support to survivors, dialogue across communities and grassroots skills building, they continue to contribute to stability and social cohesion.
Kosovo is now preparing the new program of gender equality. It's very important to say that “women, peace and security” is one of the main pillars, the third pillar, of this new program.
Also, civil society organizations, particularly women-led organizations, have played a central role in advocating for these advances, providing services and promoting accountability. There has also been important progress in recognizing survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, who now have access to legal recognition and to institutional support.
I have mentioned what may be some positive steps that happened here, but there are also many issues that still remain. We need continuous investment to maintain peace in this part of the world, in our Balkans. Kosovo and the wider region continue to face challenges linked to unresolved grievances from the war, incomplete justice for victims and persistent mistrust between communities in Kosovo. By “communities”, I mean the majority Albanian community, the minority Serb community and other ethnic communities such as the Bosnian, Roma and Ashkali communities.
The western Balkans, in addition, are facing challenges from disinformation and foreign influence. This has been mentioned before. External factors often exploit existing divisions, amplify mistrust and undermine confidence in democratic institutions. This makes resilient and inclusive institutions even more important to have in Kosovo. In this context, a women, peace and security agenda is not about gender equality; it's about stability in Kosovo and the wider region. It's about social cohesion. It's about democratic governance in Kosovo.
Despite policy progress, women in Kosovo remain under-represented in decision-making institutions. Since I'm talking about women, peace and security, I'm going to mention the participation of women in security forces, which is only at around 15%. In the Kosovo police service, women are at around 10%. We are still not at the percentage we would want. The law on gender equality calls for fifty-fifty participation in all decision-making areas.
One notable gap is also women's limited and inconsistent participation in the Kosovo and Serbia dialogue, which was mentioned. It is our only platform.
The most important platform for co-operation and communication with Serbia for the time being is being facilitated by the EU. That process, if implemented and handled correctly, will have a direct impact on long-lasting peace in Kosovo.
Another concern, which is very important to say, is the gradual reduction and fragmentation of international funding for women, peace and security. It's also worth noting that this is happening not only to the women, peace and security agenda but also across all the human rights and women's empowerment issues, and not only with funding but also with anti-gender narratives and the backtracking in the field of human rights and gender.
Canada, in this area, can continue and can increase its meaningful participation and engagement. Canada has been a strong supporter of women, peace and security globally. Continued support for women's civil society organizations, women's leadership development and women's participation in peace and security processes can help strengthen Kosovo. Canada can also continue to promote the meaningful inclusion of women in dialogue and decision-making processes and support efforts to build resilience against disinformation and polarization.
Why does this matter beyond Kosovo? It's because the stability of the western Balkans is not a regional concern. A stable Balkan region is a stable Europe. The region's experience also demonstrates how inclusive peacebuilding strengthens societies and helps prevent future instability. Across the western Balkans—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
Thank you. I have to stop you, unfortunately, because we're way over the time.
Gender equality and social inclusion specialist, As an Individual
Sure.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen
I hope you can cover some of the extra points during questions.
I will now open the floor for questions, beginning with MP Michael Chong.
You have six minutes.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Some of our witnesses mentioned taking concrete steps to deepen the presence in the region and talked about delivering tangible results in terms of diplomatic assets. I want to ask a question about our embassies and consulates.
I know we have embassies in Croatia and Serbia, and we have consulates in North Macedonia and Albania. However, we have nothing in Montenegro and Kosovo. It seems to me that of the six states in the western Balkans, Montenegro is closest to being admitted into the European Union. Is that a fair assessment? That would suggest that the Canadian government should be looking at opening an embassy in Montenegro, because I believe we have embassies in all the other member states of the European Union. Is that a fair conclusion?
Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
Yes, I would say that's a fair conclusion.