Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Gëzim Visoka, and I am an associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Dublin City University in Ireland. My research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding, the dynamics of diplomatic recognition and the rise of counterpeace forces in the Balkans.
For three decades, peace in the western Balkans has hinged on the stability and values of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Today, however, shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities and internal hesitation within the EU are directly undermining that security.
Today I want to highlight three interlinked trends that are affecting security in the western Balkans.
First, as we witness democratic backsliding and autocratization, as well as a global decline in the liberal international order, the Balkan countries are mirroring these trends. Serbia is no longer classified as a democracy but as an electoral autocracy experiencing protracted social instability. Other Balkan countries remain only partially free, affected by political instability, corruption, and in some places, restricted media freedom. As democracy promotion fades away from the spotlight of western foreign policy, regional leaders are actively backtracking on critical reforms.
Second, a shift towards transactional diplomacy, promoted by the Trump administration, has revived dangerous revisionist tendencies and heightened ethnic tensions, undermining the international peacebuilding and state-building investments of the past three decades. We've seen armed and sabotage attacks by Serb groups in northern Kosovo, coupled with aggressive disinformation campaigns designed to inflame ethnic frictions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, and ethnic polarization in North Macedonia and Montenegro. Furthermore, U.S. pressure on NATO and threats to withdraw security support from Europe have triggered competitive militarization politics and policies in the western Balkans. These cracks directly benefit Russia's grand strategy, which relies on disinformation, collaboration with antipeace actors and exploitation of frozen conflicts to weaken European and Euro-Atlantic security.
Third, security threats in the western Balkans do not come solely from hostile external forces such as Russia. EU and NATO membership remains the primary strategic goal for the region, but enlargement has largely stalled because of the EU's lack of political will to integrate the western Balkans. Only recently has the EU signalled a renewed interest in expediting accession procedures, particularly for Montenegro and Albania, driven by the geopolitical imperative to offer membership prospects to Ukraine and Moldova to deter Russian aggression. A critical weakness remains within the EU itself. Kosovo remains unrecognized by five EU member states—Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain—four of which are NATO members that have so far blocked Kosovo's EU and NATO membership path and indirectly contributed to the stalled normalization of relations with Serbia. Their recognition of Kosovo and their willingness to unblock its Euro-Atlantic path would ultimately make Europe safer and more prosperous.
Honourable members of the committee, Canada has a proud history of supporting peace operations and the rules-based international order in the western Balkans. At this critical time, I believe that Canada is uniquely positioned to provide principled leadership to the Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Balkans. We cannot allow transactional politics to undo three decades of peacebuilding. Canada can, and should, play a pivotal role in rallying NATO and EU allies towards a unified, decisive stance on democracy and regional integration; the preservation of peace in and the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the recognition of Kosovo's independence and its rightful membership in international organizations.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.