Good afternoon.
In response to the spring 1972 North Vietnamese offensive, the United States retaliated with an unrestricted bombing campaign, including the mining of Haiphong harbour. At anchor and transiting to and from the port were Soviet merchant ships, which created the possibility of a major incident. At the same time, President Nixon was at the Moscow summit with General Secretary Brezhnev, signing the SALT treaty and ushering in a period of relaxed tensions or détente.
I raise this example—and there are many more—to remind the committee that in the world of great power politics, relations among the powers are generally a mix of confrontation, competition and co-operation, depending on the issue and the location. Nothing is more dangerous to international peace and security than when powers perceive the world in black and white terms. Polarization is the harbinger of a major war, which is in the interest of no one.
While the steps taken by the west and Canada since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and even earlier, are fully understandable, these steps should not colour areas of legitimate competition and co-operation. This should be the case for the Arctic and the security of the Canadian Arctic.
Security requires a mix of deterrence or defence capabilities and diplomatic interaction. Canada, along with its allies, has taken long overdue important first steps to provide enhanced defence and security for the Arctic and North America. However, the country and our allies have neglected the diplomatic side of the equation as a means of providing reassurance that defence initiatives are not perceived as aggressive or threatening, per se, by Russia and China. No one wants to stumble into war by misperception and accident.
Placing the Arctic Council on hiatus was an understandable signal or message to Moscow, but the time has come to return to a normal relationship with Russia, which includes ministerial meetings of the council. The return of working groups, albeit with Russian scientists engaging virtually, is a useful first baby step. This a way to begin normalizing and insulating relations with Russia in the Arctic from the Ukraine imbroglio, out of common interest.
Nonetheless, the time has come to begin the process of ministerial re-engagement. In no way would this legitimize Russia's invasion of Ukraine or undermine western and Canadian support to Ukraine. It would enhance co-operative security measures within the gambit of the Arctic Council.
At the same time, with existing and planned defence initiatives in the Arctic, consideration should be given to opening low-level diplomatic/military discussions, an Arctic security forces round table, to develop and implement confidence and security-building measures to avoid misperceptions and potential accidents that might be perceived as threatening.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the vital defence initiatives being undertaken by the government do not serve to undermine the economic and environmental security of the indigenous and local communities. These initiatives and the building of new defence infrastructure must not put a strain on these communities.
In conclusion, these considerations require bold and potentially unpopular leadership by Canada in cementing its place as the leading Arctic state.
I look forward to expanding on my comments and answering any other questions related to Arctic security.
Thank you.