Thank you for having me and inviting me to join this morning's proceedings. All protocols are observed.
I would like to focus my remarks today on the new possibilities for curbing gun violence opened by the UN Security Council's authorization of a new foreign security mission for Haiti.
In the coming months a window of opportunity may emerge to lay the foundations for lasting peace, but this could also turn into another failed attempt to rein in the growing power of gangs.
Haiti will face two important transitions in the coming months. First, the Kenyan-led security mission will transition into a gang suppression force, but there is little clarity about how this process will be managed. Second, in February 2026, the mandate of the current transitional administration will end, and it will need to be replaced by a new governing structure.
Credible elections cannot take place before the Transitional Presidential Council's term ends. Gangs control much of the two departments where over half of the electorate resides, as well as the main national highways, which would prevent the distribution and centralization of electoral materials. Holding elections amid the wide opposition to Haiti's current leadership will also inevitably trigger a post-electoral crisis, with political groups refusing to recognize the results.
While maintaining the current transitional structure could help preserve some political stability, the government is severely discredited due to corruption scandals and the endless political infighting, which has prevented it from designing and implementing a comprehensive security strategy to enhance coordination among the different security forces operating on the ground.
Consultations to establish a new political arrangement to succeed the transitional government after February have only recently begun and have shown little progress. There is a significant risk that any last-minute agreement will result in a weak governance structure lacking sufficient support, and may be perceived by Haitians as being imposed by the international community.
The multinational force authorized, two years ago, the deployment of a multinational mission that would be composed of 2,500 officers, but it has only been able to deploy 1,000 of them. Due to a lack of funding, personnel and equipment, the force has only been able to establish three of the planned 12 bases that were meant to maintain a continuous presence and carry dedicated operations against the gangs in all territories they currently occupy.
The mission operates with less than 30% of its required equipment. Armoured vehicles are not suited to the urban environment in Port-au-Prince and a lack of spare parts has left half of the fleet out of service. Although the force now has two helicopters for medical evacuations, it still lacks air and maritime combat capabilities, which are critical to disrupt supplies to the gangs.
The new security mission's concept was deployed mainly to address the funding shortages and logistical challenges that have limited the foreign force's operational capacity so far. The mission will have a UN support office based in Port-au-Prince, which will be funded through predictable resources coming from the UN's assessed peacekeeping budget. However, the cost of the mission's personnel will still depend on voluntary contributions. At full deployment, this could amount to around $100 million per year. Without these contributions, the new mission will not be able to reach and sustain its full capacity to achieve its objectives.
It is still unclear how the transition to the new force will unfold. Countries currently participating in the current mission have expressed their intention to remain under the gang suppression force, but it is not yet known whether the currently deployed contingents will be fully integrated into the new structure. In the meantime, voluntary contributions will be needed to pay for the mission's logistics and basic personnel needs to ensure that current personnel remain operational on the ground until the new force is fully deployed. A gap between the outgoing Kenyan-led mission and the incoming gang suppression force must be avoided at all costs as gangs will certainly take advantage of it.
The new force has a more offensive mandate than the previous one, but operations should begin in rather accessible areas to minimize civilian casualties, while disrupting gang supply chains and cutting off the revenue sources. Initial victories in sparsely populated areas, as, for example, regaining control of specific sections of national roads currently held by gangs, would carry symbolic value, build public support and encourage defections within gang ranks.
It is unlikely that the new security force will solve Haiti's security problem by arresting or killing all of the estimated 12,000 gang members—of whom 30% to 50% are minors—nor would such an approach be desirable, as most gang members join these groups at a young age to meet their most basic needs in an environment offering few, if any, alternatives. Haitian authorities have recently launched a program to help minors who want to leave gangs do so safely, but it currently envisions reaching only a fraction of the estimated number of children involved in these groups.
Haitians should also start exploring when and under what conditions they could contemplate talking with the criminal groups, with the goal of permanently dismantling them. The Haitian state, with international support, should consider what kinds of exit pathways could be offered beyond minors, including for senior gang members willing to disarm and co-operate with authorities.
As Haitian authorities and their international counterparts plan for these two crucial transitions, they must be prepared for the Viv Ansanm gang coalition to step up attacks in an effort to derail them, expand territorial control, target critical infrastructure and attempt to bring down the transitional government again, as they did last year.
Thank you.