Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I would like to point out the absolute relevance of the motion, relative to the most recent letter received from Erin O'Gorman. She indicated in the second-last sentence of the letter that:
The response above was referring specifically to backup copies of emails in a PST file—a digital file folder created by an employee on a desktop computer—that was corrupted. No backup copies exist of this PST file.
Those two sentences in themselves indicate the necessity of looking into this. The fact that an employee—never mind the CIO of the CBSA—can create the backup copies in a PST file, that they can move them to their desktop computer, that they could be corrupted within their own desktop computer and then corrupted beyond recall so that they cannot be examined in situations like ArriveCAN, which requires the evaluation of all the emails....
In the last sentence that she gives, “No backup copies exist of this PST file”, if we don't have backup copies, we don't know what was in this PST file. We don't know what information we don't have.
My point is that the most recent communication from Erin O'Gorman absolutely indicates the necessity of this motion and of this study.
Further to the omission of the President of the Treasury Board from the motion, you will recall the motion that I moved last week, before receiving the second communication from Erin O'Gorman. The chair indicated that in an attempt to determine from the Information Commissioner the possibility of registering a complaint about the acceptability of this information being stored in that way and about why this information was stored, she indicated that she had no jurisdiction over it and that we actually had to go to the President of the Treasury Board. That was due to the situation that we found ourselves in—without access to these corrupted emails—being under the purview of the Treasury Board's directive on information management, which is governed by the President of the Treasury Board, Anita Anand.
This is absolutely a study that is needed, as I indicated in my opening, to ensure that we completely understand the processes and to ensure that we understand how this came to happen so that it doesn't happen again.
It is clear, by the directives that oversee the possibility of this situation occurring again, that these directives come from the Treasury Board; therefore, the President of the Treasury Board should be here to answer for that, Mr. Chair.
That was incredibly verbose, but I believe I've made my points.
Thank you.