Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
With me are Warren Newman, who is general counsel for constitutional and administrative law; Kathy O'Hara, deputy secretary to the cabinet, machinery of government; and Dan McDougall, director of operations, legislation and House planning.
Good morning, colleagues. I'm very pleased to appear before your committee to talk about Bill C-16 relating to fixed election dates. I will begin by describing the present system for calling general elections and I will mention some of the difficulties it creates.
I also want to talk about why the government chose to draft the bill the way it did, and why the route we took was both necessary and effective.
Finally, I would be happy to respond to any questions.
Today, as you know, it is the prerogative of the Prime Minister whose government has not lost the confidence in the House of Commons to select what he or she regards as a propitious time for an election to renew the government's mandate. The Prime Minister then requests dissolution of the House from the Governor General, and if the Governor General agrees, he or she proclaims the date of the election.
What we have is a situation where the Prime Minister is able to choose the date of the general election--not necessarily what is in the best interests of the country, but conceivably what is in the best interests of his or her party. Bill C-16 will address this situation and produce a number of other benefits.
As set out in the government's platform, this bill is modelled after existing provincial fixed-date elections legislation. The legislation is similar to the approach used by British Columbia, Ontario, and Newfoundland and Labrador. British Columbia just had its first fixed-date election on May 17, 2005. Ontario, and Newfoundland and Labrador, will soon have their fixed-date elections October 4, 2007, and October 9, 2007 respectively.
In British Columbia, there was certainly no evidence of what some critics have called a lame-duck government, and certainly no evidence that the legislation was in some way illusory or ineffective.
The government's bill provides that the date for the next general election will be Monday, October 19, 2009. Of course, this will be the date only if the government is able to retain the confidence of the House until that time. This bill does not affect the powers of the Governor General to call an election sooner if a government loses the confidence of the House. For example, if the government were to be defeated tomorrow, a general election would be held according to normal practice; however, the subsequent election would be scheduled for the third Monday in October in the fourth calendar year after the next election. That is the normal model that would be established by this bill. General elections would occur on the third Monday of October in the fourth calendar year following the previous general election.
We chose the third Monday in October because it was the date that was likely to maximize voter turnout and the least likely to conflict with cultural or religious holidays or elections in other jurisdictions. This raises an additional feature of the bill that I want to bring to your attention, which provides for an alternate election date in the event of a conflict with a date of religious or cultural significance, or an election in another jurisdiction.
In the current system, the date of the general election is chosen by the government, so it is rare that a polling date is chosen that comes into conflict with a date of cultural or religious significance, or with elections in other jurisdictions. However, with the introduction of legislation providing for fixed-date elections, there is some possibility that in the future the stipulated election date will occasionally be the same as a day of cultural or religious significance, or an election in another jurisdiction.
The Ontario fixed-date elections legislation provides that if there is a conflict with a day of cultural or religious significance, the Chief Elections Officer may recommend an alternative polling date to the Lieutenant Governor in Council up to seven days following the date that would otherwise be the polling date.
Using a variation of the Ontario legislation providing for fixed-date elections, our bill empowers the Chief Electoral Officer to recommend an alternate polling day to the Governor in Council should he or she find that the polling date is not suitable for that purpose. The alternate date would be either the Tuesday or the Monday following the Monday that would otherwise be the polling date. Allowing alternate polling days to be held on the following Tuesday or Monday is consistent with the current federal practice of holding elections on a Monday or a Tuesday.
Fixed-date elections will provide numerous benefits to our political system. With fixed-date elections the timing of general elections will be known to all, which will provide for greater fairness. Instead of the governing party having the advantage of determining when the next election will take place and being the single party that may know for up to several months when it will occur, all parties will be on an equal footing.
Another key advantage of fixed-date elections is that this measure will provide transparency as to when general elections will be held. Rather than decisions about election dates being made behind closed doors, general election dates will be public knowledge. I think they will allow for improved governance. For example, fixed-date elections will allow for better parliamentary planning. Members of parliamentary committees will be able to set their agendas well in advance, which will make the work of committees and Parliament as a whole more efficient.
Another reason for adopting fixed-date elections is that this measure will likely improve voter turnout because elections will be held in October, except when a government loses the confidence of the House. The weather is generally favourable in most parts of the country at that time of year, and fewer people are transient. So for example, most students will not be in transition between home and school at that time and will be able to vote. Moreover, seniors will not be deterred from voting, as they might in some of the colder months.
Now, it should be noted that the weekend before the third Monday in October is Thanksgiving weekend. This would be the weekend of advance voting, as advance voting is set in the Canada Elections Act for the tenth, ninth, and seventh days before polling day. That would be the Friday, the Saturday, and the Monday prior to the election date. I believe that having Canadians discussing the general election during part of a Thanksgiving weekend is not a bad thing. And if some Canadians wish to spend a few minutes voting in advance polls that weekend, all the better.
For your information, only 10.5% of those who voted in 2006 voted in the advance polls, while 2.8% voted either at a returning office or by postal ballot. The vast majority of voters, 86.7% in 2006, cast their votes on polling day. So those who would have to staff the advance polls, which are open from noon until 8 p.m. in fewer than 3,000 locations, would be aware of this responsibility before they accepted the position.
Some members have indicated that the bill is illusory in that the Prime Minister can call an election at any point up until the fixed election date. All I can say is that this view does not reflect the way our system of responsible government actually works. The Prime Minister has to retain his or her prerogative to advise dissolution to allow for situations when the government loses the confidence of the House. This is a fundamental principle of our system of responsible government.
It has been suggested that the government should insert a clause into Bill C-16 constraining the Prime Minister's ability to request dissolution of Parliament to certain circumstances. Let me be clear. Including a clause that attempts to constrain the Prime Minister in requesting dissolution of Parliament would, in our view, present a risk, which we should not ignore, that the legislation would be found unconstitutional if challenged in the courts. Why? Under the rules and conventions of responsible government, the Governor General's power to dissolve Parliament has to be exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Governor General's legal power under the Constitution and the exercise of that power on the advice of the Prime Minister are fundamentally and inseparably linked. If one limits the Prime Minister's ability to advise, one risks constraining the Governor General's powers in a way that would be unconstitutional.
An amendment in relation to the powers of the Office of the Governor General would require, of course, the consent of the Houses of Parliament and of the legislative assemblies of all provinces, and I think with respect to this piece of legislation, it is unnecessary and unwanted.
It has also been suggested that governments should insert a clause into Bill C-16 that would define very specifically what constitutes a vote of confidence. This would, it is argued, prevent governments from engineering their own defeat in minority situations. Again, constraining the Prime Minister's power to advise the dissolution of Parliament except in certain circumstances would risk being declared unconstitutional and fettering the Governor General's powers. Moreover, if the bill were to attempt to define confidence or to provide criteria for when confidence is lost, the whole concept of confidence itself would risk becoming justiciable in the courts, something that would run contrary to the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and the appropriate role of the courts in our constitutional system of parliamentary democracy.
The government has followed the broad approach of British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Ontario, which is an approach that works. If one looks for other examples within the British parliamentary system where fixed-date elections are in place, such as New Zealand, Scotland, and Wales, none of them has provisions like the ones that have been suggested by certain members at second reading.
The government is committed to making this modest but important change to improve Canadian democratic institutions and practices, but this change must be done in a way that is respectful of our Constitution, our great heritage, and the principles of responsible government.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that the third week in October is National Citizenship Week in this country, a time when we celebrate what it means to be a citizen of Canada. It is fitting, then, that the general election date will be set for the third Monday in October--a most fitting and functional expression of our citizenship.
Fixed-date elections will provide for greater fairness, increased transparency and predictability, improved policy planning, and, I believe, increased voter turnout. In June of this past year, Ipsos Reid released the results of a poll that showed 78% of Canadians support government's plans to provide for fixed-date elections. I hope you will join me in voting in favour of this important and widely supported measure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.