Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Oct. 3rd, 2024

[Voices]

Oh, oh! (laughter)

[C/Supt Jeffrey Beaulac, Acting Chief Security Officer, Departmental Security, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

I thank the member for her question, Mr. Chair.

The answer is not simple. It is not up to the RCMP to choose what members should have access to, or not, and how their laws should be written. We enforce the law. That was very clearly stated by my colleagues in the opening remarks. One of the concerns we have in our work is that sometimes the definitions are a bit vague.

As well, the international side of things is not the only thing that might worry us; there is also the internal side. As the national police service, we are in contact with every police force in Canada and with other law enforcement agencies. As was very clearly stated, the owner of information is entitled to decide where and when it should be used.

In the RCMP, every day, we look after the information we have. We make sure we protect it, because we do not want to damage our ability to do our job and the ability of our internal and international partners to do theirs.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

If I understand correctly, Mr. Chair, there is a difference between the information I have and what I might do with that information. It is this vigilance we are talking about.

I would like to hear CSIS's comments about this.

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Mr. Chair, I can start and my colleague will be able to add to my answer.

From the perspective of our international partners, what they require from us in order to continue providing information and critical intelligence is the confidence that the information they give us will be protected and—if we choose and get their permission to pass that information on to others in the Canadian government or those external to the Canadian government—that there are appropriate frameworks and measures in place to ensure against the distribution of that information even further onward.

From our perspective, the really critical piece is ensuring that with those intelligence-sharing agreements that we have, we can live up to our obligations and protect the information. This is something that's so critically important to us. We are a double-headed intelligence service. We do both domestic and foreign. We are a relatively small intelligence service, so we are very dependent upon the information that our intelligence allies give us to be able to do our job and protect Canadians.

What we produce is very much desired by our partners and allies, but we ultimately are also net importers of intelligence, so we need to be able to provide those assurances and have those frameworks in place, and that's why that need-to-know principle is so important for us.

[Bo Basler, Director General and Coordinator, Foreign Interference, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

The one piece I'll add to Dr. Giles's comments is that with our international partnerships, when we develop the sharing frameworks and mechanisms, how we use the information is spelled out as part of those mechanisms at the start, but it is also contained in each piece of intelligence that we exchange.

The intelligence will come to us or, conversely, our intelligence will be shared with a partner. It will say the security level at which it must be kept, but it will also say how that information can be used.

Often, when we receive a piece of intelligence, it will say, “This may be used by your department or by appropriately cleared members of the Government of Canada for investigation or for intelligence, but not for court proceedings,” for example. For each piece of intelligence, it is specified how it may be used and by whom, which I think is a critical element in all of this. If we want to use it differently, that's where we go back to the partners to say, “Now we may want to use this as part of a court proceeding. Can we use it in an affidavit?” for example.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

Thank you, Ms. Gaudreau.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have six minutes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

I have so many questions.

The sponsor of the bill, who is with us today, made many references to the number of people who currently hold secret security clearance—it's about 250,000—and said that only 23 have been rejected.

Can you go through those numbers for me? Also, when you get security clearance, do you always keep it? I know there's revocation if it's necessary, but how long does that last?

What I'm getting at is this: Where members of Parliament are allowed this access, how will CSIS, or whoever provides the clearances, handle and manage that in terms of numbers? Is that even an issue?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

I'll answer very briefly, and then I can ask colleagues to comment.

CSIS's role in the security clearance, the government security screening process.... We also do immigration security screening; it's a separate program. However, our government security screening colleagues provide advice to the deputy head who has requested that the security clearance be undertaken and done.

We're not a decision-maker. We don't keep track of who has clearances. We provide advice on each individual case to the deputy head who has requested that we do so.

[Mike MacDonald]

Here are the statistics as best we can gather them, because you have to remember that each deputy head of an organization controls the clearances and the reliability status that are given in an organization.

I can say this: With regard to government employees, every person in the public service of Canada has to have a reliability status, which is good for 10 years. That's 100%, so you're at 360,000 plus. Roughly 51% of individuals will have only a reliability or an enhanced level of that. Roughly 40% of the public service of Canada has secret clearance, and then roughly 8% or 9% will have top secret clearance or top secret enhanced clearance, so the pyramid gets smaller the higher up you go.

Now, we do know that roughly 110,000 to 130,000 contractors are screened per year by PSPC as part of its program, and the last bit of data that we do have a good sense of is for new hires coming into the public service. About one in 400-plus to 500 actually don't get a clearance. That's for new hires, but again, this is not absolute data. This is the best that we can glean. That's for new people who are coming in and making an application into the public service.

In other words, denials are given. With regard to secret clearances, I believe you have 10 years, and it's five-year renewals for top secret. That's how the system operates, very briefly.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Who would be in charge, then, if this goes through? Hypothetically, what deputy head would be in charge of those general members of Parliament's clearances?

[Sean Jorgensen]

If you don't mind, I'll take that.

I must say that that's an area that is ambiguous in the bill right now. Up until this point, it's been the Privy Council Office that has done that, so, for MPs who come in for the NML or for NSICOP, it goes through my shop. Then, the decision to grant or revoke rests with me, or if it's a revocation or denial, it would rest with the clerk of the Privy Council.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Do you have the capacity to handle an onslaught of 343 potential members? Also, how long would that security clearance last? I know it's not dictated in the bill, so maybe this is part of that clarification. However, how long would that security clearance, then, last? Would it be the automatic 10 years?

[Sean Jorgensen]

That's another good question. It's not clear in the bill whether, essentially, an application would be going through the process that was set up and built for the public service. If that is the case, then it would last for 10 years. The revocation is another question that I think the committee would want to think about. What would be the implications if a member of Parliament were denied a clearance or, through whatever case, had their clearance revoked? What implications would that have for the individual member of Parliament, for their party, for the caucus, for the leader of that party and for Parliament more generally?

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Currently, the revocation would sit with the deputy head's, I guess—

[Sean Jorgensen]

Authority.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

—authority. Thank you. Clearly I need more caffeine.

So, that would be a problem.

If the security clearance lasts 10 years, then, what if the member doesn't?

[Sean Jorgensen]

Once you leave Parliament, your clearance remains valid for a year in the event that, for example.... This is how it works in the public service: If you come back to a job, it would be renewed. Otherwise, you'd have to get the clearance done again.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Then the other, revocation.... Has that been thought through? Let's say that, as a member of Parliament, I want to have somebody else, if I found somebody else. Is there a process of challenging that security clearance?

[Sean Jorgensen]

Again, it's unclear, but there are processes that enable a public servant to challenge the revocation or the denial of a clearance, and that happens at the reliability level—a different group. For a secret or a top secret, it goes to NSIRA.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

Thank you, Ms. Mathyssen.

Mr. Duncan, the floor is yours for five minutes.

[Eric Duncan, Conservative, Stormont—Dundas—South Glengarry, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Jorgensen, I direct my questions to you here. When we talk about the right to apply for need-to-know status and have a security clearance, the chief of staff to the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs would be deemed to have the right to apply, and they have a security clearance. Is that correct?

[Sean Jorgensen]

That is correct—

[Eric Duncan, Conservative, Stormont—Dundas—South Glengarry, ON]

I'm going to give a list here. The minister's staff that works at the Ontario desk for the Minister of Transport would be deemed to have the right to apply for need-to-know. Is that correct?

[Sean Jorgensen]

No.

[Eric Duncan, Conservative, Stormont—Dundas—South Glengarry, ON]

For any ministerial staffer who applies, there's a rule here:

All individuals who work in or for the office of any minister, including exempt staff, other employees, contractors, students, and persons on loan, assignment, or secondment, regardless of their work location, require a Level 2 (Secret) security clearance prior to appointment.