First of all, we need to get clarity on what we're discussing when we're talking about Arctic sovereignty and security. We have sovereignty. No one has a better claim to ownership over Canada than Canadians. Our sovereignty is nested with indigenous sovereignties intermingling with those of our state through our land claim agreements and so on. I think we create more uncertainty about our sovereignty than many external actors do.
Disentangle that from security and ask what type of security threat we are focusing on. We have threats through the Arctic and threats that would emanate from outside of our Arctic and pass over or through to strike at targets outside of the region. This is investment in domain awareness. This is NORAD modernization. Much of this is dedicated, critical military infrastructure, much of which will not have dual use.
When it comes to threats to the Arctic, I disagree with Dr. Leuprecht. It is not Russian Spetsnaz units landing outside of CFS Alert. I spent almost the entire month of July on an operation with the Canadian Rangers, Operation Nanook-Takuniq, on northern Ellesmere Island. I'm not worried about an invasion of land forces on northern Ellesmere. What I am worried about is a whole bunch of interference activities and other ways that nefarious foreign actors may seek to influence or undermine Canadians' abilities, including northern rights holders' abilities, to influence and chart our desired future direction.
Here's where I think investments in other security departments and agencies are absolutely essential, as much as coordinating with defence is. When it comes to the “in” threats, NATO's seven baseline requirements for national resilience give us a really nice hook for how we can make smart, strategic investments with that 1.5% of GDP. That's helping us meet our obligations.