Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Nov. 3rd, 2022

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'm from a wonderful little area not far from here, Laurentides—Labelle.

As I listen to everything that's being said, I'm thinking about my constituents, the people following our proceedings and voters in general, and wondering what information they need to know.

It's not at all reassuring to hear, right off the bat, that foreign actors are targeting a specific party in an effort to interfere in elections. I want to use my time to learn more from the witnesses.

I understand what the role of the Privy Council Office is, but I want to know what the limits are regarding information that is not to be shared, once the threshold has been reached.

I'd also like to know why we are learning about this now and why it takes a committee to have this discussion.

Perhaps those concerned are aware of what's going on, but how is it that voters know so little about the problem of foreign interference?

I'd like a short answer, Madam Chair.

[Lyall King]

Thank you very much for the question, Madam Chair. Maybe I will have a go at answering this.

I think it's a fantastic question. It's one that we've talked about a fair bit as a SITE group in terms of wanting to make sure that information is relevant and available to the public as well, so I would say that when it comes to constituents, it's about education and information sharing at the end of the day. That's what it comes down to.

In terms of educating, certainly the Government of Canada—CSE—has produced a number of reports over the years on threats to democratic processes, in 2017, 2019 and 2021, updating the types of things that people can look out for and how they can protect themselves. There's plenty of advice and guidance online as well, which we have on our website.

We've also issued, as I'm sure you've heard this week, the national cyber-threat assessment, which does talk a bit more generically about what people may expect to see and what the real risks are to Canadians with respect to cyber-threats. Cybercrime is one of those.

Equally, we mentioned the activities of nation-states in those products as well, in terms of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. As well, I know the service has issued a number of products publicly to describe the ways in which foreign-fed actors behave and the methodologies they use. So “education, education, education” is one thing I would say.

The other thing is letting people understand what is a good source. Evaluate your sources, and that's I think probably a challenge there. It's not just the SITE task force and our intelligence agencies playing a role here, but equally, certainly, Elections Canada as well, in terms of providing clear, valid, good information for the public.

I'll stop there and open it up to my colleagues if they have additional comments.

[Adam Fisher]

Madam Chair, if I can have a couple of seconds, I can add to that and reinforce the message from my colleague.

From a service perspective, we see this as critically important. Foreign-influenced activity cannot be addressed by the federal government alone, never mind other levels of government and civil society.

Although our founding act and our mandate have always been to provide highly classified information to government, we have, in the last five to 10 years, developed a very robust stakeholder engagement program through which we engage with civil society, academics, communities, diaspora communities, the media, industry and all levels of government. We do that in an unclassified setting. There's a lot we can talk about in an unclassified setting that prepares Canadians well to be able to identify the threats that we face in an FI environment.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you.

I have a very important question. Are we adequately equipped?

When I think about two-factor authentication and the biometric information financial institutions have been requiring of their clients for quite some time now, I wonder whether we have the tools we need to respond to cyber-attacks against individuals.

You monitor the situation beyond the scope of elections. Do you think we are way off track when it comes to our legislation? You mentioned our Five Eyes partners. Are there comparisons to be drawn in terms of what's being done elsewhere? Are there best practices we should be following?

[Lyall King]

Madam Chair, I will attempt to answer a bit of that question.

I would say that we are in an environment that is increasingly online. We talked about this, and I'll refer back to the national cyber-threat assessment for this piece. Canada has a pretty significant digital economy. We understand people are working in hybrid ways now. We have to use the Internet, so it comes down—

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

In light of your expertise, do you think we are adequately equipped?

If not, efforts are needed on a number of fronts: privacy protection, education and digital media transparency. That's a lot. You shouldn't be working in the wilderness.

Are we well equipped?

[Lyall King]

Thank you for the clarification.

My response is that it's an ever-changing environment. We always have to be evolving ourselves and our methodologies to address the threats. Can we ever be 100% sure that we are able to deal with everything? I think the answer is no.

I think the point here is pushing the bar and the message around resilience. It's not necessarily whether something will happen, but being prepared for when it happens, and that means being able to detect—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We're going to go to Mr. MacGregor for six minutes.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I really appreciate hearing from our witnesses today. The committee that I'm usually a member of is the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. The witnesses' organizations are no strangers to appearing before that committee.

I'm glad to see the procedure and House affairs committee looking at this issue, because at the public safety committee, we have looked at issues of ideologically motivated violent extremism and Canada's security stance vis-à-vis Russia. We have had a number of experts in the field and representing your agencies—including the chief of the defence staff—who have painted a very stark picture about the changing geopolitical tensions in the international order, particularly the threats posed to Canada and other like-minded democracies by Russia and China. I think the testimony from General Wayne Eyre was a wake-up call for every member of that committee. We have heard a lot of information in the course of both of our studies about what foreign actors are attempting to do to disrupt the Canadian democratic system and influence our citizens and our democratic norms.

What I would like to hear a bit more from you about is.... One of the areas that we have concentrated on is the role of social media platforms. We've really grappled with what the correct course of action is for Canada's Parliament to take in terms of how we regulate them and what kinds of partnerships we need to establish with them.

Could one of you inform us as to what your working relationship is like with some of the major social media platforms? Are there ways that parliamentarians could help you improve that relationship?

Take a few minutes to talk about that, please.

[Tara Denham]

Madam Chair, I could perhaps start on that one. Thank you for the question.

Again, I'm going to start with the context of the elections. As this committee is familiar with, there was the Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online. That's a voluntary declaration that social media companies were encouraged to participate in. A number of them have signed on, which is progress. I think we need to continue to work on those types of declarations and encourage more social media companies to sign on.

From a Global Affairs perspective, we're looking at that and sharing what we've done, so a best practice is that declaration. We then look at what other countries are doing and the result of that. That type of work, like the declaration, also encourages social media companies to work together; they're collaborating to understand what the space is and what actions are taken. We then look at that and say, if the collective of this is happening not only in Canada but in other countries, then how do we engage in a global conversation, perhaps about frameworks of behaviour for social media companies?

I know there are a lot of conversations about legislation. National legislation would not be the purview of Global Affairs. I can say that we're watching that and we engage in entities like the Freedom Online Coalition, of which Canada is currently the chair. We try to push those conversations about what can be done when you're talking about actions that cross national and international borders.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you for that answer.

Mr. King, you mentioned that it's an ever-changing threat environment, and I think the subtext is that we have to be nimble. In your opinion, what are the legislative, policy and funding gaps to which parliamentarians should pay particular attention to enable your collection of agencies to meet this ever-changing threat environment? What should parliamentarians, maybe those on the public safety committee and this committee, be paying attention to, so that you have the tools required to do your jobs and protect our democratic system?

[Lyall King]

Thank you for the question.

To be quite frank, I don't think I would be qualified to necessarily comment on some of those big things you've asked for, sir.

I think I would underline—keeping it in a SITE perspective and the particular roles and mandates of our organization as part of SITE—that we need to continue to make sure we have an open dialogue with social media companies. We each have different areas of focus and different ways to engage. From a cyber centre perspective, that means working with them to try to highlight threats that we see through our aperture, what we understand that to be, and to learn from them as to how we can detect, respond to and reduce those threats.

I would not want to comment on the legislative aspect of things. I would maybe double down, from a SITE perspective, that we want to continue to engage and have an open and collaborative, sharing relationship where that's possible.

Adam, I'm not sure whether you would like to comment from the services perspective.

[Adam Fisher]

No, I think you covered it nicely.

I could make a pitch, and I hope my colleagues will forgive me for doing this. I'm on solid ground in doing it. I know my deputy director has said the same thing in front of this committee.

In terms of social media and the technology of foreign-influenced activity, the threat is evolving. Certainly, speaking from a service point of view, we don't have all the tools to adequately understand that threat. What I'm referring to in particular is the ability to look at data and integrate that into our investigations and assessments. Our act has not kept pace in terms of the technology and the legal landscape in that respect.

That's something that certainly my organization would flag as perhaps needing something there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We will now go for five minutes to Mr. Calkins, followed by Monsieur Fergus.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Thank you.

I'll keep going on that vein of questioning.

Mr. Fisher, is it because the legislation is not technologically neutral enough, or is there some other gap? Can you be a little more specific, without giving away our monitoring posture or anything like that? Your answer was interesting, but vague enough that I might not have got it.

[Adam Fisher]

It was probably by design, Madam Chair. Forgive me for being so general about it. It's really not my area of expertise.

I'll say that our act was designed in 1984, and it has not had significant changes or amendments. Certainly the technological environment we find ourselves in now, combined with the very real necessity to guard privacy rights and constitutional rights that are top of mind here, requires a rethink of how we approach these threats.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Madam Chair, in 1984 I was singing along to Van Halen on the radio, and I can assure you that is a very long time ago. If we were lucky, we had a Sony Walkman.

This is a little bit alarming, so I'm hoping there is a way that you and your organization can be a little more direct, maybe through another medium, with members of this committee, but your point is well taken.

I have a general question for you. It's one thing to identify the threat. It's one thing to monitor it, and it's one thing to track it, given the current structure of the legislation. It's another thing to inform the panel of five that you talked about, and it's another thing for them to decide that a threshold is met and to inform electors or to talk to political parties.

I want to talk a bit more about what we are doing to interdict, disrupt and, if necessary, carry out an investigation and prosecution of a foreign actor that might be operating within the territorial confines of Canada. Is there anybody here who can speak to whether or not we have any gaps on that front?

[Adam Fisher]

Madam Chair, I can perhaps start, and then I'll hand it over to my colleague from the RCMP.

Certainly in terms of action that the service can take when it sees foreign-influenced activity occurring within Canada, we have mechanisms under our threat reduction mandate, both warranted and non-warranted solutions, that are sometimes applied to foreign-influenced activity that we see in an attempt to diminish that threat. We usually approach this in a very collaborative way with other government agencies and departments so that we choose the best tool.

When it comes to prosecution, that does become difficult in this space. It's the age-old problem of transferring intelligence into an evidentiary arena, and that is difficult. There are ways to do it, and it's always an option on the table.

I'll stop there and maybe let my colleague from the Mounties jump in.

[Lisa Ducharme, Acting Director General, Federal Policing National Intelligence, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force]

Thank you for the question.

With respect to foreign interference threats in general, the RCMP uses all of its authorities to be able to tackle these problems and looks for the criminality per the Security of Information Act. It must be able to prove that there is espionage, release of classified information, foreign influence, threats or violence. It also has the Criminal Code, which has various offences such as threat, intimidation and bribery of officials, and it also has other legislative tools at its disposal.

When it comes to election issues, it is the Commissioner of Canada Elections who is responsible for determining whether they wish to proceed with an investigation, and that is with the advice of Elections Canada and the panel of five, and through the SITE task force advising the panel of five.

The RCMP has a memorandum of understanding with the Commissioner of Canada Elections to investigate what they want to pursue. We can work with them on joint investigations, and we can provide technical assistance, advice, guidance and other such support, should they wish to proceed with an investigation.

Thank you.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

My colleague adjacent to me just said that elections are a very short window, and this process sounds like it is a very long process.

Madam Chair, I'll take the time from my colleague in the next round, if it's possible.

If you could boil down any efficiencies that this committee should be aware of, anything that can make that process more efficient for your organizations, and let this committee know, I think this committee would appreciate it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Vice-Chair Nater was kind enough to offer time for an answer right now, but we can take that in writing, per Mr. Calkins' preference.

Now it's over to Mr. Fergus for five minutes.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for sharing their insights today.

This is a very serious issue.

I have three questions, and I'll start with the easiest one.

Mr. King, in response to a fellow member's question, you said that China, North Korea, Iran and Russia were the top four countries responsible for political interference on social media.

I know most of our questions have focused on China, but can you tell us briefly what the other countries are doing? Is it the same thing that China is doing, or is it different? Is there a difference quality-wise in their unwanted interference?

[Lyall King]

Thank you for your question.

I'm going to switch to English, so I can provide a clearer answer.

Thank you very much.

I should clarify something there. When I listed the countries that I did, they're from the national cyber-threat assessment, which speaks to the strategic cyber-threats to Canada from nation-states, rather than specifically those countries being engaged in social media-related activities targeting us in a political sense during that. I should really just clarify that.

I will note that, generally speaking, when it comes to threats to democratic processes—and it's no surprise, as we've mentioned this before—China and Russia tend to be the two big players in that space. They do represent different threats to us because they behave in different ways, because of their different interests, intent and capabilities.

I would just like to be very clear that the comment on those four countries that I noted was in relation to the broader strategic threat to Canada from a cyber perspective, sir. Thank you.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thanks for clarifying that.

Can you tell us the difference between what China is doing and what Russia is doing? We've talked a lot about China, but I'd like to hear about Russia as well.

What kinds of activities is Russia engaged in, and how are they different from China's?

[Lyall King]

Thank you.

I'll make a brief comment and perhaps open it up to my colleague from the service as well.

Again, I have to underline that I obviously can't get into the specifics of some of the things that we understand of the behaviours and activities of these states, but it's easy enough to point out, I think, from open-source intelligence and what you see in the press, to be quite frank, as to how things unfold. You'll even see social media companies, for example, outing the use of fake accounts and that sort of thing.

Russia and China do have different ways of operating in that sphere, but I couldn't comment specifically on some of the things that we observe. I will maybe just open this up to Mr. Fisher from the service to see if he wants to add any nuance to that.