Mr. Chair, and honourable members, it's an honour and a pleasure to be able to speak to you today.
I have been studying, writing about and working with international institutions for 35 years as a professor, as a dean of a public policy school, aa a government official in the U.S. Department of State, and then, as the head of a think and action tank.
In 2022, I was invited to join the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, which was tasked with making recommendations on how to reform international institutions for the pact for the future in 2024. It seems like another world. However, we met for two years. We were 12 people, including the current president of Singapore. We were completely representative of the world's geography and population. We issued a report, which I would recommend to you, given that this is the outset of your investigations. It is entitled “A Breakthrough for People and Planet: Effective and Inclusive Global Governance for Today and the Future”. It is very long—well, not very long for a UN report, but it is long. Nevertheless, I would commend it to you as the distillation of many comments from people all over the world, as well as from experts.
One of the parts of that report, which is much shorter, is that we set out 10 principles for effective multilateralism on one page. I am going to list those, and then I'm going to focus on five of them directly in the context of this moment.
First, effective multilateral institutions must be people-centred. They must be focused on the people they are supposed to serve—not the states but the people within the states. That's how you judge them.
They need to be representative. I'll come back to that.
They need to be transparent. This doesn't mean they need to be completely open, but it does mean their data and content need to be publicly accessible.
They need to be equitable. I will come back to that.
They need to be networked. Again, I will come back to that.
They need to be resourced. That one needs no explanation.
They need to be mission-focussed with a clear mission, which is, in fact, where progress is measurable.
They need to be flexible—and I'll come back to that—accountable and, finally, future-oriented.
There's more on each of these, but it is, I think, a very good framework for thinking about how to design new international institutions.
The principles of representativeness and equity are linked, and the attributes of being networked, flexible and future-oriented are linked, so I'll talk about them that way.
On representation, we cannot have a global institution in 2045 that is run by the victors of 1945. As long as that is the case, the institution is illegitimate and ineffective, and that is what we are seeing now.
Kofi Annan really tried to reform the UN Security Council. He got as close as I think you can get. I don't believe that can happen now. Instead, I think you have to work through the parts of the UN and the UN system that do work, specifically the UN General Assembly.
One of the things we said representativeness means is that stakeholders have a place at the table and a clear voice but also that you must have majority voting, even against the wishes of a minority opposition in matters of global concern. That is a key principle. It's hard to do, but you're not going to be effective without it.
In terms of representation and majority voting, real representation means a far greater role for global south countries in all global institutions, and a real role, not a role where the global north countries get together, and then add a few global south countries at the table. It has to be representative, with genuine input throughout.
Then, we get to representative, equitable, networked, flexible and future-oriented. These, again, all go together.
I want to start here by quoting a late great Canadian, John Ruggie, who was a professor and a dean and worked hard for Kofi Annan. He said back in the 1970s that institutions are not just entities with headquarters and letterhead. They are not just these formal things that we had always studied. Instead, they are collections of rules, norms and decision-making procedures that constrain behaviour, shape agendas and actually prescribe the behaviour of states.
If you look at that definition, when we look at international institutions, we have to include informal institutions, like the Basel committee on central bankers or the International Organization of Securities Commissions, which was actually chartered under the law of Quebec as a non-profit. These are very informal, but many of them are very powerful institutions that bring together the right officials from the right countries, who can then act directly domestically.
