Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Nov. 19th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Joe Preston]

I'll go ahead and start the meeting. We've had a bit of a delay today, so we're going to do our best.

Before I introduce Monsieur Massicotte for testimony today, the supplementary estimates have been delivered to this committee for the areas with which we need to look at them. We have until three days before the last supply day, so we're on a bit of a guess here as to when we can look at them or whether we should, I guess. That's to the will of the committee to decide. First, should we be calling the clerk forward on supplementary estimates? If so, we have a couple of meetings coming up here in late November and early December with only one witness. I thought maybe we could spend a short period of time looking at the supplementary estimates, if it's the will of the committee to do so.

I'm looking for a bit of guidance. And no one's making eye contact, so I will make my own decision.

[Marcel Proulx, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Please do so. We can criticize.

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[The Chair, Conservative, Joe Preston]

Okay. Let's say yes, that we will look at them. We will try to find a time and place that the clerk can come...one of the meetings where we have only one witness. We'll do 15 or 20 minutes on the supplementaries and then move to the witness. If that's the will of the committee, I'll leave it up to the clerk to work that scheduling out with the clerk of the House.

All right, moving on, I should have said that we are in public today and we are continuing, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), our study on the review of the Referendum Act.

Our witness today is Louis Massicotte. I'm going to let him introduce himself. He's a professor from Laval University. I'll let him do his own introduction. He has an opening statement, and then we will be able to ask him all the questions we can in the time that's left.

We're sorry we've taken some of your time away today, sir. The floor is yours.

[Louis Massicotte, Professor, Department of Political Science, Laval University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'll make my presentation in French and I will try to answer questions in either language.

I did not expect to have to introduce myself. I will try to be brief.

As you mentioned, I am a professor of political science at Laval University. I also hold the chair in democracy and parliamentary institutions research. That chair was established jointly by the National Assembly of Quebec and Laval University. However, I am not speaking here in any official capacity and I in no way speak for either of those two institutions.

I would like to thank you for inviting me to participate in your study of the Referendum Act. For me, the act is a bit of an old friend, since on June 15, 1992, I was invited to appear before the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs to comment on what was at that time Bill C-81. I must tell you that that was my first appearance before a federal parliamentary committee. I wondered whether it would be my last appearance, not because things went badly, but simply because, given the situation in 1992, I wondered whether I would still be a citizen of the same country at the end of the year. You know what the situation was.

I decided to reread the text I had prepared for my appearance at that time. Reading what one wrote 17 years ago is something approached with a degree of apprehension. At the time, I told the senators that a referendum was described by everyone as a deadlock breaking mechanism. I told them that rather than breaking deadlocks, what a referendum might do was confirm them, and that provincial politicians were merely reflecting the intransigence of their respective populations. Let us say that I reread that today and I have the feeling I was not completely wrong.

I will now say a few words about the situation 17 years ago. At the time, no one knew what the government had in mind when it introduced that bill. I will spare you all the hypotheses that were circulating then, but several days ago I decided to reread Mr. Mulroney's memoirs, he having been in a good position to know about all this. I realized that he did not say a word on the subject. So I was no farther ahead. In any event, it seems that once the Charlottetown Accord was signed, the decision to organize a referendum was made by the premiers very quickly, with the results that you know. That is the only time the act has been used since it was enacted.

I have read the document prepared by your researcher, Mr. Bédard, and it gives me a good idea of the questions that concern you. Your mandate includes very technical questions about which I think you should rely on technicians rather than professors. Your mandate also involves broader issues about which professors may be able to provide you with some useful information. I am going to stick to those issues.

The question that seemed most interesting to me is: should a referendum and a general election be allowed to be held at the same time? Myself, I see no major problem in this option being open to Parliament if it so wishes. I know that the present act does not permit it. I know that in Quebec, the legislation also does not permit it. This might be difficult because Quebec's Referendum Act provides for stringent limits on spending and it would be difficult to enforce them at the same time as a provincial election. It would not always be easy to distinguish between a referendum expenditure and an election expenditure. There would be a high risk of confusion, and this would make the effectiveness of the limits problematic.

The federal act is not based on the strict principle of equal spending for the “yes” and the “no”. As a result, it would probably not prompt the same objections. There is no shortage of precedents in Canadian history for referendums held at the same time as an election, although there have been none at the federal level, or in fact in Quebec. I have a reasonably good body of documentation on the history of referendums in Canada. I had a chance to consult it before coming here.

I found at least seven provinces and one territory that have at one time or another held a referendum and a general election at the same time. I have the years and the subjects of the referendums, if you are interested. The most recent cases, the ones that are most interesting for you, occurred in British Columbia and Ontario. I understand that those two provinces' chief electoral officers have told you or will tell you how things went.

At the international level, you may be interested to learn that Australia has combined elections and referendums seven times in its history, and that two referendum questions were put on the same date in 1999—as I recall; I was there. New Zealand held a referendum at the same time as an election in 1993 and 1999. France has done it once, in 1945. In England and Germany, the practice is unknown because referendums there are very rare, in any case. So the problem does not arise very much.

I see an advantage to a simultaneous election and referendum in terms of election turnout. One of the most consistent observations in this regard is that turnout depends to a large extent on the nature of the vote, on its salience, as it is put in English. A municipal or school board election, for example, draws fewer people than a provincial election. If a major and minor election are held at the same time, the second one will draw a higher turnout than if it were held in isolation. The country with the record for turnout for local elections, municipal elections, is Sweden. And coincidentally, it is the only country where local elections are held at the same time as elections for parliament.

In Germany, like here, there is considerable concern about the marked decline in turnout for provincial elections. In recent years, a rather clever trick has been used. Some provinces have simply decided to hold their provincial elections on the same day as the federal election. I can tell you—and I will spare you the details—that the effects are quite miraculous: if we look at the figures, we see that when the provincial election is held at the same time as the federal election, the turnout is significantly higher; and conversely, when a province stops holding its provincial elections on the same day as the federal election, when the provincial election is held in isolation, that is, there is a marked drop in the turnout. So holding the votes simultaneously may be an advantage.

I would note that right here, referendums on electoral reform have clearly illustrated how what I am saying applies. In Prince Edward Island, as you may know, a referendum on the voting method was held in isolation and there was a 33% turnout, while in British Columbia and Ontario, the election and the referendum were combined and while the turnout was not spectacular, it was still considerably higher.

I am simply saying that if a referendum deals with a broad reform, the importance of the subject will of course be enough to draw voters; we saw that with Charlottetown. If, however, the referendum deals with a less important question, one that is less sexy in the voters' eyes, we might be afraid that voters will stay home, so that by doing this, I think, we would protect against that risk.

Concerning referendum committees, another question that is part of your committee's mandate, the present act does not impose an equal ceiling for spending by the “yes” and the “no”. It limits the spending of each referendum committee, but not the number of committees. To many people, that provision allows the wealthy to buy the outcome of the referendum.

When I appeared before your fellow senators in 1992, I suggested that this vision, that the government could buy the outcome of the referendum simply by spending more than its adversaries, was somewhat simplistic.

I do not think I was wrong, in that in 1992, as you know, supporters of the Charlottetown Accord outside Quebec spent not twice as much as their adversaries, not 5 times or 10 times as much, but 13 times as much. Nonetheless, as you know, they lost the referendum. If memory serves, they lost by a substantial margin.

I don't think that Mr. Trudeau's speech at La Maison Egg Roll ended up in the expense accounts for the “no”, nor did the tape recordings of Ms. Wilhelmy's and Mr. Tremblay's late-night frustration. If that cost the “no” committee a cent, it was certainly the most profitable cent in all the history of elections in Canada. It did not appear in any expense. And yet any expert will tell you: that is what made the most difference in the referendum. In fact, it had more impact than all of the expensive advertising with which voters were inundated at the time.

It might have been amusing for some to see the “no” protagonists at the time, Mr. Trudeau, Mr. Preston Manning and Mr. Jacques Parizeau, having to work together on the same committee. It would certainly have been interesting to observe, but I don't think they would have found the experience very enjoyable.

Now let's consider the discrepancies between the Elections Act and the Referendum Act. If I understand correctly, in 2000, when a new Elections Act was enacted, amendments were also made for consistency with the Referendum Act. As I understand it, that exercise has not been repeated since then, and so there are discrepancies between the Elections Act and the Referendum Act. In particular, it seems that inmates have the right to vote in elections, but not in a referendum. Personally, I think that discrepancy is undesirable in principle. Referendum law should, as much as possible, be in line with elections law.

In fact, I apply the same reasoning to contributions. I do not see why companies and unions could contribute to referendum funds but not to election funds. In a way, there has to be consistency with the principles we proclaim. Choose the rule you like best, but I think, as much as possible, it should be the same for elections and referendums. However, I would like to state a caveat that seems appropriate to me. If you opt to model the Referendum Act on the Election Act, and thus prohibit contributions by companies and unions, the government will probably have to make up the difference that will remain as a result of prohibiting contributions from corporations. Obviously, taxpayers will be the ones who have to pay the difference, because the government will very probably have to give the various committees a subsidy to compensate.

The final point in my comments is the interaction between provincial and federal referendums. The Referendum Act is asymmetrical legislation, in that it can apply in one province, in several provinces or in the entire country. Special circumstances meant that in 1992, there were, legally speaking, two referendums. There was one in Quebec and one in the entire country less Quebec. I am not sure that was the best choice, even though political reality at the time made it necessary. I would simply like to point out that whatever good arguments can be made for doing it, there are in fact people who lost their right to vote because the Quebec act required six months' residence, which the federal act did not.

Personally, in 1992, I moved to Quebec. Very fortunately for me, I moved in January 1992. The referendum was held in October. If I had had the misfortune of having to move in July 1992, I would not have been in good standing under the act and I would not have been able to exercise my right to vote, because I would not have lived in Quebec for six months.

Obviously, I am not going to tell you that the referendum would have lost much if my voice had not been heard. What I want to say is that in terms of principles, it seems to me that a solution that means that people lose their right to vote is not the best solution.

I would add that this business of applying one act rather than another ended up in a fight between our two governments over money that went on for two years: whether Mr. Mulroney, two years earlier, had promised to reimburse Mr. Bourassa for the referendum. They were hunting everywhere at Privy Council to find a piece of paper. Apparently there wasn't one. I can tell you that people in very high places in the election bureaucracy did not even know there had been an agreement on this. It eventually ended as you know. In my opinion, that was not the best scenario.

On the question of that interaction, you can keep the flexibility in the existing act, if it appeals to you. But in terms of principles, I think this is pushing opting-out a little too far. In fact, to my knowledge, we are the only federation in the world that does things this way. Ordinarily, in a federation, when a “national” referendum is held, it is held throughout the country. In any event, I teach a course on comparative federalism, so I have to know a little about these things.

I will talk a little about another small detail, one that is more technical but that is still of some interest. In fact, I referred to it earlier. When Parliament votes on the motion that contains the referendum question, it does not know—in any event, there is no obligation to tell it—what province the referendum will be held in. It is the executive that decides, after the vote on the referendum question is held, which province the referendum will be held in.

Personally, I think the motion to adopt the referendum question should, at that point, specify the province where the referendum will be held, because in my humble opinion that kind of decision should not be left to the executive and be announced after the House of Commons and the Senate have passed the referendum question.

Ladies and gentlemen, those are my written comments. I am now prepared to answer your questions as best I can.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joe Preston]

Mr. Proulx, you're first today.

Let's start off our questioning of Professor Massicotte.

[Marcel Proulx, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, Mr. Massicotte, thank you for traveling from one capital city to another to be with us this morning. It is much appreciated.

Mr. Massicotte, I have a completely technical question.

Assume that a general election is going to be held and that at the same time there is a referendum campaign. Someone stands as a candidate in the riding of Hull—Aylmer and has to limit their spending to amount x for the general campaign. Let's take the magic number of $100,000 in spending. At the same time, for the referendum, there are “yes” committees and “no” committees whose spending is also limited. We know that in a general election, the votes are counted per individual, per candidate, so there is competition among four or five or six or seven or eight candidates in the riding. For the referendum, it is the total votes that decide the winner, all the votes, not by riding, but for the entire jurisdiction affected by the referendum, whether it be federal, provincial or municipal. Right in the middle of the campaign, after public debates are held, we find ourselves in a situation where the Liberal candidate in Hull—Aylmer has to give their opinion on the referendum. The candidate says they are on the “yes” side or the “no” side. Assume they come out in favour of the “no” and campaign very actively both to get elected and for the “no” camp.

How are we going to distinguish between the candidate's personal campaign expenses and the expenses associated with one of the “yes” or “no” committees?

It has become so complicated for official agents to do the accounting for all this, to do it with extreme care. They have always done it, but they were going to have to file report after report. This is almost as bad as it is for this government's advertising signs.

How do you see this, Mr. Massicotte? I understand the broad principles, whether we can have an election at the same time as a referendum and whether we can change the rules. My answer to that is “yes”, but in practice, the real question is how to do it. There has to be two sets of books, two arenas. How do you see this?

[Louis Massicotte]

Mr. Proulx, you are persuading me of the merits of public discussion, because when I listen to you I can distinguish between two scenarios, two typical referendums.

In the first kind of referendum, the people who support Party A almost all support one referendum option, and the people who support Party B all support the other option. As a result, in that scenario—

[Marcel Proulx, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

That is possible.

[Louis Massicotte]

There is a risk that this scenario will cause problems. In the other cases I have in mind, that correspond to the most recent instances dealing with the electoral system—and much longer ago, with prohibition—the reason why a referendum was decided on was precisely because the parties were unable to arrive at an internal consensus, for the “yes” or the “no”.

One tactic that is good policy was for people to say that if it was impossible to find unity within their ranks, it was better to put the question to the voters. In that case, I think doing it simultaneously does not cause a lot of problems because there is a campaign held. In Ontario and British Columbia, when there were referendums on the electoral system, all the politicians spread the word: they agreed not to tell the voters that they supported the system. I think the vast majority of candidates or sitting members were not very enthusiastic about the electoral system proposed. So there was a kind of self-censorship order. They decided it would be preferable not to come out in favour of the existing system to avoid voters reacting the opposite way and saying to themselves that it was probably a good idea after all. You are undoubtedly familiar with this kind of knee-jerk opposition. In other words, the problem you refer to does not arise if the parties are not clearly in favour of the “yes” or the “no” in a referendum.

In the other case, I think you have identified a very good argument, that it may not be wise, in terms of public policy, to do it that way.

As to your question about how to distinguish between the expenses, it all depends on the type of campaign you have. If you say offhand, on television or radio or in an interview with the local paper, that you support the “yes” or the “no”, that is not an election expense. It is if you start printing advertising or incurring expenses that it could become problematic.

Myself, I think it is possible, in accounting terms, to distinguish between referendum spending and election spending. I know it may be a little labour-intensive, but that can also be true sometimes in an election under the existing rules, when it comes to dividing up national expenses and local expenses. You see the difference. The fact is that it is done. The act provides for it.

Have I answered your question?

[Marcel Proulx, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Partly. I am going to come back to it later. My time is up for now.

[Louis Massicotte]

I will be happy to come back to it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joe Preston]

Let's see if we can be just a little more compact on our questions and answers.

Mr. Lukiwski.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Professor Massicotte, please excuse me: I don't speak French. I speak English.

You mentioned several times during your presentation that if the Referendum Act were to be aligned with the Elections Act there should be consistency of spending, contribution limits, number of contributors, types of contributors, that sort of thing. Would you prefer to see the Referendum Act aligned with the Elections Act, or would you rather see a stand-alone Referendum Act?

[Louis Massicotte]

I think I would prefer the Referendum Act to be aligned with the Elections Act. As far as I know, the Referendum Act has not been debated on its own merits since 1992. The Canada Elections Act, on the other hand, has been debated many times. I understand that in 2000 a brand new Elections Act was adopted. Parliament had time to adjust its thinking to everything that happened—new members of Parliament, representations, court decisions. I would tend to assume that the most up-to-date of these two documents is the Elections Act. So if you have to change one to square with the other, I would suggest that the Referendum Act should follow the principles set out in the Canada Elections Act, unless, in your wisdom, and in accordance with your privilege as members of Parliament, you feel that the Elections Act is wrong.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

Thank you for that.

Let me ask you another question about the composition, then, of referendum committees. Again, in your opinion, would you prefer to see a system similar to the one in Quebec, where they have umbrella committees? You mentioned the interesting possibility and the interesting dynamics that could have occurred back in 1992 if Mr. Manning and Mr. Trudeau and others had been forced to be part of the same committee.

In your opinion, do you believe in setting up the system of umbrella committees whereby all those on the yes side would be under one umbrella, and all those on the no side would be under another umbrella? Or do you prefer a system in which there would be as many committees established as deemed necessary?

I'd be interested to hear your views on that.

[Louis Massicotte]

Okay. I have to be consistent with what I said earlier. I said that when the act was discussed, this was the hottest issue. We've read the debates of that time, and this was one of the main issues debated. Of course, the Quebec model was put forward in those days as a possibility. It was rejected at that time for various reasons, many of which were legal. Apparently the government had a preponderance of legal opinion on the issue that suggested that this would not stand well with the courts.

I think there were deeper reasons for that. I mean, I have the impression that they feared that following this model would probably be impossible at another level. My instinctive preference—you know, I come from Quebec, so I'm proud of what we have done—is for the Quebec model, but you have to be careful before transferring to an arena something that is quite appropriate in another arena. Quebec is a smaller society. It's more homogenous. It's probably easier to force everybody to be on one side or the other, and we have been able to do it successfully so far.

By the way, our system survived the test of the courts in the Libman case, subject to a few amendments that were not basic in nature. Whether the same system would work on the wider Canadian scene, I'm less convinced. When we were discussing the issue in the abstract in 1992, we did not know what kind of referendum would follow. If I had known through some divine revelation that we would end up with the kind of alignment we had, and the strange scenario you've mentioned, I would probably have been very reluctant to advocate the Quebec model in these circumstances.

A further reason I was not so insistent on taking the Quebec model was that I was not convinced 100% that spending more than your opponents really made the difference. There was an assumption at that time—I think it has been shattered beyond repair—based on the 1982 referendum in Quebec, that you could literally buy the outcome of the referendum. I was not convinced at that time, based on the literature. And with the kind of campaign we had in 1992, I'm even less convinced that money can buy the outcome of a referendum.

We have a bizarre system, by the way. We have almost a free-for-all when it comes to referendum committees. On the other hand, when it comes to distributed time--you know, free air time on TV--it's the rule of equality that prevails. “Yes” has 50% and “no” has 50%. They have to agree among themselves to share that among the various committees. On the whole, we have a free-for-all. It's probably the system that is the least problematic given our circumstances, the complexity of the country, and the fact that one issue may be seen very differently in one province compared to the others.

You know, most of the campaign was along these lines. You went to Quebec, and you would tell people in Quebec, look, it's marvellous; we have 25% of the seats in the House of Commons in perpetuity, which is extraordinary, and the Senate that is proposed is toothless and probably will remain very weak. Now, the same people, if they had to go outside Quebec, had to say, well, 25% for Quebec is not that important, and we have an equality of seats for the provinces in the Senate, and that's great.

Probably it's best to leave some flexibility in the system.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joe Preston]

Thank you, Mr. Lukiwski.

Monsieur Desnoyers.

[Luc Desnoyers, Bloc, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, Mr. Massicotte.

You talked about referendum legislation in various provinces. You mentioned British Columbia and other provinces. Can you tell us a bit more about this? I will then come back to the Quebec legislation.

[Louis Massicotte]

The situations are very different from one province to another. In the case of Quebec, a framework act was enacted in 1978 that allows for various referendums to be held. I mention it because to start with, referendums are not a normal method of governing. When a referendum is held, it is because there is a genuinely thorny problem. In 1898, it was prohibition, and the fact was that Canadians did not have the same opinions about it. In 1942, it was conscription. So in those cases, to highlight the completely exceptional nature of the referendum in a democracy that was fundamentally representative, special legislation was enacted that laid out all the details of the referendum, and then the legislation was forgotten about.

Quebec wanted to adopt a framework act. Quite frankly, not all provinces have made the same choice. In some cases, there is still ad hoc legislation today. Which provinces have framework acts? I admit that you kind of have me there. I am trying to remember. British Columbia has one. I think Saskatchewan has one. Prince Edward Island has one too, I'm certain. Quebec has one. I don't know what the situation is for the other provinces. I would have to check.

I think that referendums as a tool have still not become part of our customs today. I would note that your act is another of the framework acts, in the sense that it allows for more than one referendum to be held.

That is all I can tell you about this. We could try to give you—

[Luc Desnoyers, Bloc, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Regarding 1992, you referred to an aspect of the Quebec act. You said that residents who arrived six months before the referendum was held did not have access to the vote, which is a technicality, to use the word you used right at the beginning. I don't know whether this was raised in Quebec in relation to the application of that act, but historically, what the Bourassa-Mulroney agreement did, and I would like to hear your thoughts on this, was to put referendum structures in place throughout Canada, ultimately, so that each province could adapt it as it chose. In fact, Canada is an immense country where there are significant differences from one end of the country to the other. So when referendum legislation can be enacted that people can more easily make sense of, it very probably allows for the objectives to be achieved. The 1992 referendum is an example.

Consider the 1995 referendum. You referred to finances and the stringency of the Quebec act, particularly the financial aspect, as compared to the federal Referendum Act, which is less stringent. Certainly this was felt in the 1995 referendum, when everyone loved us and all the advertising posters were reserved on all the highways. You said that money did not play an important role; I'm not sure that was the case in 1995. Yes, money played an important role.

I would like to go back to my questions about the development of referendum legislation in Canada as a whole. This has brought a new and important aspect to how each community, each province, is able to make its voice heard.

[Louis Massicotte]

In 1992, that flexibility did mean that everyone got what they wanted. In 1992, Quebeckers were convinced that their approach was preferable. That is the approach that won out. I think there was also another reason.

Politics is funny: you never know exactly where you are going to end up. When the decision was made to consult people by referendum, the belief in the Canadian political class was that it was going to be a cakewalk. There were no speeches from Mr. Trudeau or tape recorded late-night indiscretions from certain people. So they were sure it would pass. I also think that people in the federal government told themselves they had to be careful, if the referendum was held in Quebec under a law that in fact allowed people to spend what they wanted and it passed, the losers would say it was illegitimate. While if the referendum took place under a much more stringent law in that regard, the result would have to be accepted by the losers.

In fact, that isn't how it happened, but personally, I didn't have the impression that money played a very big role in that regard. I know there are cases… Sometimes the one who spends the most wins, that can't be denied. What I dispute, however, personally, is the idea that all you have to do to win is spend money. I think I have seen otherwise.

[Luc Desnoyers, Bloc, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

I would like to hear some of your thoughts on the whole flexibility aspect. I think that exists in the federal Referendum Act.

[Louis Massicotte]

It exists. I am not going to jump off a cliff if you keep it. The only thing I am saying is that it seems to me that it is not illegitimate for a government to put the same question to all voters in the country. I would note that the same question has been put and the vote was held on the same date. That is a factor for unity.

There is also another reason why I have doubts on this selectivity question. You know what the result of selectivity was in 1992, and you don't seem to have been unhappy with it.

Professors have to have good memories. I remember very clearly the context in which selectivity was introduced. It was introduced during Mr. Trudeau's time, in the late 1970s. At that time, when there were federal-provincial negotiations, this is how Mr. Trudeau saw things: he represented all Canadians, and Canadians agreed with him on the goals. Unfortunately for him, there were always two or three hardheads among the provincial premiers. In his eyes, and this can be seen in black and white in public documents, the referendum was almost a punitive expedition against a recalcitrant province. In other words, he said to himself that if they stood up to him, he would hold a referendum not in the provinces that agreed with him, but in his adversaries' province, to show them they did not have the support of voters in their province. In other words, he wanted to show them up in front of their own people.

Obviously, this was a pressure tactic. I have never liked that approach. Personally, I am not a hardcore centralist, but I think that saying it is legitimate for the government of a federal country to consult all of the people on a question doesn't mean falling that line, and that as far as possible there have to be very strong reasons not to do it.

That being said, I appreciate the reasons why you would decide differently and I acknowledge that they are shared by quite a few people.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joe Preston]

Thank you, Professor.

We'll move on back to Mr. Proulx for the sequel.