On the Russian front, in particular, they started reinvesting in a lot of these capabilities with northern application close to 20 years ago. I think that maybe waiting five years or 10 years to be certain that this was a trajectory that was certain to be a problem.... We could have maybe had a little leeway for about half the time that it's taken us to really kick into gear to start responding, but I think, at this point, we're well overdue.
In terms of things that we could do, I think there are a number. Part of it, as we discussed earlier, is that we have a tendency to be extraordinarily Canadian and to want to have a competitive environment in all circumstances. I think there are a lot of environments in which it doesn't make any sense to create a competition just for the sake of having one, so making more decisions on a sole-source basis would be smart.
There are a number of other things we should do. We're trying to do a lot at the same time. We're undertaking the most comprehensive military modernization effort since we rearmed for the Korean War, and I think we're doing so with a Government of Canada administrative apparatus and bureaucracy that's a little heavier than it was in the early 1950s. Until we can change that, I think we need to make priorities. I think one of the priorities that we should make is to focus our efforts on Arctic capability, both for our own reasons and because I think it's an opportunity to have a constructive discussion with the U.S. administration and to do something that they want.