Evidence of meeting #72 for Government Operations and Estimates in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was commissioner.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Michael Ferguson  Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada
Scott Chamberlain  Director of Labour Relations, General Counsel, Association of Canadian Financial Officers
Debi Daviau  President, Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada
Larry Rousseau  Executive Vice-President, National Capital Region, Public Service Alliance of Canada
Stan Korosec  As an Individual
Patricia Harewood  Counsel, Public Service Alliance of Canada
Isabelle Roy  General Counsel, Legal Affairs, Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada

February 21st, 2017 / 8:45 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Tom Lukiwski

Ladies and gentlemen, I call the meeting to order. I'm a big believer in punctuality and starting on time. It's 8:45 and we have quorum. I think we'll start.

This is the continuing study of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, also known as the whistle-blowers protection act.

We are very pleased to have with us the Auditor General of Canada, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Chamberlain, representing the Association of Canadian Financial Officers.

Mr. Ferguson, I believe you have a short opening statement. Following that, we'll have Mr. Chamberlain's short statement. We'll follow that with a round of questions from all of our committee members.

Mr. Ferguson, welcome to our committee. The floor is yours.

8:45 a.m.

Michael Ferguson Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for this opportunity to present our office's experience under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act.

Joining me at the table is Andrew Hayes, senior legal counsel for the office.

Under section 14 of the act, the Auditor General has the power to receive, review, and investigate disclosures about wrongdoing on the part of the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner or PSIC officials.

To date we have received 27 disclosures of alleged wrongdoing by PSIC officials that have resulted in three completed investigations, one investigation that is still under way, and one performance audit.

In conducting our work, we've noted some limitations that exist within the act. For example, we cannot investigate complaints of reprisals that come from PSIC employees and, in the course of an investigation, we are not allowed to seek information from outside the public sector.

These limitations proved to be a problem in 2010, when we began investigating three disclosures received by our office under the act. This caused us to convert our investigation into a performance audit, to be able to fully examine allegations of reprisal and obtain all the required information.

In our view, this illustrates why it’s important that PSIC employees have the same avenues of recourse as other public servants. We see two options if Parliament wishes to address the limitations we've noted.

The first option is to expand our mandate. We’ve noted that the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada has recommended that consideration be given to amending section 14 of the act. This would allow the Auditor General to investigate disclosures coming from the public concerning PSIC officials and reprisal complaints made by PSIC employees, with all the related powers and duties of the commissioner.

Our experience has been that PSDPA investigations are often complex and time-consuming. An expansion of our mandate would likely increase the number of disclosures, with considerable impact on our resources. To take on this work, we would need additional funding or we would have to reduce the number of performance audits that we can do.

The second option is to consider an alternate model, such as that which exists for the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner. These agents have the ability to appoint an independent investigator to deal with complaints regarding their obligations under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.

The committee should be aware that we did not pursue many of the complaints that we received because they were disputes of decisions reached by the commissioner. The correct approach for an individual to dispute a decision is to file an application for judicial review with the Federal Court, which we believe is appropriate.

Ultimately, it’s up to Parliament to decide how it wishes to address the limitations we've noted under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act. We will, of course, comply with whatever Parliament decides.

Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening statement. We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have.

Thank you.

8:45 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Tom Lukiwski

Thank you, Mr. Ferguson.

Mr. Chamberlain, go ahead, please.

8:45 a.m.

Scott Chamberlain Director of Labour Relations, General Counsel, Association of Canadian Financial Officers

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to appear before you today.

My colleagues and I at ACFO have had the opportunity to counsel hundreds of public servants who came forward and wanted to do the right thing. In the vast majority of these cases, those public servants decide not to do anything.

I've heard the committee ask questions about why the numbers are so low. I believe it's not because public servants don't want to come forward and disclose wrongdoing, and not because there is no wrongdoing that exists; it is because these public servants' singular fear is that they will lose their livelihood as a result of doing the right thing.

With that in mind, ACFO submits that in order to have an effective system, we need a single system managed by an independent office that has the power to protect the livelihood of those who come forward.

I'll talk a little about my background. I am ACFO's general counsel and director of labour relations. As such, for every case file that comes into my organization, I either talk to the member or talk to the labour relations adviser, who talks to the member. Until very recently, ACFO discouraged its members from coming forward. We've always discouraged them from going to the departments, because we don't feel they are protected there. Until about two years ago, we discouraged them from going to PSIC, because we did not feel they would be protected there. We think that's changing, and their trajectory is in the right direction now.

I've had the opportunity to represent the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD, representing 62 million workers globally, and 20 million workers at Public Services International before the ILO, working on whistle-blowing and anti-corruption measures. I've also served on the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner's advisory board, and I'm the chair of Canadians for Tax Fairness, an independent, not-for-profit NGO. In that role, I've referred a number of private sector whistle-blowers to law enforcement, to PSIC, and to the media.

I can tell you that in all these—internationally, private sector, and public sector—there is a fear that blowing the whistle will ruin your life. I think you've heard the evidence already that this does occur.

We have five recommendations we think will help in this regard. I'll indicate where the models are, because these recommendations are tried and tested in other jurisdictions.

The first is, I think, unique to ACFO in terms of what the committee is going to hear. We believe that a public servant who blows the whistle should have a staffing priority. The staffing priority system is well established in the public service. It's typically used for public servants who come back from leave. Let's say they've relocated with their spouse, or they've had military service; when they come back, if they're qualified, they are at the front of the queue for jobs.

I think you've heard other witnesses suggest that pay protection is in order for whistle-blowers, and I agree with that, but I think that before you protect pay, you can give the members an option to use the staffing priority process to find another job outside the context in which they've blown the whistle so that they can continue to contribute. Most of them do want to continue to contribute and not sit at home while a lengthy process takes place. If you look at the U.S. system, the South Korean system, and the whistle-blower protection in South Africa—the provisions are detailed in our brief—you see that there is pay protection, and in some cases staffing priority rights, in those jurisdictions.

Second, we believe—and I know you've heard this, so I won't belabour the point—that a reverse onus is absolutely essential for cases of reprisal. This exists most recently in Quebec. I'm not even sure the legislation is published, but I know through colleagues in Quebec that the Quebec legislation will have reverse onus. It exists in the U.S. and in South Africa.

Third, to echo Mr. Ferguson's point, we believe that there should be an expansion of the jurisdiction so that investigations can follow the trail into the private sector. Too often we hear of investigations stopped because a senior public servant has retired, or the chain of waste goes into the private sector. This needs to change. You need only look to New Zealand or Australia for examples of legislation covering both the public and the private sectors.

Fourth is an incentive system. This is something we're working on internationally quite a bit. We believe that in certain cases whistle-blowers should be rewarded if their information results in the recovery of revenue. If you look at the U.S. system, it's firmly in place there. Actually, it has been in place since the days of Lincoln. In Ontario the securities commission has just put in a program like this, and Korea has a system as well.

The fear that people raise with an incentive-based system is that it will result in a lot of false claims, but the evidence does not bear that out. Much more is recovered. I have spoken to people in the U.S. in particular who work on these files directly. They report that false claims are not an issue and that they have recovered billions of dollars as a result of an incentive-based system.

Strangely enough, it is firmly based in English common law, a principle called qui tam, which has just gone out of practice. It's time to bring it back.

Finally, we believe that there should be a consolidation of the integrity function. The disclosure process in the departments does not work. My members will not use it. They believe and I believe that departmental systems are designed to contain problems, not to deal with them. These systems serve to cause waste to fester, and it comes out when it's much worse. It comes out often in the media, or by other means.

Independence is essential. You can only do that through an independent office, and we had one already.

I have just a few other points.

There is something I would like to read to you. It's a little long, but I think it's worth it. Then I'll close.

It's an impact statement from a member we supported. She was involved in the PSIC case. There was a decision. It was the chair of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.

It's going to sound familiar, because it details gross mismanagement in terms of harassment, as you have seen in some of the more recent cases. I would urge you to read those cases and think about why PSIC is dealing with harassment when it seems so obvious when you read these cases.

The answer, similarly, is that departmental systems for harassment do not work. They're designed—again—to contain harassment, and they're not independent. This is why you're seeing harassment come up through the PSIC process and result in decisions that seem fairly obvious.

Realize that this harassment is often a product of corruption and waste in government and that harassment is a way to suppress people from speaking out, to suppress people from blowing the whistle.

Please bear with me for two minutes.

This is from Doreen Dyet. She has never disclosed her name before. She's a member. She was anonymous in the report, but she wanted you to know her name today.

As a former Director of Financial Services of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal I would like to convey my feelings to the Standing Committee about my experiences in dealing with the wrongdoing of the CHRT Chairperson....

As a manager, staff frequently complained to me about abuse...and her inappropriate conduct. Prior to her appointment, I had received a Chairperson's Award for work I had done in implementing harassment and recourse policies and procedures at the CHRT....

I was involved in a total of four difficult and grueling processes before [PSIC ruled in my favour].

She filed a harassment complaint. She participated in an investigation with the PCO. She filed multiple grievances over multiple years and had no recourse. Doreen Dyet only got a result by going to PSIC, and for that, ACFO supports PSIC and the current commissioner. We also support all 16 recommendations save one, which is that we believe that the legal fees should be at the discretion of the PSIC commissioner, not TBS, in terms of offering whistle-blowers more.

Given the time, I won't read through the whole statement, but I will provide it, translated, to the committee afterwards.

I will say that Doreen Dyet was successful. She won her whistle-blowing complaint. She lost her marriage. She lost her health. She lost her job after 34 years of service.

With the whistle-blowing system that we now have in place, even if you win, you lose. Ultimately, that is why, to 95% of members who call me up, I say, “You shouldn't go forward. If you're worried about feeding your family, if you're worried about your job, if you're worried about your health, it's not in your interest to come forward.”

The changes that I and some of the other witnesses have recommended are important to making a change happen so that people aren't afraid of losing their livelihoods.

Thank you.

8:55 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Tom Lukiwski

Thank you very much.

We'll start our seven-minute round with Mr. Peterson.

8:55 a.m.

Liberal

Kyle Peterson Liberal Newmarket—Aurora, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning, everyone.

Thank you for being here. I appreciate your submissions today.

I'm going to follow up with you, Mr. Chamberlain, on your comments and some of your recommendations. Can you elaborate on the reverse onus? I know some of us here are lawyers, but a lot of people aren't.

Just so that we can get it on the record, why is it that the way the system is now may put an undue burden on the complainant, and how might the reverse onus alleviate that undue burden when it comes to reprisals?

8:55 a.m.

Director of Labour Relations, General Counsel, Association of Canadian Financial Officers

Scott Chamberlain

Simply put, reverse onus is a rule of evidence. Normally, if you're alleging something, you have to prove it. That makes legal sense in most circumstances.

In this context, when we're often dealing with a power imbalance, the person who is blowing the whistle is usually not the person who has the power and the control. Often they are excluded from the workplace after this, so they don't have the evidence. It is a very difficult evidentiary burden to prove. Often it gets to a fifty-fifty, a “he said, he said” or a “he said, she said”, and that weighs in favour of the respondent in those cases. Reverse onus would change that balance—very slightly, in fact—so that the employer, who has the control, who has the power, and who has the other employees at their disposal, bears a bit more of an onus.

It's not unheard of. We have managerial exclusions, for example, which depend on whether an employee falls within a union or not. For certain exclusions, the onus is on the union and for certain exclusions the onus is on the employer. It's not unusual. It's not typical, but it's a well-known legal principle, and it serves a purpose in this case.

9 a.m.

Liberal

Kyle Peterson Liberal Newmarket—Aurora, ON

You mentioned that when you get calls from potential complainants in your organization, you often dissuade them from using the process because of the flaws you illuminated today.

Are there other avenues you recommend to them, or is it, “Sorry, there's not really anything you can do, and it's in your best interest just to keep quiet”?

9 a.m.

Director of Labour Relations, General Counsel, Association of Canadian Financial Officers

Scott Chamberlain

In Doreen Dyet's case, the one I was just referring to, we tried everything before we went to PSIC. This was more than two years ago. Today I would go to PSIC early on, and I do. I recommend that members go there, because I think the commissioner has made some improvements.

We grieve, and we file harassment and human rights complaints. Those were all done in that case. Two other unions went to the PCO and asked for another investigation, which was done. None of that resulted in a change in having it dealt with. Only the PSIC process did.

In terms of my other role, in terms of gains for tax fairness, I refer people to the media, the CRA, law enforcement, and PSIC now. I believe there's a role for PSIC, and the trajectory is going in the right direction.

9 a.m.

Liberal

Kyle Peterson Liberal Newmarket—Aurora, ON

I want to follow up briefly before I move on to Mr. Ferguson.

On the reward system, there are other jurisdictions you mentioned that use that system. What has been the outcome of that process there?

9 a.m.

Director of Labour Relations, General Counsel, Association of Canadian Financial Officers

Scott Chamberlain

I'm most familiar with the U.S. system. It's almost like a private prosecution, in a sense. If someone raises an issue of the government being defrauded, they are standing in the feet of the people and usually suing a third-party provider. If they prosecute that up to conclusion and recover money for the government, they get 30%, for example. If the Department of Justice steps in and says it's a valid case and they're going to take it forward, they get somewhere in the nature of 10%.

All reports are that it's a very effective system, and they've recovered billions of dollars in the United States.

9 a.m.

Liberal

Kyle Peterson Liberal Newmarket—Aurora, ON

Thank you, and thanks, Mr. Ferguson, for being here too.

From some of your recommendations, it's clear that you're limited in what you can do under this act, but I think the purpose of the act is to ensure that when complainants and employees witness what they believe is wrongdoing, they can come forward without fear of reprisal. The purpose is to make sure we have an effective public service and that people who are conducting themselves in a manner that can be defined as wrongdoing aren't profiting from that and aren't able to thrive in the public service.

Those two goals are laudable. I think we can all agree on that, but the question is how to get there.

In your review, do you see this act as being the only means? I know Mr. Chamberlain would like all complaints to go to PSIC and believes that this would be an appropriate solution. You mentioned that there should be a different resolution process. I believe that was what you said, that there should be a different avenue for complainants beyond what's in the act.

Can you expand on that?

9 a.m.

Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Michael Ferguson

Understanding that our role under the act is limited and that the only thing we are commenting on is our role, right now what we see is that there are some limitations to what we actually can do.

That really came to light in 2010, when we had three people bring forward complaints to us under the act about what was happening at PSIC itself.

9 a.m.

Liberal

Kyle Peterson Liberal Newmarket—Aurora, ON

Right.

9 a.m.

Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Michael Ferguson

When we started to look at it, we realized that these were complaints of reprisals by PSIC employees against the PSIC organization itself, and we didn't have the jurisdiction to investigate those. Similarly, it was going to require us to get information from outside the public service, and the act didn't give us the ability to do that either.

We had to stop the investigation under the PSIC legislation, and we had to conduct a performance audit under our own legislation. That wouldn't work in all cases, but in this case it did work. However, it also meant that the people who brought the complaints forward didn't have the same protection that the act would have provided them had we done an investigation under the act.

9:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Tom Lukiwski

Thank you very much.

Go ahead, Mr. Clarke, for seven minutes.

9:05 a.m.

Conservative

Alupa Clarke Conservative Beauport—Limoilou, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I also want to thank the three witnesses who are appearing before us this morning.

I have a few questions for you, Mr. Ferguson.

I understand that you can't investigate complaints made by PSIC employees and that you also can't investigate complaints made by the public in general.

That said, can you conduct an investigation when the case involves public servants who have proceeded through disclosure entities within departments?

9:05 a.m.

Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Michael Ferguson

Do you mean any public servant?

9:05 a.m.

Conservative

Alupa Clarke Conservative Beauport—Limoilou, QC

Yes. There are two avenues to take into consideration. People can proceed through the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner or through internal sources.

Can you investigate public servants who have proceeded through internal sources?

9:05 a.m.

Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Michael Ferguson

No. Our responsibility is simply to review processes used at PSIC.

9:05 a.m.

Conservative

Alupa Clarke Conservative Beauport—Limoilou, QC

Okay.

9:05 a.m.

Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Michael Ferguson

As a result, our responsibility and role is to investigate any complaints regarding how PSIC operates. Nonetheless, again, our powers are limited, given that we can't review a reprisal complaint made by a PSIC employee.

9:05 a.m.

Conservative

Alupa Clarke Conservative Beauport—Limoilou, QC

Okay.

9:05 a.m.

Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada

Michael Ferguson

So our role doesn't involve reviewing the department's internal process.

9:05 a.m.

Conservative

Alupa Clarke Conservative Beauport—Limoilou, QC

I understand what you're saying.

Your responsibilities concern public servants who file complaints regarding the process used at PSIC.

However, what about public servants who file complaints regarding a department's internal process? If you can't respond to these people, who can they contact? I suppose the solution would be to contact PSIC.

Is that correct?