Thank you very much, Madame Vignola.
Yes, I would like to emphasize that I am not against any sector of the Canadian marine industry, whether that be the designers, the builders or the equipment suppliers. I have been a firm supporter of that throughout my career in Canada, and I've participated in many unpaid activities—to the regret of my wife—that have dragged me to meetings all over the place.
We have the ability to build a capability in Canada better than we have today, but we have to go about it the right way. There are problems that come from the government side. There are problems that come from the management side within the shipyards. In my opinion, the latter are greater.
Just to give one example, the original design of the AOPS was purely commercial. It was designed to use commercial equipment, the cheapest possible commercial equipment. It was a design-to-cost project to keep the costs down. As soon as the project was awarded under NSS, the program office in DND was told that the shipyard was going to make it an ITAR project under the international arms trade regulations, because of the people they wanted to use to support them from the U.S.
That instantly caused a huge cost increase. It caused an increase in complexity. It required us to go and search for drawings that had been given to companies around the world and get them back because they weren't authorized to have them any longer. That was purely a shipyard decision, and there are many other shipyard decisions I could point to that have had the effect of driving up the price.
My concern here is that the government had lost control.
I said to the program manager at the time, “Why are you allowing this to happen?” The answer: “Oh, the shipyard tells us they need to.”
The shipyard is not in control. These are government ships.
That's the sort of messaging I've heard repeatedly about NSS, which is an indication to me that the system as designed, the system as implemented, is not a good system.