I think the quickest way to describe it is that there is official U.S. policy, and then there is what observers are seeing on the ground. There's a significant decoupling of the two.
There was a very significant piece of legislation passed by the U.S. Congress a few months ago, called the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act, which has allowed the U.S. Congress a much greater platform to essentially provide oversight over what the State Department and the administration are doing.
We've had the first of those reports submitted just a couple of days ago, and we've had a hearing by Secretary Rubio over the last two days that has also given some sense of what the policy of the administration is. Again, the problem is that what the administration has been saying and what we've been seeing on the ground are not in line.
The most significant policy shift, obviously, was the sanctions relief for Mr. Dodik and the secessionist authorities in BiH. We've also seen a kind of, I would say, subcontracting out of U.S. policy. I've mentioned this company that is incorporated in Wyoming as of a few months ago, which has been incorporated directly into Bosnian law. It is now supposedly going to be building this pipeline. It has no known funds. Its principals are directly tied to some senior political figures.