Very happily.
Any lingering ideas about Arctic exceptionalism and the region being inherently insulated from global geopolitical dynamics are now very out of date in my view, so I disagree fundamentally with Dr. Kennedy, who appeared earlier, on this particular point.
“Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy”, released last December, has three general intentions: asserting Canada's sovereignty, advancing our interests in the region and promoting a stable, prosperous and secure north. These are long-standing priorities, but how we are advancing our interests and promoting stability and security are what's changing.
Flowing from this, I want to take a few minutes to lay out what I see as the key elements of Canada's Arctic foreign policy that are the same as before, along with what has changed and what is new.
What's the same? The desire for Arctic state primacy is a long-standing priority that insists that the Arctic states are best positioned and equipped to understand the region and its peoples.
Reiterating that Canada remains committed to upholding the rules-based international order in the Arctic and that maritime claims are addressed in a manner consistent with international law gestures to the legality of our long-standing position on the Northwest Passage as historic internal waters. It also speaks to our submission in support of our extended continental shelf.
We can talk more about sovereignty later, but Canada's position is strong and long-standing, and I see no need for or benefit to revisiting or revising it substantively. Let's show some confidence.
There is the promise to secure Canada's national interests and ensure stability and prosperity for indigenous people who live in the Arctic. All recent governments have had a similar strategic intent, going back to Jean Chrétien and even before.
We see the United States framed as Canada's “greatest ally” and our “closest partner and ally in the Arctic”. Our foreign policy reinforces how close partnership with the Americans is essential to maintaining a secure, strong and well-defended North American homeland on which our mutual prosperity depends. Obviously, the re-election of Donald Trump has injected uncertainty into the mix, which we'll discuss later.
We also retain language designating the Arctic Council as the pre-eminent forum for Arctic co-operation while explaining that some of the high politics in the meetings remain on pause. We heard in the last session that climate change is a central theme characterized as both the most pressing and the most proximate threat to Canada's security in the Arctic, but I think the leakages between climate change and national security remain vague, and we might talk about that.
Furthermore, the policy adopts a whole-of-government or a whole-of-society framework, acknowledging that if we're going to address the complex range of threats facing the Arctic, we can't conceptualize security only in military terms. This entails working with Public Safety Canada—Mr. Blair, that is your former portfolio, of course—to support efforts to strengthen Canadian national resilience, to counter the malign influence and activities of foreign powers, to strengthen defence of critical infrastructure and to protect northern communities against foreign interference. All of this is very important. To me, these are the kinds of issues that are the clear and present danger we're facing as Canadians.
What has changed? We are now explicit in acknowledging the relevance and importance of NATO in the Arctic region, and talk of protecting the alliance's northern and western flanks opens up some new areas for thinking about the Arctic in securing alliance territory more generally. Russia, as I said, is now a competitor that we're stating seeks to undermine the rules-based international order.
China is now positioned as a non-Arctic state competitor and a challenger to Arctic state supremacy that we can expect will use all the tools at its disposal to advance its geopolitical interests, including in the Arctic. There is a lot of concern about China deploying dual-use research vessels and surveillance platforms to collect data, as well as actions that represent malign economic influence. At the same time, our policy is mature in leaving space for pragmatic diplomacy, where we're challenging China where we ought to, and also in being able to co-operate where interests align, such as in addressing pressing global issues like climate change, which have impacts on the Arctic.
We also astutely note, “While the risk of military attack [is] low, the region represents a geographic vector for traditional and emerging weapons systems”. This is not new, but we're now much more attentive to the fact that adversaries and competitors are employing “disinformation and influence campaigns, malicious cyber operations and espionage and foreign interference [that] target Canadians, including northerners.” This cannot be ignored.
I love that we include the Coast Guard as a partner in defence and security and its important role in maintaining awareness.
I'll have to save for questions and answers what I see as new in this, but that'll get us started.
I'll pass it over to you, Dr. Leuprecht.
