Obviously, if the EDA is providing a guarantee, there will be a form of pressure applied on the candidate to pick up the money and get the contributions in accordance with the maximum amount that can be contributed. This is the essence of the game, and how I would view it. There would be that aspect.
If that failed—if the candidate could not raise the money within three years—then the EDA is on the hook. If the EDA cannot pay, then the party is on the hook, so that we escape the perception of undue influence that can be exercised.
I should have indicated that when I ran the conflict of interest regime for the cabinet for Mr. Mulroney, loans were the bugbear. They were one of the toughest issues to come to grips with. People don't consider loans to create a conflict of interest. It's something detestable, something you don't like, and you'll say that you want to get rid of this, yet in the public's mind, it does create a problem.
As a result, we are trying to get away from that, and therefore there will be pressure of some kind. The EDA will want to go out and help raise the money as well, after the event, because it won't want to pay. That's why I said it would introduce an element of greater reasonableness about the loans and beyond the bank's or financial institution's view on the capacity to be repaid. By putting in another judgment, somebody else is going to have to pick it up, making sure that the guarantor is not someone with whom we can be in a conflict of interest or create a conflict of interest or have the appearance of favouritism. Then we've instituted a system of countervailing forces, which would eliminate the problem you're trying to eliminate.