What I am doing today is exactly that. I am presenting on Motion M-489, which I have proposed and which has been referred to this committee, dealing with an amendment to Standing Order 4 of the orders governing this House.
This motion, unlike Mr. Trost's proposal, is already laid out. There is actually a text that you can refer to, so what I am obviously hoping is that you'll look at it, decide that it is a perfectly formed jewel, and want to adopt it exactly in the form in which I wrote it. However, I am enough of a realist to recognize that you might want to amend it. If you do, the text is there to examine, but it's a somewhat different process—it's a practical matter—than what Mr. Trost is proposing.
Real estate agents tell us that we ought to sell not merely the features but also the benefits of anything we're trying to convince people to buy, so let me lay out the three substantive alterations or features of this motion.
First of all, it would introduce a preferential ballot for the election of the Speaker. “Preferential” of course refers to a ballot in which you enumerate your preference as first, second, third, and so on, exactly in the manner that Mr. Trost is proposing. It's a process with which many of us will be familiar. It's used for the leadership election in a number of parties. In many cases, it's used for nominations. I myself was nominated using such a ballot process. This tends to lead to a more consensual result. Anybody who has gone through a consensual or a preferential ballot process I think will confirm that this is indeed one of the results of doing things this way.
The proposal also includes a tiebreaking provision. Paragraph 4(8)(a) and paragraph 4(11) of the revised Standing Order 4 would allow for tiebreaking to occur. This is not currently a feature of our Standing Orders regarding the election of the Speaker, so it is conceivable you could have a tie vote. Indeed, we actually did have a tie vote on one occasion in the election of the Speaker. If memory serves, I think this was back in the nineties. Now there is a method for dealing with this.
Finally, it provides more effective discretion as to the small vote totals of people who are at the very bottom of the field, something that is not done right now. In order to avoid embarrassment, we say that vote totals will not be shown, but those who get less than 5% of the vote are automatically removed from the ballot, so you can figure out who the people are. The people who we would presumably most want to protect from this kind of embarrassment are subject to all of that embarrassment, whereas if you are the second-place finisher, there's no embarrassment in that. This provides a better bit of discretion with regard to that.
Canada's history in this regard is that we've gone through three stages. From Confederation until the early 1950s, the way Speakers were elected was by nomination by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister would propose a motion in the House. There would be a vote, typically along partisan lines, and the Speaker, who effectively was a partisan figure, would then take the chair. This led to all of the problems you might expect with lack of credibility for the Speaker.
Starting in the 1950s, under the prime ministership of Louis St. Laurent, the process began of a motion proposed by the Prime Minister and seconded by the Leader of the Opposition. This involved some level of consultation. It was an improvement. The process, which initially involved some very cursory consultation, appeared to involve more substantive consultation with time. Nonetheless, this was deemed to be inadequate. Starting in 1986, we went to the current system, which is what is known as an exhaustive ballot.
Looking across the Commonwealth, we see that a number of different options are used in different jurisdictions: the open vote on a motion, as I have mentioned; the exhaustive ballot; first past the post, which is used in some places, for example in Cyprus; and finally, the preferential ballot, what I'm proposing, also known as the alternative ballot, which is used in India's upper house and also has been used in the House of Lords.
I do have a document that I can refer to—it's in English only and I'll leave it with the clerk. It goes through all of the different systems. The clerk can make up her mind as to whether it's too much work to translate. It's not an easily translated document, but it's available to you. It was collected from various websites.
Turning to the benefits of the system I'm proposing. The most important is that it's likely to produce an obviously impartial non-partisan candidate.
One way to see this is to look at who won the Speaker's elections in the two elections that have been held so far, in 2006 and 2011, in the U.K. Unlike in Canada, the results of each round of balloting are recorded. The lower house, the House of Commons, uses our system, an exhaustive ballot, and they record who got what, not merely as here, who has been eliminated. In the House of Lords they have a preferential ballot, but they reveal who was bumped off the ballot at each level, and how many votes they had following transfers.
In 2006 it's interesting to note that a Labour candidate, Baroness Hayman, won the speakership, but an independent candidate, Lord Grenfell, was in second place and moved up rapidly with each ballot count. On the first count, Baroness Hayman had 201 votes. At the conclusion, count eight, she had 263 and was up by 62. Lord Grenfell on the other hand went from 103 to 236, so he more than doubled his vote on various counts. He's the independent candidate. People tended to move away from their original candidates and favoured the most independent individual in their second and third preferences.
In the second election in 2011 Baroness D’Souza a crossbencher, which is a way of saying an independent, was the leading candidate from the start and wound up winning. She showed persistent growth throughout the various counts. This indicates to me that the tendency to choose someone who is obviously non-partisan is favoured. Admittedly, the study is not as complete as it could be, but that's all the evidence we have available to us.
I also have a very interesting quote. If you don't mind I'll conclude on this note. This is Lord Tyler who is a member of the House of Lords. He also blogs on the blog set up by the House of Lords. You can interact with lords in the blogosphere if you so desire. He has the following comment comparing the election of the Speaker of the House of Commons to that of the House of Lords, which I thought was interesting. This is from 2009.
Lord Tyler said:
I wonder whether anybody else has examined the contrast between the two electoral systems used to produce Speakers, in the two Houses of Parliament. In the Lords, in 2007, we used an Alternative Vote (AV) system to elect our excellent Lord Speaker, Helene Hayman. In the Commons last night, they employed the “exhaustive” (and exhausting) ballot.
Although both ensure that the winner has at least 50% support – and thereby each avoids some of the crass distortion of first-past-the-post – the two systems have a different effect on the voter.
AV encourages a careful choice, in preferential terms, so that the voter adopts a positive approach, marking 1, 2, 3, and so on down the ballot paper. The least popular candidates are progressively eliminated, so you never end up with someone that most people object to. The system maximises positive support for the successful candidate.
I would argue that the Lords’ system is preferable. The procedure used by MPs over several hours yesterday means that at each stage voters are encouraged to reassess the chances of remaining candidates, and to switch their votes to block those they least like. It is quite evident from the anecdotal comments we’ve already heard that the final round turned into a contest between those who wished to avoid one candidate and those who couldn’t stand the other. In other words, the system maximized the negative.
I don't mean to suggest that has been the result in our House of Commons, but it has been my experience looking at runoff elections such as the ones that were used to determine the leadership of the Canadian Alliance, the party I belonged to before the creation of the Conservative Party of Canada, that the best strategy for a final ballot is to be harshly negative about your opponent. It does maximize your vote the best, and that is one reason I think preferential ballots are a superior way of conducting elections whenever possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.