Well, first and foremost, the structural issue is that this region has not been at the forefront of western foreign policy for a very long time. That is something that has been recognized by our adversaries. They have come in with a lot of cheap, easy cash. They have bought up enormous amounts of influence. They have also boxed us out of key projects in which countries like Canada, for instance, have a very obvious interest, like the energy sector across southeastern Europe. This is something in which Canada has fallen majorly behind countries like China and Russia.
I think what needs to happen moving forward is that, first and foremost, Canada needs to re-establish its diplomatic footprint in the region. Most of the countries in the western Balkans do not have Canadian embassies on the ground. That includes Bosnia. That includes Kosovo. That includes Albania. That includes Montenegro. It's very hard for Canada to engage in a substantive fashion when it doesn't have sustained diplomatic representation on the ground.
Once you have that, then you can actually begin identifying in a more systematic fashion what Canada's own priorities are. As I've said, energy is the most obvious one for Canada, because it's what benefits Canadians the most. However, it's also an area where we can definitely work with our European and, in particular, our British allies to improve the interconnectedness and interoperability of the region as a whole, including the NATO allies in the area and the non-NATO allies—but hopefully soon NATO allies—who, for instance, have a very robust munitions industry in the region. That is something Canada can help build up. That's something Canada can benefit from as Canada looks to improve its industrial military base here. There's a lot of synergy there.
Again, the first step needs to be actually having the diplomatic footprint on the ground.