Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Feb. 7th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I call the meeting to order.

Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to meeting number 50 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The committee is meeting today to continue its study on foreign election interference.

Today we have with us Mr. David Mulroney, Mr. Charles Burton and, on Zoom, Mr. Matthew Johnson from MediaSmarts.

We have made sure that the sound check and those kinds of things have been done.

Charles Burton is the senior fellow of the Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. David Mulroney is a former ambassador of Canada to the People's Republic of China, and I've mentioned Matthew Johnson, who is the director of education at MediaSmarts.

We will have up to five minutes for opening comments. I will just remind all members and our guests that all comments should be made through the chair.

With that, Mr. Mulroney, you have up to five minutes. Welcome to PROC.

[David Mulroney, Former Ambassador of Canada to the People's Republic of China, As an Individual]

Thank you.

I've travelled to Ottawa today because I believe the topic under discussion, PRC interference in our elections, is an increasingly serious problem and a key component of a broader campaign that threatens our sovereignty and the safety of our citizens. I worry that we have yet to address this threat with the urgency it deserves.

I’ve followed your discussions carefully and have heard some members ask why we are focusing on China. It's because China is a formidable military and economic power that, as a matter of policy, infiltrates and undermines organizations abroad perceived to be a threat to the Communist Party; it's because China is also the focus of concerns about political interference in the U.S., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand; it's because I believe that Beijing’s ambitions and capabilities are growing; and it's because many of the victims of PRC interference in Canada are members of Han Chinese, Uighur and Tibetan diaspora communities that Beijing threatens with seeming impunity.

Beijing’s tools include bribery, disinformation, collusion with criminal gangs and the ever-present threat of hostage-taking. It is increasingly sophisticated in its intimidation of elected officials who dare to speak the truth to Canadians.

Here in Canada, Beijing recruits proxies to parrot its talking points; to expand its influence in media, on college campuses and in government; and to launder its illicit financial contributions. The party’s objective is to transform Canada into a compliant country that perpetually looks over its shoulder to be sure what it says and does meets Beijing’s approval and that looks the other way when Beijing’s extraterritorial reach extends into our communities.

Beijing’s objective is a degree of influence—in our democracy, our economy, our foreign policy and even in daily life in some of our communities—beyond the ambitions of any other country. This is furthered by propagation of the falsehood that simply speaking up about PRC interference is itself racist and anti-Chinese.

Beijing’s Canada policy is being advanced aggressively. Although it’s not too late to push back, the longer we delay, the more difficult the task becomes.

I believe we need to do four things.

First, we must understand that China is the primary threat when it comes to foreign interference in Canada. Therefore, our defences, including election security, must be designed to counter techniques favoured by Beijing, such as the use of proxies.

Second, we should therefore act now to create a registry of foreign agents, something that would simply require transparency of those who disburse funds for, lobby for, or speak for foreign states in Canada. We must empower our security agencies and police to identify and bring to justice those who fail to do so. We need to hold current and former elected officials and public servants to higher standards of transparency, accountability and loyalty.

Third, Canadian police need to be more present in diaspora communities, better informed about PRC interference, and be enabled to act if they are to protect people who are being harassed and silenced by the Chinese state here in Canada.

Fourth, we must be prepared to expel Chinese diplomats involved in interference or harassment. Our failure to do so only encourages increasingly brazen meddling. This will trigger retaliation, but we must make it clear that expulsion is the inevitable consequence of such hostile behaviour.

A defining characteristic of a truly sovereign nation is the ability to shield its citizens and its institutions from foreign interference.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Burton, please go ahead.

[Dr. Charles Burton, Senior Fellow, Centre for Advancing Canada's Interests Abroad, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you.

I heartily endorse everything that Mr. Mulroney has just said, and I'd like to go on to the serious allegations made in media reports that Chinese diplomats in Canada or other agents of China's Communist Party regime have been complicit in unlawful actions to influence the results of the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections.

First of all, foreign embassies' expressing of their government's views on Canadian politics and our politicians is consistent with their diplomatic function, although I'd prefer that they didn't do that.

The Canadian embassy to China, on both of my diplomatic postings there earlier in my career, was doing the same sort of thing. I was involved in furthering Canada's foreign policy mandate to promote human rights, democratization and good governance abroad, such as by implementing Canadian government programming to encourage the Government of China to bring China's legislative and judicial system into compliance with the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including by holding free and fair elections at all levels of the Chinese government.

The difference is that what Canada does in this regard is done openly and transparently, whereas China's approach, as CSIS defines it, is: “purposely covert and malign”, designed to deceptively influence and corrupt Canada's national policies, officials, research institutions and democratic processes.

This is very much in line with the distinctive political culture of the People's Republic of China as it has developed since the party was established by Chairman Mao and his cohort of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries over a hundred years ago. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, along with Chairman Mao, has identified that his party possesses what he refers to as three treasures of the dharma, fabao, or, as they are sometimes translated, magical weapons. These are party building, armed struggle and the United Front.

The party has a United Front Work Department, consisting of a comprehensive work bureaucracy of over 40,000 people plus a much larger number of agents in foreign countries and within China who collaborate with them. The point of the United Front Work Department is to secretly develop and implement a strategy of carefully crafted deception about the true intentions of the Chinese Communist Party. It engages in a massive program of influence peddling, disinformation and coercion to suppress all voices in Canada critical of the party's domestic and international policy. As it says on their website, its mandate is to rally as many allies as possible in order to defeat a common enemy.

As secretary of the Chinese embassy's Chinese Communist Party branch, the ambassador of China to Canada oversees this activity. Last December 23,, for your reference, I sent the clerk of this committee a note listing 18 recent reports and journal articles that provide authoritative data on how this works in Canada and abroad.

Finally, let me note that over the weekend I pulled out my copy of Global Affairs Canada's publication entitled “Diplomatic, Consular and Other Representatives in Canada”. I counted up the numbers of diplomats accredited to Canada by various countries. Japan has 46 people here. India has 35. The U.K. has 23. China has 146 diplomats accredited to Canada. It does make me wonder if a significant proportion of China's exceptionally large diplomatic cohort here are engaged primarily in United Front Work, monitoring agents involved in influence peddling, disinformation and coercion.

I would imagine that CSIS would know the answer to that question, and if so, I do hope that CSIS will be prepared to share with this committee that information about the United Front work mandate of the Chinese diplomats here in Canada

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Johnson, you have up to five minutes.

Welcome.

[Matthew Johnson, Director of Education, MediaSmarts]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

For the past few years, barely a day has gone by without disinformation making the headlines. Whether it's doctored videos of politicians or conspiracy theories about vaccines, it affects our health, our democracy and even our ability to tell what's real and what isn't. According to one recent study, two-thirds of Canadians consider it to be a major threat to our country.

Nor can we hope to outgrow this problem. Young people are not necessarily better able to recognize misinformation or disinformation than their elders and are more likely to encounter it in formats that make verification more difficult, such as videos, social network posts and podcasts.

While governments and industry are taking steps to address the issue, without a national commitment to digital media literacy, their efforts will have limited effect.

Digital media literacy education has repeatedly been shown to be an effective way of limiting the impact of disinformation, and Canada has long been a pioneer in this field. Today, however, we've fallen behind. In Canadian schools, digital media literacy is often introduced late, relegated to optional subjects, or taught as separate topics, such as online safety, misinformation or film studies, rather than as an integrated discipline.

Adult learners might have access to only a patchwork of mostly local programs aimed at teaching basic digital skills. A recent report from the Open Society Institute underlined this decline, finding that Canada now ranks seventh in their media literacy index.

Finland, the top-ranked country in the study, provides the kind of model that Canada once did. The focus on digital media literacy in that country is a direct result of concerns about foreign, particularly Russian, disinformation.

What can Canada learn from their example?

First is the importance of integrating digital media literacy across the curriculum, both as its own subject and in existing subjects. Rather than isolating it in one course or focusing on a single issue such as fake news, the Finnish curriculum takes a comprehensive approach, from teaching how to recognize misleading statistics in math class, to analyzing the visual appeal of ads or memes in art. Whether it's understanding how algorithms use our personal information to target us with election ads, recognizing bad-faith arguments, or learning how to identify and question our own biases and act as responsible sharers of information, Canadians need a full range of digital media literacy skills to be engaged and informed citizens.

Digital media literacy has consistently been shown to be effective in building resiliency to disinformation. One recent study found that participants who reported studying critical thinking activities and media literacy in school were 26% less likely to believe in conspiracy theories, while other research has found that education in media literacy makes people more likely to verify information and less likely to share misinformation.

Most recently, a task force on disinformation on the war in Ukraine identified the need to educate people about disinformation and media literacy as one of their 10 recommendations.

While curriculum in Canada is, of course, a provincial and territorial responsibility, there is room for the federal government to establish national standards for digital media literacy. On a broader scale, there's an urgent need to adopt a national digital media literacy strategy. All sectors and levels of government can collaborate to support equitable access; promote engaged citizenship and close the digital divide; provide adequate funding to develop, deliver and evaluate digital media literacy programs; and adapt those programs to meet the needs of everyone in Canada.

In order to be critical and engaged citizens, the youth in our research say they need to be able to make free and informed choices about what information platforms collect about them and how it is used, and to know how those platforms' algorithms decide what content to show them.

Digital media literacy is not going to be the only solution for disinformation, but it will be part of any successful solution. While regulation, legislation and platform policies are all likely to be parts of the solution as well, none of those will be possible without a populace that is sufficiently well informed and engaged to demand and make use of them.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We'll start with out six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mr. Turnbull.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the witnesses.

I'm going to direct my first question to Mr. Mulroney.

We have repeatedly seen the Prime Minister and Liberal cabinet ministers and MPs downplay Beijing's interference in our elections. Even at this committee on November 1, a member of this committee, a parliamentary secretary speaking on behalf of the government, said that it makes her wonder why there is such a focus on China, notwithstanding that CSIS has identified China as Canada's most significant foreign interference threat actor.

Do statements such as those from the parliamentary secretary give you any confidence that this is a government that takes Beijing's interference in our elections seriously?

[David Mulroney]

One of the reasons I wanted to come today was to talk about China, because I noticed that discussion on where China fits in. People focus on Russia and other threats, and they are all threats. However, China is categorically different, and we need to understand that.

I was reading something that the director general of MI5, the British internal security agency, said. He said that Russian interference has an effect like a bout of bad weather. You don't want it, but that's what it's like. Chinese interference is like climate change. It is much more systemic. It's based on the large financial reserves that China has. It's delivered sometimes through the companies that China has seen invest in other countries. It has the capabilities. It also has the intent.

China, I believe, sees itself in a moment in the world when it has the potential to achieve global leadership. They believe the United States is a spent force. This is their moment. That is driving them to be bold and exceptionally threatening.

They are also very opportunistic and quick to pick the weakest target. My concern is that Canada not be the weakest target. Frankly, I have some worries on that score.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that.

Mr. Mulroney, you were quoted in a November 7 Global News report by Sam Cooper that revealed that the Prime Minister was briefed by CSIS about a vast network of interference in the 2019 election. You said:

Canada is more exposed than other Western democracies to China's interference, and yet as the United States, UK and Australia strengthen their counter-interference laws and ramp up investigations into Xi's United Front networks, Ottawa remains strangely inactive.

Can you elaborate on that comment and speak to how this government is failing to respond in the way that it needs to on this level of interference by Beijing?

[David Mulroney]

I believe that China picks the path of least resistance. Right now, when you look at the Five Eyes in particular, that's Canada. New Zealand isn't much further ahead, but we're not New Zealand. We're a more attractive target than New Zealand.

I think if you looked at the United States, Britain and Australia in the last two or three years, they have all had what they would consider a crisis in terms of Chinese penetration of their government and electoral systems—serious Chinese interference.

The Department of Justice and the FBI talk about opening two investigations a day. I think that was the quote I saw. First, they understand the threat and they're acting.

Australia has its registry of foreign agents, which requires transparency of Australians who act for foreign governments. The United States has the Foreign Agents Registration Act. It has also taken steps to prosecute people who have been found to be interfering in the business of Congress, and indeed congressional elections. The U.K. has identified a person who was very active in British politics and funded several politicians as a foreign agent working for China. Those things send messages.

Recently we also saw Britain leaning on the Chinese consulate in Manchester, England, after protesters were dragged into the consulate and beaten. The result was that five diplomats left the consulate.

They're taking action, but we aren't.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I have a question for both Mr. Mulroney and Mr. Burton.

Before I get to that, just to clarify for the record, Mr. Mulroney, I thought I heard you say—to clarify that I heard you correctly—that Beijing's interference in our elections and its interference more broadly is growing.

[David Mulroney]

It is growing.

The allegations are what concerned me about the Global News report. I know that they're working on elaborating the details. The scope, if it is indeed 11 ridings just in the GTA, would be formidable and ambitious in any country. That growth and ambition and possibly a growth in capability are some things we have to take note of.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Right.

Now for my question. The Liberals have often cited the establishment of the SITE task force and the critical election incident public protocol to say that they're taking action.

What do you say in response to that? Do you think that these mechanisms are sufficient to combat Beijing and other foreign interference in our elections?

That is to both Mr. Burton and Mr. Mulroney.

[Dr. Charles Burton]

Certainly, the disinformation that was launched in the recent election, in particular in Steveston—Richmond East at former MP Kenny Chiu, was largely in the Chinese language and largely inaccessible to people who are monitoring elections. In other words, we don't have the capability within the Canadian system to deal with activities in the diaspora community that could affect election results improperly.

In the case of Mr. Chiu, he didn't really have anywhere to turn with a complaint about being slandered and mischaracterized in the Chinese language. There was no means to identify where the source of the Chinese information in WeChat came from. There was nothing in the Conservative Party, or indeed within Elections Canada or even within the G7 rapid response mechanism in Global Affairs, that was able to come to terms with this, and he was unable to respond to these allegations, which were utterly false.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

When we hear the beep-beep, it's easiest if we let the next person go.

Mr. Turnbull, you have up to six minutes.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thanks to all the witnesses for your testimony today. I appreciated your opening remarks.

Mr. Mulroney, I totally concur that we have to take these foreign threats seriously. As I think both you and Mr. Burton stated, this is a campaign. It's over many years.

What's interesting to me is that from our conversations, somehow it seems as though the Conservatives just woke up to this threat during our committee meetings and proceedings just recently, whereas I think this has been a systemic issue for quite some time.

Would you not agree that these attempts at foreign interference in Canada's election process and other forms of foreign interference from China specifically have been ongoing for quite a number of years before 2019?

Mr. Burton, maybe we'll go to you first.

[Dr. Charles Burton]

Yes.

Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, since he came into power 10 years ago, has allocated a massive increase in resources towards the United Front Work Department, particularly their 9th and 10th bureaus, which are involved in engaging with persons of Chinese origin in foreign countries. There has been an increase.

Seeing that after what happened in the previous elections no Chinese diplomats have been declared persona non grata and no agents of the Chinese regime have been brought before a Canadian court to be accountable for alleged criminal activity emboldens the Chinese regime to do much more of it in the next election. In other words, the longer we remain passive and ineffective, the more encouraged they'll be that they can do more of this and get away with it.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you for that.

I understand that. It's becoming more acute over time in terms of the general assumption that we're essentially not meeting this threat.

[Dr. Charles Burton]

They're putting a lot more resources into it. It's becoming a much more central part of the Chinese government's foreign policy.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Got it.

Mr. Mulroney, I have a quick question for you, just to follow up on that

You mentioned the registry of foreign agents that you've recommended. I recently looked at an article that I think you were quoted in or that was published on a website here. Maybe you could give us a little bit more information on that, and then I want to share my time with my colleague MP O'Connell.

Could you speak to that a little bit more? How does that work?

[David Mulroney]

What would happen in the way it works in Australia is that if you.... The issues they are concerned with are that if you are disbursing money for a foreign entity that is either part of the government or controlled by the government, if you've lobbied for them—and some of that's already captured by lobbying legislation, but this is specifically for foreign governments—and if you communicate, if you deliver their talking points, you have to be transparent. If someone's on Power & Politics talking about foreign policy, Canadians deserve to know if that person's also being paid by a foreign state to say those things. They certainly need to know if a politician or a public servant, whether current, former or recently retired, is being paid.

The Australian government also works to identify entities that they think are representative of foreign states. There's an appeal process, but once that identification is made, if you work for them along those lines, you need to be transparent.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you.

We'll go over to you, Ms. O'Connell.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Turnbull, for sharing your time.

Madam Chair, through you, I'd ask that Mr. Cooper table with this committee my full quote, because I would hate for misinformation to be spread within this committee.

Mr. Burton, I want to speak quickly about the comments you made when you brought up the example of Mr. Kenny Chiu and the election campaign. Were you aware of the testimony we had in this committee from members of the critical election incident public protocol, who spoke about the process that our government put in place for the 2019 and 2021 elections for parties to have full security clearance?

They described the process by which parties could bring specific examples. You said that Mr. Chiu had no opportunity to find out what was happening because there's a difference between activity and impact. In fact, in the description of the process for the critical incident report, they spoke about how parties could, in fact, bring really specific examples to CSIS, to the national security community. They could brief the parties, and the parties could take action or inform their members.

Your comment that there was no process would have been the case under the previous government, but in this instance Mr. Chiu could have raised it with his party and his party could have brought it to the national security community. They could have provided a full briefing, but they didn't. We heard from the critical incident report that no instances were brought forward from the Conservative Party.

[Dr. Charles Burton]

I think what happened in the case of Mr. Chiu was that on the same day that a poll came out that showed that the Conservatives might achieve a minority government, this massive campaign of disinformation on multiple Chinese-language websites directed at people in Canada appeared. It was a matter of gathering information.

I mobilized some friends in the Honk Kong community to go through the Internet to try to find out where it came from, and we failed to do so. I think it's really that it happened too fast, and immediately Mr. Chiu's numbers started to plummet as soon as the thing came out.