The “disincentives” was his term, actually, and I think that's a very good idea.
I was taking the point of view of Professor Andrew Heard, the pre-eminent authority on Canadian constitutional conventions, who had written an article in The Globe and Mail suggesting that the House could adopt a resolution to express the view that it did not want the Prime Minister, or even the Governor General, to prorogue unless the House had been consulted, except in certain cases, for example—or at least not to prorogue for a longer period than was mentioned, for example, in the motion of Mr. Layton adopted recently by the House. You could have that kind of resolution, according to Professor Heard, and it would serve as a statement of what the House wants.
One of the things I would emphasize is that I would expect the Governor General, whoever it is, to take that into consideration when considering any requests for prorogation by a Prime Minister. For example, whatever you want to put in a resolution in the House, you would have to allow for prorogations when the government decides that it doesn't want to continue its agenda. You would not want to be able to block the government from doing that sensible kind of thing, so you'd have to write that resolution very carefully.
As I said, I question whether seven days is long enough, but that's another matter for debate.
The other thing is that you could put it into law, but I think we look at enforceability too much. Sometimes the statement that this is what we expect, as Mr. Walsh said, in the Constitution.... But even in law, the Governor General is aware of the laws, and if a law says that the Prime Minister is not to advise the Governor General to do something unless the House of Commons has approved, I think the Governor General would very likely say, “I think you'd better go back and get the approval”.