Thank you for the invitation to speak today. I will confine my remarks to my area of research expertise and focus, specifically the defence relationship and, in particular, NORAD.
The good news is that NORAD continues to function as intended. At the operational level, the command remains effective and continues to provide a framework through which Canada and the United States co-operate on continental defence. However, several persistent issues warrant close attention.
My central message today is straightforward. Canada largely gets the NORAD it wants because the command is not a politically salient issue in the United States, relative to other defence priorities such as homeland defence and the golden dome. That arrangement has worked well for Canada, but it could change, and it could change quickly. Some strategic manoeuvring now would be prudent.
The first long-standing irritant in the bilateral defence relationship has been Canada's position on ballistic missile defence, now more accurately discussed in the broader context of integrated air and missile defence. This issue has been partially mitigated by Minister McGuinty's July 16, 2025, statement that the government has removed all restrictions on air and missile defence of Canada. While this does not signal policy change per se, it does create some strategic flexibility.
A second issue concerns possible changes to the U.S. unified command plan and the implications these could have for NORAD's command and control arrangements. At present, the commander of NORAD also serves as the commander of U.S. northern command, a dual-hatted arrangement that has provided continuity and efficiency. Should the United States revisit proposals to establish an Americas command, for example—as was suggested after the 9/11 attacks—or fundamentally change the geographic distribution of commands in a way that would bifurcate Canada from the continental United States, the underlying NORAD command structure could require reconsideration. It's important to remember that the NORAD agreement itself can be terminated by either party with 12 months' written notice.
Third, Canada should continue exploring opportunities to broaden participation in continental defence arrangements. Greenland, both geographically and strategically, makes considerable sense as a future partner. Canada, the United States, Greenland and Denmark already co-operate closely in the resupply of Canadian Forces Station Alert through Pituffik Space Base, and Denmark and Canada have a new defence co-operation memorandum of understanding.
There are, however, potential organizational changes that could weaken NORAD's distinctly binational character. For example, if USNORTHCOM and NORAD were to merge any operations positions within the command, Canada would need to insist on separate positions for NORAD and USNORTHCOM. The two organizations have different mandates, responsibilities and political foundations, and preserving those distinctions remains important.
What should Canada do?
First, with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence currently in abeyance, now is the time to reinforce the Military Cooperation Committee and begin to identify a future Canadian co-chair for a revitalized defence dialogue mechanism. Rather than selecting a sitting parliamentarian, consideration should be given to an individual with deep expertise in Canada-U.S. political, diplomatic, economic and military relations.
Second, Canada should restore a Global Affairs Canada political adviser position at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. The current Department of National Defence technical adviser is essential, particularly given the scale and complexity of NORAD modernization projects. However, modernization is only part of the challenge. The agreement itself requires stewardship, and that is fundamentally a diplomatic and political function best performed by Global Affairs Canada.
Third, as the U.S. military reassesses future billet allocations, Canada must likewise continue to evaluate which positions best serve Canadian interests. In my view, Canadian billets within the United States military remain essential, particularly the deputy command positions in the Alaska NORAD region, the continental NORAD region and the NORAD headquarters itself. These posts provide Canada with influence, situational awareness and direct access to decision-making.
Fourth, and most importantly, NORAD modernization projects must be accelerated, especially those related to domain awareness and continental defence. Improved detection, tracking and attribution capabilities are foundational to every other aspect of continental defence. Canada cannot afford to wait for improvements to arrive according to a 20-year budget cycle.
In closing, NORAD remains valuable to both countries. However, successful institutions require constant tending. Canada should not assume that decades of stability guarantee future continuity. The best way to preserve the NORAD we have is to actively shape the NORAD we will need.
Thank you.
