Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Nov. 3rd, 2022

[Adam Fisher]

Sure. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'll speak in general terms again, not specific to social media, and I'll just make a couple of comments.

My colleague has already referred to this. Their approaches and their activity in the FI space do depend on their strategic intent. From open sources, you can generally infer that Russia is more inclined towards disrupting and undermining our system of government through messaging that casts what is happening here in some doubt. China, I would say, by comparison, is more interested in working within the system to corrupt it, compromising officials, elected officials and individuals at all levels of government, within industry, within civil society, using our open and free society for their nefarious purposes.

That's how I would, at a very high level, generally distinguish between the two. I would say that, without a doubt, China is the foremost aggressor in this space.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Gaudreau. You have two and a half minutes.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I will be asking our valued witnesses questions that they will have to answer in writing for the purposes of our report. We'll let you know when we need those answers by at the end of the meeting.

I'm going to fire off all my questions.

You said that you looked to what the Five Eyes partners were doing, so I'd like to know what best practices the Five Eyes have adopted.

You also talked about the tools you use to carry out your work. We don't have time to get into them now, but I'd like to know more about those tools.

I asked you earlier whether you were adequately equipped to do your work. You mentioned a few things, but I'd like you to provide a more thorough answer.

Lastly, two things I took away from your comments were transparency and education. What do you need on that front?

You can take the last little bit of time to tell me what you need in order to ensure people are educated about this. As pointed out, we should be embarrassed about the state of privacy protection. The legislation goes back to 1984. I hope that will get through to people.

You have about 30 seconds to comment.

[Lyall King]

Thank you for your questions.

Once again, I'm going to answer in English.

That's a lot of questions.

I would just maybe underline, in terms of the authorities and tools we have to do our jobs, that, as Mr. Fisher has already stated, the service might require some updates to legislation, given the age of that.

CSE did have the Communications Security Establishment Act come into force in 2019, which has enabled and provided us with additional tools, which we are using. Therefore, from a CSE perspective, we feel that this modernization has really helped us quite significantly, and it just remains to continually invest in our ability to stay on top of the issue from a technological perspective with investment.

Perhaps Tara or Lisa would like to speak.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Not this time, but I look forward to hearing from you next time.

Mr. MacGregor, you have two and a half minutes.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

To our witnesses, I want to focus specifically on Russia, because of the conflict in Ukraine and the changed relationship between Canada and Russia because of that conflict.

At our public safety committee, we have heard testimony during the studies that I previously mentioned about the relationship between the Russian government and various Russian criminal organizations that commit a variety of financial crimes around the world. There's also a sort of loose relationship between the Russian government and these criminal organizations within Russia.

My two questions are as follows. Can you comment about this relationship vis-à-vis foreign influence? Second, how has activity from Russia changed from the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine? What kind of trends can you broadly speak about that you have observed since the start of that conflict?

[Lyall King]

Adam, do you want to have a crack at that first?

[Adam Fisher]

Sure. We're veering a little bit outside the scope of election security.

Certainly, with the conflict in Ukraine, we've seen Russia using social media to promote its narrative of blaming the invasion on the aggression of NATO. That narrative is obviously counter to the one the west subscribes to. What the conflict has changed has been maybe their focus in terms of the narratives they're pushing, through both overt and covert means.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

To be clear, I was asking whether their activity has changed vis-à-vis interference in elections, not only in Canada but also among our democratic allies, just to be specific.

[Adam Fisher]

I'm not sure I have an adequate answer for you on that one in an unclassified forum.

[Lyall King]

Perhaps I can just offer that it's a space we continue to look at to try to understand. Again, it may veer a little bit outside of what the SITE focus is, but in terms of understanding the nexus between the various components of the Russian regime—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We will now go to Mr. Nater for two minutes—maybe even two and a half—followed by Ms. O'Connell.

Mr. Nater, go ahead.

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses.

I want to start with a question and open it up to whoever is best positioned to answer it.

When we see some diaspora approaching a million to 1.5 million individuals within Canada, and the fact that often an election can be decided by a handful of seats—a dozen or so seats, with a total of 20,000 to 30,000 votes total, can influence an election—how capable are foreign state actors currently of moving that needle by 20,000 to 30,000 votes among the diaspora within Canada?

[Lyall King]

I'm sorry, Adam, but I may pick on you for that one.

[Adam Fisher]

Madam Chair, thank you.

I'm hesitant to comment precisely on the extent to which foreign adversaries can turn the needle in certain ridings or elections.

Certainly with respect to China, they look to interfere domestically in all respects. That includes in certain elections and ridings. They certainly see local diaspora as an opportunity to advance their narrative and to coerce and pursue outcomes that are in the interests of the PRC. The intent is there, and certainly.... I'm speaking in very general terms here. I'm not speaking specifically of the last election or any particular riding. In general terms, certainly they see that as an opportunity for foreign influence activity.

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you for that.

I want to go briefly to Mr. King.

Earlier this week, the Chief Electoral Officer stated that Elections Canada did not experience any breaches to its IT infrastructure or interference with its electoral operations, which I think is good. My question for you is whether you would agree with that.

Second, very briefly—and perhaps you can answer in writing at a future date—what threats do you see in terms of the IT infrastructure for Elections Canada when considering 338 electoral districts and 338 riding offices?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I'll give 30 seconds for an answer.

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you.

[Lyall King]

Thank you very much for the question.

Madam Chair, in response, I would certainly say that I absolutely agree with the Chief Electoral Officer in terms of that assessment. The cyber centre has worked very closely with Elections Canada for many years, in terms of hardening systems and being able to detect and defend in that space. We're quite confident on that particular view.

The other thing, in terms of looking at the overall threat—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I'm going to have to let it go there. I'm sorry. I was trying.

We will make sure that we.... I will reiterate a couple of points at the end.

Ms. O'Connell, you have three minutes.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

On Tuesday, we heard from CSIS that foreign actors, whether it's to disrupt or influence elections, are not strictly supporting one party over the other, but are really about showing distrust in political institutions and in democracy. That vein is the context for my questions.

The 2020 CSIS annual report also talks about foreign governments continuing to try to interfere in Canadian affairs—in this context, elections. That same 2020 CSIS report speaks a lot about incels, and in particular people who go to forums to promote violence against women.

In the context of foreign state actors trying to promote violence, disinformation and misinformation, would you suggest that incels—which CSIS has identified in terms of violent extremism—are a forum where foreign state actors might want to create upheaval in our democratic institutions? In particular, would the promotion of violence against women be a forum where foreign state actors might love to delve in and promote disinformation and misinformation?

[Lyall King]

Thank you for the question, Madam Chair.

Again, I'll answer that in a general way. What I would say is that our adversaries are opportunistic. They look for issues that are divisive domestically and they exploit them. Certainly that is a theoretical possibility, and foreign adversaries could take advantage of that domestically.

I would also clarify or expand a bit on the reference to foreign-influenced activity disrupting Canadian society and undermining our institutions. Equally, in foreign-influenced activity, there are states that are looking to exploit the system we have from the inside in a covert and deceptive way. That is equally worrisome and of concern for the service from a national security perspective.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you to the witnesses for your participation.

As the members have requested, we would appreciate it if you would send the clerk the necessary information, whether classified as secret or not.

We also appreciate the time you've taken to participate in our study. We thank you for the work you do and the responsibilities you shoulder.

Have a good day.

I will suspend really quickly and we'll get ready with panel two. Please stay close to your seats, because I'd like to start it within two minutes.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Now that the second panel is ready, we will resume the meeting.

We have two witnesses joining us.

We are welcoming Marcus Kolga, director of DisinfoWatch, and Jim Judd, former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, who is appearing as an individual.

We'll start with Mr. Kolga.

Welcome, Mr. Kolga. You have four minutes for your opening statement.

[Marcus Kolga, Director, DisinfoWatch]

Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee, for dedicating your time to study the threat posed by disinformation to election integrity and, indeed, the cohesion of our entire democracy.

My name is Marcus Kolga. I've been monitoring, analyzing and exposing Russian disinformation for the past 15 years. In 2020, I started DisinfoWatch, a platform dedicated to exposing foreign disinformation narratives with the support of the U.S. State Department and Journalists for Human Rights, under the roof of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. DisinfoWatch was initially focused on tracking foreign disinformation about COVID-19. We expanded its scope in 2021, and we were actively tracking foreign narratives during the last federal election.

In the weeks before the September 20, 2021, election, we were alerted to Chinese state media narratives that directly targeted the Conservative Party and its leader, Erin O’Toole. Simultaneously, members of the Chinese Canadian community brought to our attention similar narratives appearing on local Canadian Chinese-language media platforms and the Chinese social media channel WeChat. WeChat is commonly regarded as a tool used by the Chinese government for surveillance and repression.

On September 9, 2021, the Chinese Communist Party-owned tabloid Global Times published an article attacking the Conservative Party’s foreign policy platform. The Global Times article threatened Canadians that if they elected a Conservative government, Canadians should expect “strong counter strike and Canada will be the one to suffer”.

At the same time, an anonymous article was posted to WeChat targeting an incumbent MP, Kenny Chiu. In September 2021, Chiu introduced a private member's bill to create a Canadian foreign influence registry modelled on existing Australian and U.S. legislation. The registry law would have required individuals and groups acting on behalf of identified foreign authoritarian regimes, such as Russia, North Korea, Iran or China, to identify and register themselves. This would have threatened Chinese government influence operations in Canada. The anonymous WeChat article falsely accused Chiu of seeking to “suppress the Chinese community” through his bill.

Both the Global Times and WeChat narratives were shared on local Chinese Canadian digital and social media platforms.

According to Taiwan’s leading disinformation analysis NGO, Doublethink, Chinese state actors often use low-level disinformation disseminated on chat platforms—