Government Operations Committee on June 3rd, 2022

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you, General.

We'll now go to Mrs. Vignola for four minutes.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for taking the time to make your statements in two official languages. It's very nice to hear the witnesses speak my native language.

My first question will be for Brigadier-General Jeannot Boucher.

In your comments, you referred to a three-year cycle. That seems a bit short to me, especially when you take into account the construction time and the life cycle of the infrastructure. However, I know that the time you had to make your remarks was very short and that you did not have time to develop your idea.

For the next couple of minutes, could you tell us more about what this cycle entails and the medium‑ to long-term vision for defence planning?

[BGen Jeannot Boucher]

Mr. Chair, I thank the member for her question.

Ms. Vignola, this is what we do during the three-year cycle.

Firstly, we look at the operating environment, which has evolved much more rapidly than we expected.

Second, we can determine what the implications are for allies and for Canada. This is where we are able to identify gaps in our capabilities, whether it's equipment, structure or infrastructure.

Thirdly, we develop scenarios and do modelling, to identify priorities in relation to our capabilities. Then we can develop a program from the projects we have discussed.

Our planning horizon is five to twenty years. We are looking at what capabilities we need to start developing now, in order to achieve our goals within a few years.

We repeat this cycle every three years, to keep us up to date and make any adjustments required.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Thank you very much for these clarifications.

I find a three-year cycle a bit short when you think of the life cycle of ships and aircraft, among other things. However, the details you provided have helped to clarify my thinking.

I will now turn to Deputy Commander Alain Pelletier.

As was said earlier, the North Warning System needs to be replaced because it is outdated. We've known that for quite some time. Earlier, Mr. Paul‑Hus mentioned the over-the-horizon radar.

The area to be covered, to be protected, is gigantic. Will one radar be enough or will other infrastructure, other radars or other satellites be needed to cover the whole northern territory well?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Mr. Chair, I thank the member for her question.

Of course, the territory is huge. NORAD's area of operation is global, not limited to North America. Indeed, our aerospace warning mission actually covers the whole world. We need to know where the missiles are being launched from, so that we can establish a possible trajectory and warn both governments of this threat.

So we use assets that are provided to us by the space commands in the United States, as well as assets that are provided by the director general of space in Canada.

We monitor, globally, the particular threat associated with the air domain. Obviously, the traditional approach is to focus on the north, but there is also a focus on the east and west of the continent.

The over-the-horizon radars allow us, through their technology, to have a view of the airspace at distances that are at least a dozen times wider or longer than what we currently get from the North Warning System.

We have also sought to define the radar structure we need to meet our requirements. The U.S. government, in its budget estimates for the current year, has budgeted for the purchase of four radars, which will allow for the positioning of a radar on the east, south and west coasts as well as in Alaska. These radars, combined with Canada's likely contribution to the north, will give us a command and control architecture, as well as viewing and detection architecture that will allow us to meet future requirements.

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you, General.

We'll now go to Mr. Boulerice for four minutes.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I also thank the witnesses for being here today. The discussions we are having are important.

This afternoon we are not necessarily talking about fighter jets. One of the first topics we talked about when I came to the House in 2011 was the F‑18 replacement. Eleven years later, I feel like we've made some progress, but not a lot. The process is rather long.

My question is for Mr. Quinn.

Mr. Quinn, I would like you to tell us about the situation in the Arctic, in the Canadian north.

In your assessment, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, by a much more isolated and aggressive Russia, what is the level of threat to our national security with respect to Canada's north?

[Jonathan Quinn]

Thank you for your question.

Yes, I would say to this that we've been seeing some trends in the global security environment for some time now. While we didn't necessarily predict what's happening in Ukraine, I think what is happening is pretty consistent with the trends we had identified and with the analysis we've been doing of global competition, which I mentioned during my opening remarks, and how we're really entering what we would call a “new phase of global competition”.

In terms of what that means for Canada, I would say that in the Arctic, we still don't necessarily see an immediate military threat to Canada's Arctic, but the region is changing quite dramatically both from a physical perspective and a geopolitical perspective.

On the physical side of things, it brings some pretty practical challenges. There is increasing activity, which could lead to increasing demands on the Canadian Armed Forces to conduct more safety and security-type operations, search and rescue operations. Also on the practical side, climate change is dramatically reducing the permafrost, which has implications for northern infrastructure. Those all need to be taken into account.

From the geopolitical side, I think Russia is obviously the most capable Arctic military actor. They're rapidly modernizing and building up their forces. China has declared itself a near-Arctic state and is also developing some capabilities that are capable of challenging Canadian interests in the Arctic over the long term.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Excuse me for interrupting you, but I don't have much time.

We've talked a lot about the need for the detection system in the Arctic.

Lieutenant-General Pelletier, I'm trying to get this right. We need to be better equipped and better prepared. We need to modernize, have a more functional warning system in the north, add radar. Would that mean that at the moment we are threatened with incursion, for example, by Russian submarines that would be undetectable?

Is our current system good or are we really behind the curve?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thank you for your question.

Of course, as our discussion is public, this limits my ability to respond to you somewhat. However, we can tell you that we currently have a submarine detection system. And the technology in this area has evolved on the Russian and Chinese side. These capabilities exist on the east coast and, at present, we expect these capabilities to be present on the west coast. But I'm not an expert on Arctic navigation capabilities. You would have to go to the Canadian Navy.

So we have a detection system. We have proposed that this detection capability from coast to coast as well as in the Arctic be augmented, and that need has been addressed by Brigadier-General Boucher's team.

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you, General.

We'll now go into our second round and start with Mr. McCauley for four minutes.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Great, thanks Chair.

Gentlemen, thanks for joining us today. I appreciate the information so far.

I have the same question for all three of you. I'll start with you, Mr. Pelletier, and then Mr. Quinn, and then Mr. Boucher to follow up. In your opinion, should Canada be joining the U.S. ballistic missile defense program?

Go ahead, Mr. Pelletier.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Obviously, ballistic missile defence is not one, but a series of multiple—

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Pelletier, I'm going to interrupt you. It's a relatively simple question.

Do you believe, as a partner in NORAD, that Canada should be joining this, especially seeing the new threats? If you say that it has to be a political decision, that's fine, but I would just like a simple answer.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Okay. I do believe that this is a policy discussion and decision to be made by our government.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Do you have a role in providing a recommendation, and would you share that?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I have a role in providing information as to how we currently do business as it relates to the—

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

So NORAD does not provide.... You don't provide a recommendation to the government from your office on joining—

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

The chief of defence staff provides a recommendation.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Okay, that's a fair answer.

Mr. Quinn, I have the same question for you.

[Jonathan Quinn]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Chair.

I think that the minister recently said we're looking at all of the different threats to Canada—

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Yes, I saw the comprehensive review, but that's just talking points.

I'd like to know, and I think Canadians would like to know, if we should be joining, especially considering the new threats from both China and also the Russian aggression.

[Jonathan Quinn]

Mr. Chair, all I can say at this point is that we're considering all options. We're looking at the threats faced in this regard. We'll take all of that into consideration as we await a government decision on what we're doing in terms of NORAD modernization and fulfilling the commitments that have been made.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

I think I see where we're going with this, so I'll spare Mr. Boucher having to answer that.

Mr. Boucher, you talked about planning five to 20 years out for future procurement and future equipment. How difficult is this process when it's taking us—the past and the current governments are guilty—10 years to make a decision on a fighter? It's going to be 10 or 15 years for us to get a warship into the water.

How does that affect your five- to 20-year planning process?

[BGen Jeannot Boucher]

As I said earlier, we work closely with our allies on this, whether it's the U.S. or our NATO partners, which use a very similar process. Once again, we look at the operating environment, its implications and what the capability gaps are for Canada. Those will vary slightly—