Foreign Affairs Committee on Oct. 2nd, 2025

[Christian Leuprecht, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada and Queen's University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to acknowledge all the committee members, including the members who served the country. I have enormous respect for them. In fact, I know a number of them quite well.

I'll be giving my remarks in English. However, I encourage the members to speak in the official language of their choice.

I just returned from the NATO in the Nordics conference, which is organized biannually by the Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies on behalf of the military universities in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. I also bring extensive comparative expertise on matters of the Arctic and of Arctic foreign policy among allied and partner countries, including my book, entitled Polar Cousins: Comparing Antarctic and Arctic Geostrategic Futures.

February 2026: Russia has landed troops on Svalbard. At the same time, Russia is dropping platoons of soldiers near CFS Alert, while a Chinese supposed “research” vessel is providing logistics and drone coverage. Is Canada ready for a provocation?

The Canadian Armed Forces has been tasked with being “ready, resilient and relevant” to detect, deter, defend and defeat accelerating threats to Canada and Canada’s national interests. At the same time, the “Inflection Point 2025” document by the Canadian Army observes:

Our stretched force, purpose built for employment on “contribution warfare” missions for the last several decades, has resulted in an Army that is currently postured for presence in competition, but challenged for crisis and unprepared for conflict due to the lack of critical enablers, sustainment, depth, and focus.

Why is this a problem for Arctic sovereignty?

First, countries need policy enablers. Earlier this year, Canada released a robust and timely Arctic foreign policy, but the fundamental problem with the policy is that it reflects a broader challenge: that in this country we build policy backward. If Canada had a national security strategy, then other relevant policies would flow from the national security strategy. However, without a national security strategy, there is no shared understanding, no unity of purpose and effort, and no coherence within and across government and its departments. That reflects the broader failure of Canada and allies over the past 25 years. We had no vision. We left international security up to the Americans, and now we’re surprised and complaining about the world we live in.

Canada’s Arctic foreign policy reflects the same problem that Canada is facing in so many other areas of foreign policy: We do not have the initiative. The Arctic foreign policy is an acknowledgement that Canada must regain the initiative. Canada’s sovereignty is measured by Canada’s ability and capability to shape the environment rather than simply having to react to it.

The government likes to tout investments that it is making in Arctic security, defence and foreign policy. However, the problem is that the threat vectors across the Arctic are accelerating while the rules-based international order is atrophying; infrastructure investments in the Arctic cost about 10 times what they cost in southern Canada; models from the south don’t apply in the north, which that means the closest comparators are not found in Canada but among other Arctic allies; and, with respect to the United States, the Arctic has always been an area of contestation, going back to at least the Alaska boundary dispute. The best return on those investments that we can hope for is to preserve the status quo, but given the changing character of the Arctic, preserving the status quo is not an option.

In having to invest more for a lower rate of return, the Arctic is a laboratory for Canadian foreign policy more broadly. On the one hand, due to structural domestic and geopolitical changes, Canada’s interests are increasingly diverging from those of the United States. On the other hand, the European Union, and Europe, is becoming a more autarkic actor.

Canada is left with two stark choices: draw even closer to the United States by default or invest more in Canadian foreign policy and foreign policy instruments in the hopes of continuing to assert Canada’s interests as a middle power by partnering with Europe in counterbalancing the vagaries of U.S. unilateralism and global headwinds.

Security is job number one for any government, and the Arctic is Canada’s top-priority theatre, before the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. It is not just about protecting Canadian sovereignty but for Canadians to realize that if North America is not safe and secure, then Canada's ability to make sovereign decisions that best reflect Canadian interests will be compromised, as will the ability of the United States to provide extended nuclear deterrence, which would result in global nuclear proliferation. As a result, the Arctic foreign policy is about investing not just in Canadian sovereignty but in continental security and global stability and therefore in NATO.

Canadian politicians have traditionally done a poor job of explaining to our European allies the value of Canada's investments in NATO's North American pillar. The government also needs to explain to Canadians that the Arctic is no longer a zone of perennial peace. The Arctic is now in play as a zone of adversarial competition and rivalry. What Canada does or does not do in the Arctic has national, continental, allied and global ramifications. Arctic foreign policy and related efforts to secure Canada's Arctic sovereignty are not discretionary. If it fails, so will Canada.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much, Dr. Leuprecht, for your opening statement.

I now turn to my colleagues for the questions, beginning with MP Michael Chong.

You have six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you, Chair. Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

I asked the previous panellists the same question.

Are you familiar at all with some of the proposals to build high-speed Internet submarine cables between Europe and North America and Europe and Asia through the Canadian Arctic? In particular, I'm thinking about a project that I understand that is being proposed by a group of companies from Finland, the United States and Japan that would go through parts of the Canadian Arctic. I believe that project is called the Far North Fiber project.

Are either of you familiar with this?

Okay, maybe you could speak to it.

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Yes, happily.

Certainly there's a suite of fibre projects. We see a lot of fibre already existent in the European high north and Arctic. In the Baltic region you see many of those strands already strung across. We've seen proposals on the Canadian side or running through and connecting Europe to Asia. These have been on the books for quite some time. We see on the Russian side—I think you mentioned this one in the last panel—the Polar Express project, for example, proposing to connect Murmansk to Vladivostok.

What I think is interesting is that in these different scenarios, single strands of fibre are things that can be disrupted by a deliberate anchor dragging or an inadvertent anchor dragging, or other kinds of disruption.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

That was going to be my next question.

We've seen disruptions in the Baltic Sea and elsewhere of submarine Internet cables that carry these. The submarine cables, I understand, carry a majority of the world's global Internet traffic.

What capacity do we have or do we need if we don't have it, to monitor subsurface movements of nefarious actors who would drag an anchor or otherwise to cut these cables?

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Right now these are difficult. I will turn it over to Dr. Leuprecht in just a second.

They are difficult, because they are often low-signature and very difficult to attribute. The benefit is that if we see these as part of a suite of different communications systems from seabed to outer space, they are adding redundancy to satellites. We also need to be thinking about redundancy and duplication that is strategic and deliberate when we're deploying these systems. I think the question is very much directed in the right direction. That is, if we're building infrastructure, if we're making these investments, we also need to think about how we're defending this infrastructure and making sure that it's built right into the plans from the onset.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I'm sorry, I have a second quick question. I don't have unlimited time.

Part of the government's Arctic foreign policy is to assert Canada's sovereignty. The defence policy also has made the Arctic a big focus. In early 2022, just three years ago, Canada and Finland announced the purchase of F-35 jets. For Finland I believe it's about 64 jets, and Canada indicated its intention to purchase 88. To that end, both the Finns and the Canadians are preparing training and facilities in the Far North to welcome the arrival of those jets.

The Auditor General has indicated that Canada is years behind schedule and won't be operational with the F-35s until at least 2033-2034. Finland, a much smaller country purchasing almost the same number of jets, is going to be fully operational with these jets in the Far North in 2030. I'm just wondering what the Finns are doing that allows them to purchase almost the same number of jets with a fraction of the resources that we have—I think they are a country of some four million people—and get them operational by 2030, where we are years behind schedule in a country with 10 times the resources, people and economy that the Fins have.

What are they doing that we are not doing to make this happen?

[Christian Leuprecht]

In Finland, there's a broad consensus in terms of the need to defend the country. This is a country that can surge to 400,000 soldiers in a matter of weeks. It has 4,000 artillery pieces that it can marshal, and this is a country where there's a broad multipartisan consensus in the way you conduct security, defence and foreign policy in ways that do not politicize them for partisan gain.

Other than the United States, it is also the country that probably has the most advanced ways of trying to protect its underwater critical infrastructure. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs has done exceptional work, and the former president, who's now the chair of the European hybrid threat centre, is, in my view, one of the absolute best people in the world on this.

You know, if you are living next to Russia, and you've had the experience that Finland has had, you take your security and your defence seriously. It has the political cover, the will and the strategy, as I pointed out in my opening remarks, which is what we're missing. We're just doing it piecemeal, here and there.

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I'm happy to jump in on this as well.

I think, looking at the F-35, it is incumbent upon Canada to make a decision and stick by the decision it has made. It's important right now to have transparency and certainty within an alliance construct, and these are obviously going to be pretty serious investments in creating and laying out the enabling infrastructure in the north. This is going to be different from the forward-operating locations that we had for CF-18s.

If we look across to Eielson Air Force Base and the infrastructure housing F-35s in the United States, these are ultra-secure facilities. These are absolutely the most advanced airframes and sensor suits that you can imagine. These are not going to be dual use-type facilities that we're building. This is going to be dedicated military infrastructure.

In order to have that in place in time for when we actually receive these airframes, we need to start now in working out the relationships and getting that infrastructure built. We need to get the right sorts of relationships in place to make sure they're secured and that we're able to make the most of this very important investment that we're making.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

Before I proceed to MP Blair, I just want to remind the members and the witnesses to speak a little more slowly for the benefit of the interpreters.

Next, we will go to MP Bill Blair.

[Bill Blair, Liberal, Scarborough Southwest, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Welcome to both of our guests, Dr. Lackenbauer and Dr. Leuprecht.

It's good to see you again, Christian. We've had many opportunities to have conversations in the past, and it's nice in this format.

If I may, I wanted to comment. First of all, we haven't spoken very much about the defence policy update that was released in April 2024. It was entitled, “Our North, Strong and Free”, and it focused on a number of things.

I will share with you as well, Dr. Leuprecht, that our policy work on that was informed, in part, by your own work in “Making Canada’s Arctic security paradigm fit for purpose”.

We talked a lot about the impact of climate change and the new technologies that were making our north far more accessible, but we also talked about the activities of our adversaries, in particular China and Russia, and some of the things that we were doing. I think it was really important to acknowledge those challenges.

One of the things that I have also learned in my fairly extensive work on defence in the Arctic is, you know, when I've gone to the Arctic, to people who live in those communities, particularly the Inuit, we talk about defending sovereignty and what that means to them. They say that it does not mean a fighter jet occasionally flying by. It does not mean a ship once in a while sailing through when the ice is out. What it actually means for them is infrastructure, significant investment in infrastructure. They talk about airport runways, highways, fibre optics, water treatment plants, power generation plants, and significant investments that could be multi-use to those communities. Of course, that presents a fairly significant challenge for us as well.

I would like your take on where we should be spending our money first. As you've seen, the Prime Minister, quite recently, in June of this year, made a commitment at the NATO summit in the Hague to significantly expand our defence expenditure. Additionally, there was a commitment to raise it over the next several years to as much as 5%, and 1.5% of that is an investment primarily in nation-building infrastructure, which has a security component.

Let me also agree with you that we've gone through decades of underinvestment in our national security, and I think that was born, in large part, of complacency. We were surrounded by three oceans, one of which was mostly frozen most of the time. We also shared our only land border with a benign superpower. Our complacency, I think, was based on a pretty fair expectation of how things would continue, but they've clearly changed.

I'd like your input on how we might best use our significant investments of $9 billion extra this year. In every subsequent year, defence spending will actually increase. What's the best way to invest that money?

[Christian Leuprecht]

Mr. Blair, as you know, I have great respect for the work you did in that department. It's a very unwieldy department that I have lots of experience in myself.

The first thing is that we need to think about the effects we want to achieve. This is always a challenge in trying to make sure we are targeting the payoffs and are able to explain them to our allies. As you know, I spend lots of time in Europe, and nobody counts what Canada does in the north as an investment in NATO.

On the importance of infrastructure, I share your view on critical infrastructure. The first point I always make when I'm talking about Arctic security is that when you talk to the locals in the north, they'll tell you the first priority isn't the Russians showing up; it's food security and other elements of human security, and how we can both use infrastructure to improve the lives of our Canadian citizens who share that territory and leverage that at the same time for our purpose of sovereignty.

One of the challenges we're going to have is that we're sitting on a ticking time bomb. With the amount of money we're spending on infrastructure and defence and so forth, if we do not spend it well and we do not spend it to considerable effect for national sovereignty and the benefit of Canadian society and Canadians, there will be a reckoning from the Canadian electorate. If we're going to spend these amounts of money, these are exactly the questions we need to ask.

I worry that we might be spending too much money too quickly with too little a concrete plan of what we're actually looking to get for that money in the medium and the long term.

[Bill Blair, Liberal, Scarborough Southwest, ON]

First of all, I agree that we talked a lot about spending, but we need to talk about investing and think about what the return is on that investment.

Go ahead, Dr. Lackenbauer.

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

First of all, we need to get clarity on what we're discussing when we're talking about Arctic sovereignty and security. We have sovereignty. No one has a better claim to ownership over Canada than Canadians. Our sovereignty is nested with indigenous sovereignties intermingling with those of our state through our land claim agreements and so on. I think we create more uncertainty about our sovereignty than many external actors do.

Disentangle that from security and ask what type of security threat we are focusing on. We have threats through the Arctic and threats that would emanate from outside of our Arctic and pass over or through to strike at targets outside of the region. This is investment in domain awareness. This is NORAD modernization. Much of this is dedicated, critical military infrastructure, much of which will not have dual use.

When it comes to threats to the Arctic, I disagree with Dr. Leuprecht. It is not Russian Spetsnaz units landing outside of CFS Alert. I spent almost the entire month of July on an operation with the Canadian Rangers, Operation Nanook-Takuniq, on northern Ellesmere Island. I'm not worried about an invasion of land forces on northern Ellesmere. What I am worried about is a whole bunch of interference activities and other ways that nefarious foreign actors may seek to influence or undermine Canadians' abilities, including northern rights holders' abilities, to influence and chart our desired future direction.

Here's where I think investments in other security departments and agencies are absolutely essential, as much as coordinating with defence is. When it comes to the “in” threats, NATO's seven baseline requirements for national resilience give us a really nice hook for how we can make smart, strategic investments with that 1.5% of GDP. That's helping us meet our obligations.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you, Professor. We're over the time, so I will go next to MP Simard.

Mr. Simard, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Mario Simard, Bloc, Jonquière, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for your remarks. I can see from your body language that you're also passionate about this topic.

I have a question that may take you in a different direction. Given my area of interest, I usually sit on the Standing Committee on Natural Resources. Did you know that the federal government wants to contribute to a critical minerals bank that would serve NATO countries, given that northern Canada has a wealth of critical minerals?

Russia and China are the main producers of rare earths, for example. They carry out a great deal of dumping, which makes it difficult to develop mining projects. In a way, they're driving prices down. Within NATO, people are talking about setting a floor price for certain critical minerals in order to successfully develop these industries. I would like to hear your thoughts on this.

I would also like to hear your opinion on another topic. You spoke earlier about interference. Isn't there a risk that Russian or Chinese entrepreneurs could provide funding for some of these projects, even here in Canada? I would like to hear your thoughts on the whole concept of critical minerals and rare earths and their strategic implications.

[Christian Leuprecht]

The issue with critical minerals in the Far North is that the costs often exceed the profitability of mines in this region. In terms of infrastructure, it often isn't cost‑effective to pursue this path. You probably know this, since you sit on the Standing Committee on Natural Resources. In principle, Canada could make a contribution. However, it must develop a national strategy that makes these types of investments profitable for the private sector, which ties in with Mr. Blair's comment. It would then be necessary to provide the infrastructure for these critical resources. This infrastructure could contribute to the well‑being of local communities and our allies and would support our defence and national security. As you noted during my remarks, I doubt that the comprehensive strategy needed to properly align all these factors is in place.

[Mario Simard, Bloc, Jonquière, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Leuprecht.

Mr. Lackenbauer, what do you think?

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Yes, thank you. That's an excellent question.

I think that critical minerals are one of those sectors that we should be focusing on, because these are risks that are not just hypothetical; they're very real.

I think a lot of our attention for the last few years has been looking at foreign-owned entities purchasing outright entire mining operations and then controlling and dictating flows. I think what we've seen play out in one case in particular, about 100 kilometres east of Yellowknife, was about controlling supply chains and value chains, as you mentioned, Mr. Simard. It's sometimes as advantageous for China, with its monopoly, to keep those critical minerals in the ground as it is to extract them. It's having that offtake in making sure that we do not have the refining and processing capabilities in Canada or friendly countries to control that value chain.

Here's where I think it's both looking collectively with allies to invest and share the risk associated with the costs of extracting these minerals and refining them but also leveraging tools like the Investment Canada Act. In my mind, it's one of the primary instruments of asserting Canada's sovereignty. It's a different way. It's not an icebreaker hull in the water or a CF-18 flying in the skies, but it's still a way of asserting our right to control activities in our jurisdiction.

Here, if we are serious about a green transition, accessing the latest defence technologies and contributing to those supply chains, it's incumbent upon us to really move in terms of critical minerals and act upon that strategy that's been articulated.

[Mario Simard, Bloc, Jonquière, QC]

Thank you.

Gentlemen, if you have any recommendations or documents to submit to the committee on this matter, it would be beneficial both for us and for the studies carried out by the Standing Committee on Natural Resources.

In your opinion, is it wishful thinking to believe that NATO could agree to set a floor price for certain critical minerals in order to launch this type of project? I've heard this idea. However, I wonder whether NATO member countries have actually launched a structured initiative for rare earths, for example.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Give a brief response, please.

[Christian Leuprecht]

I just have a quick comment.

In my opinion, the challenges that we face in the Far North are similar to the challenges encountered in the rest of Canada. Too much regulation makes it difficult to invest and to carry out projects in Canada.

I just spent six months in Brussels, where I had discussions with officials from a number of European Union member countries. According to the European Union and the European perspective in general, Canada remains an extremely difficult economic and political player to do business with.

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I think it's also fair to say that some of these initiatives have certainly been under discussion at NATO. One of the challenges is that right now we've had—let's call it what it is—a rogue actor in Washington who has disrupted a lot of the opportunity space to be able to focus on and channel what these strategic priorities are. Perhaps putting in that guaranteed floor price is one mechanism.

I just hope that we return to a situation where we are working together collectively to make sure that we are protecting these supply chains, recognizing that it's key to our self-determining future.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We'll go next to MP Ziad Aboultaif for five minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thanks to the witnesses.

Dr. Lackenbauer, you just gave me my first question.

We were told and we were convinced that we needed to work with our allies as far as the Arctic goes. The closest ally at this point is the United States. The Alaska summit between President Putin and President Trump—without knowing any details and I'm not sure if you have any details or any reading on that—has become a concern over what the relationship and the policy over the Arctic is going to be. Our policy was introduced in December 2024. The summit happened last month.

I would like to know from you and Dr. Leuprecht what you think of the position of the United States. How is that strategy going make it difficult for Canada to continue implementing and protecting Canada's interests in the north?