Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
With me today are Mrs. Diane Davidson, who is the deputy chief electoral officer and senior legal counsel at Elections Canada; Mrs. Janice Vézina, who is the executive director of political financing and corporate services; and Mr. Stéphane Perrault, who is the senior general counsel at Elections Canada.
Thank you again.
As the chairman just said, it was only on Tuesday that we were invited to appear before your committee regarding this bill, which is very important for the political financing system. At that time, we were very busy preparing our appearance before the Senate regarding Bill C-31, which greatly hindered our ability to prepare a detailed and adequate analysis of the bill at hand.
Nevertheless, I think that it is important to share some comments with you today. I did not have the opportunity to prepare type-written notes. However, I would like to speak to you about certain issues that are raised by this bill. First, let me note that this bill responds to a recommendation my predecessor made and that it reflects his suggestions very well. Nonetheless, I must say that we were not consulted about drafting the bill. Therefore, we were informed about it only when it was tabled before the House.
The bill adds an important piece to the financial framework as regards the inflow of moneys to regulated entities under the Canada Elections Act. While the bill certainly responds to recommendations made by Elections Canada last January, it only touches one aspect of these recommendations, which is the loan aspect.
One observation I have in reviewing the piece of legislation is that loans should not be looked at in isolation from other rules regarding access to money, such as the one regarding stricter contribution limits, the existence or absence of spending limits for various entities governed by the act—mainly leadership contests—the rules governing transfers among various entities, and the availability of tax credits for certain entities during or outside the writ period, as well as other subsidies, such as the allowance offered to parties. The interaction of those evolving rules may have significant implications for candidates, lenders, and parties who have different financial needs and borrowing capabilities.
The proposed restrictions on loans, in conjunction with the recent contribution limit, will require entities to rely more heavily on loans from financial institutions to fund their activities. That's one likely outcome of Bill C-54.
The question arises as to whether financial institutions will be willing to play this role, and if so, to what extent, and how they will adjust their lending practices under the rules set out by Bill C-54. For example, a guarantor may not guarantee a loan for more than $1,100, except for parties and district associations. As parties are the only ones allowed to guarantee substantial loans, this may have an impact on the relationship between parties and candidates or between independent candidates and those supported by political parties. Will candidates or small parties be able to find sufficient financing to support their campaigns?
These are some of the questions that come to mind when we look more comprehensively at the financial framework for financial entities. I must admit that I have no answers at this time to those questions. It will require much more analysis.
Following our study which, I repeat, was only preliminary, I can say that this bill has some problems with implementation. Let me mention a few of them. For instance, the bill states that loans to candidates must be paid back 18 months after the date on which they were made rather than 18 months after the date of the election. In this way, a loan might have to be paid back even before the election is held. In our opinion, this is an operational problem.
Secondly, although the bill allows candidates to borrow from financial institutions, a candidate cannot use more than $1,100 worth of his personal resources or goods, for example his house, as collateral. We want to know whether a candidate can be exempted from these restrictions on loans or collateral, without violating the spirit of the bill.
A third example, which has more to do with the operations of Elections Canada, would be a situation in which a candidate tells us that the bank, following its usual accounting practice, considers a loan to be unrecoverable or written off. According to this bill, the Chief Electoral Officer must determine whether the loan has really been written off following the usual practice of the financial institution. However, nothing in the bill provides that the Chief Electoral Officer should have access to the documents of the financial institutions and that he will be able to verify their practices in such cases.
If a loan is written off, the riding association becomes responsible for the debt as if it had put up collateral. As we interpret the bill, this is more or less an automatic process triggered by writing off the debt. If this occurs, the association might not have agreed to collaterize the loan. Perhaps this is the intention of the bill, but I must draw it to your attention. Of course, these are only examples. A closer study would probably come up with more such examples.
In conclusion, Mr. Chair, I was--