Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 11th, 2023

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to thank all the witnesses for their opening remarks. They were very informative.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, I'd like to begin with you and go back to a few of the things you mentioned. The Sidewinder report, which was drafted by your organization, says that China was not particularly subtle in its efforts back in the day, but that even so, the various governments never did anything. You mentioned dubious decisions made by successive governments. Could you give us a few examples? I'd also like to know whether the shelving, if not the actual destruction of the Sidewinder report, was one such debatable decision.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Thank you very much.

The report was not, in fact, shelved. We were ordered to shred it, along with all the working notes we had put together. To my knowledge, only one copy exists today, and it's with the RCMP.

There are many examples of dubious decisions made over the years. One was mentioned by Mr. Fergus, about the fact that everyone now knows that that there was an inappropriate relationship between a journalist who is now acknowledged by all the intelligence services to have been a spy, and a parliamentary secretary. The government's reaction was to say that it was a personal matter and that nothing was to be done about it. Not only that, but the man in question remained on the job.

Earlier, I mentioned another decision, which was that an energy company in Alberta was sold for $15 billion, while we couldn't buy anything. When the company was acquired for $15 billion, we found ourselves with an influential power in our midst. As ordinary Canadian citizens, if today we wanted to talk to the premier of Alberta, we'd probably be put on a long waiting list, whereas a company that has invested $15 billion, with perhaps several thousand employees, will likely get a hearing within a week. That's the kind of situation we've noticed.

We've also seen instances of people who clearly appeared to be meeting regularly with agents from the United Front Work Department, the main Chinese agency that handles foreign interference around the world. People were meeting them in the community and in China, and some had their travel to China paid for. These people were close to the circles of power and the decision-making system.

Several mayors, including the mayor of Vancouver and the mayor of Ottawa, were against certain Chinese activities, but made a trip to China at the Chinese government's expense. When they returned, they adopted municipal bylaws to counter frequent demonstrations being held in front of embassies.

Those are only a few examples. At the moment, there's a lot of foreign interference at the provincial level, and the provinces are completely in the dark. Nothing is being done and there has been no awareness raising.

When CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, attempted to make industries aware of intellectual property theft, the Security Intelligence Review Committee reprimanded CSIS, saying that it was not its responsibility and that its role was to give information to the government, and specifically to the Prime Minister. We can see the outcome today: all the prime ministers sat tight and did nothing.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

My speaking time is limited, but I'd like to continue this line of inquiry.

You mentioned that China's ways of doing things were rather primitive and you gave us some examples. Another witness, Mr. Morris Rosenberg, told us that he had been naïve at the time. Should we believe him? If someone closes his eyes or makes dubious decisions, could it be out of personal interest?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

I can't speak on behalf of Mr. Rosenberg. However, what I've seen is that in most instances involving any of the political parties, even if they are not officially in power, people are always motivated by personal or partisan interests.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to ask a question about Canada's international credibility, particularly with the Five Eyes, which you've mentioned before.

We've been told several times that CSIS is to blame, and that it should have been passing on the information. What message are we sending to the Five Eyes when we blame CSIS? If Canada disparages its own intelligence services, what message is being sent to the Five Eyes?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

It is sending a very bad message.

The Five Eyes are currently asking themselves some serious questions, further to a litany of poor or overly late decisions, even when the evidence was blatant: the Huawei decision, the decision to expel a diplomat, the decision to address the issue of foreign interference. It took a whistleblower to get Canada moving on this. It's a matter of considerable concern to the United States and the Five Eyes.

Through Operation Dragon Lord, the United States monitored the Canadian government and looked into its relationship with China. Since the 1990s, our allies have had doubts about Canada's willingness to take action and protect secrets to which it is privy.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Green, you have the floor.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you. Good morning.

I'm going to put a series of rapid-fire questions to you. Given that I only have six minutes, I'm going to ask that, should I need to intervene and take my time back, you not take it personally. It's certainly not personal.

I'd like to begin with you, Mr. Juneau-Katsuya. I've had the privilege of sitting on a committee with you in the past. You've provided some compelling testimony at committee that certainly is in keeping with what you're saying here today.

To be specific, you mentioned that every single prime minister since Mulroney has been warned about foreign interference and none of them did anything about this. I think we can all agree that foreign interference is a non-partisan issue.

Just so that I'm clear, the act requires CSIS to report foreign interference only to the government. Is that correct?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Currently, yes.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Do you believe that CSIS should be required to tell—or is CSIS required to tell—the target of foreign interference about the interference?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Depending on the operational situation, sometimes we might decide not to inform the target or the person who is targeted right away in order to understand a bit more about the network and what is at play. Eventually, it is our responsibility to protect Canadian citizens because ultimately our boss is not the government; it is the Canadian people.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

It's safe to say there are different types of foreign interventions. One could be in favour of a particular candidate and boosting them. You mentioned the nomination processes.

I have a keen interest in hoping there are recommendations from all of our standing committees on this particular issue that will safeguard us in further elections.

In your opinion, do you believe the nomination process, in the continuum of interference and influence, is probably one of the most vulnerable points of intervention that a government can be involved in?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Absolutely. It is one of the less regulated processes to a certain extent. It is left to every political party to decide who will be eligible to vote and who will be eligible to volunteer or work as political staff. You have here a pool of possible interference at play.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

In your work, did you ever come across allegations, information or intelligence, whether it was verified or not, that foreign actors, be they state actors or non-state actors, used nomination processes to find preferred candidates and to perhaps influence members of a particular community, ethnic group or nationality to attend en masse and support one candidate over another?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Worse than that, I've seen candidates going to the consulate and asking for their help.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

They were going to the consulate—going to the state actors.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

They were going to the state actors and asking for their help to be elected, and they got elected.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

You've provided in testimony at the ethics committee, which I'm on, that CSIS, the RCMP and other government agencies are essentially using spyware to monitor Canadian citizens who might be involved in this domestically. As I understand, there would need to be a process for that. There is a process from which they would have ministerial approval, perhaps from the Minister of Public Safety.

There are also MPs sometimes who are targeted in this. Is that correct?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Yes, but just to be clear, usually we do not target Canadians. We target foreign agents. If they are in contact with Canadians, then the Canadians might become part of it.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Given the nature of smart phones, it's a comprehensive capture, so everything that comes in would be captured by that.

That being said, is it your testimony here today that information has been collected that says there were candidates seeking favour from foreign national consulates to get into the nomination streams domestically?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

That's correct.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

There are currently laws in place for that. You mentioned treason. I think part of the challenge we have around finding case law is that it's something we probably all have heard of but maybe don't fully understand.

Can you perhaps reflect for a moment on how important it would be for us to have clear legislation in place with clear consequences that ensure the threshold for that type of thing could be avoided in future processes?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

In our jargon, we call them “agents of influence”. Stalin used to call them the useful idiots.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Yes.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Those useful people sometimes either intentionally or by inadvertence offer their services simply because they are seduced by a culture, by a country or by national interest. They believe they do the right thing, but unfortunately they don't understand that there are professional intelligence officers who are capable of manipulating them and eventually get what they want.