Thank you very much, Madam Speaker.
Good morning to my colleagues.
I have to say how impressive it was to have my colleague, MP Vandenbeld, here to share her experience in this regard and bring forward such good information on where PROC could look with respect to foreign interference.
I want to touch on something that I've talked a bit about, because, as I mentioned, it's very near and dear to me. I'm looking at the amendment to the motion as amended—the reference to “security-cleared party representatives”—and the importance of security-cleared party representatives. There's been reference that there is no willingness to share information, versus the capacity to share information, and there is a difference. When information is classified, it's not a question of whether we are willing to share it; it's a question of whether it can be shared. There is a very big distinction.
As MP Vandenbeld said, a committee of all parliamentarians was set up a few years back. It has representatives from all parties, as well as senators. As I said previously, I'm incredibly impressed with the calibre of expertise that the members who sit on NSICOP hold. MP Alex Ruff, for instance, served as a colonel in the Canadian Armed Forces for over 25 years and understands intimately the importance of national security and the importance of working with our allies. He is a member of NSICOP. I have no doubts whatsoever that a study of foreign interference held at NSICOP would be taken very seriously and with the utmost of care.
My colleague Mr. Bergeron, from the Montarville riding, which is next to mine, has worked in international affairs. He has my respect and I have great confidence in his abilities.
When we asked the director of CSIS, when he was here, what the impact of classified information being made public would be, he testified that to do so would not only put our relationship with the Five Eyes at risk but put the safety of our intelligence assets around the world at risk.
MP Vandenbeld spoke of that. She referenced a report done by Australia. It's a Five Eyes report. I think it would be helpful if it could be provided to the members of this committee, because I think there's a lot of referenced material that could be beneficial for us in there.
No member of this committee has the necessary clearance to look at classified documents, that I'm aware of. I'm looking around the table, and I don't think any of us has that necessary clearance but that could be one of the questions. Could members of PROC be given the necessary clearance? If the members of this committee were adamant that they wanted to see classified briefings, could members of PROC receive them?
Of course, what would happen is that any briefings that were provided would be in a secure location. Obviously the staff who support us would not be eligible to be in the room, and of course any information provided to us could never be made public. We already have a group of parliamentarians who have the necessary clearance looking into this. I think that is beneficial. I understand that, in the Prime Minister's announcement, he asked NSICOP to look into it, and a press release was issued last week by the chair of NSICOP stating that they will look into it.
There's another area to note when we talk about top secret clearance and the concerns that members of Parliament on this committee have talked about. It is briefings on best practices with respect to cybersecurity and mitigation measures for foreign interference. Could that be something all members of Parliament, including their staff, receive? For instance, obviously all of our devices, which we have a habit of carrying with us everywhere, could be hacked. There could be tracking on them or access to the microphones and cameras. Some people in this room might have a compromised phone with them right now. Have people who work in MPs' offices or senators' offices, or the MPs themselves, received the necessary training on mitigating such interference? Is that something PROC should look into?
When we go in camera to discuss conversations here or even reports, we all have our devices with us. We are putting that information at risk because anyone of us could be a target of foreign interference. I don't know if other parties or other MPs have had training or briefings on cyber safety and what tools are at their disposal, but I received a special bag—I don't know if other MPs did—in which to put my devices when I'm in a meeting. It's a special bag that will prevent communication of my device. I know that when we go into caucus meetings, we put our devices in a little locked box and do not bring them into the room.
This is an opportunity for members of Parliament and their staff, who are probably more likely to be the target than the MPs themselves...and the reason is that often they are the gatekeepers to MPs. When someone wants to meet with an MP or speak to an MP, they go through the office. They want to speak to the staff member who is handling the agenda of the MP. My staff probably know a bit more about my agenda and where I'm supposed to be than I do. Do our staff members have the necessary training to be mindful of and be prepared and on the lookout for possible attempts?
Talking about training and briefings, I have questions about official party leaders. Do they receive briefings on potential threats and attempts? In the case of the 2019 and 2021 elections, were party leaders provided briefings during the election on what to do and how to flag anything they were seeing or hearing on the ground? Those are things PROC could be looking at.
I know that this committee put forth a report in the House with respect to a public inquiry, and I think it's important that people understand what a public inquiry is.
We have heard repeated calls that there needs to be an independent inquiry, not an investigation by parliamentarians, to verify what happened. However—