Evidence of meeting #72 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was campaign.
A video is available from Parliament.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much.
Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, you mentioned earlier that certain types of ridings were at greater risk of interference. I'd like to hear what you have to say on this, and I'd like to hear from Mr. German as well. Is it true? If so, should we concentrate our efforts on ridings like these?
Barrister and Solicitor, Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute
I think it's fair to say that where ridings contain a large number of people of Chinese ethnicity, you're going to see more action and more areas of concern. Another member mentioned Steveston. I lived in Steveston for many years. Certainly the Lower Mainland is a rich community because of the different ethnicities that exist in greater Vancouver, but there's always a downside. The influence of Canadian citizens who happen to have been born elsewhere or who happen to have relatives elsewhere is really an issue we have to be alive to. My friends have spoken to that with greater detail than I'm able to in terms of specifics.
Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
I totally agree with you that this would be the best place to start, because it's the weak point in our system. Foreign interference is not just political in nature,; it also takes the form of influence and intimidation. All authoritarian governments that practise intimidation will work from within communities, whether to embed agents there, or simply to intimidate the people. There is no doubt whatsoever that the authorities should give special attention to such communities.
The problem facing us today, however, is that the legislative system does not give the police the tools to which Mr. German alluded.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
Thank you very much.
Mr. German, you mentioned the layers of money laundering. I think there have been some comments around Canada's role in being a useful idiot and people being useful idiots in some instances. At the ethics committee, we're studying the Trudeau Foundation. That allegation was lobbied there. Mr. Zhang Bin, who's a multi-billionaire in China and a very influential person, provided a donation to the Trudeau Foundation.
In your opinion, is that type of intervention considered influence, or could it also cross the threshold into interference?
Barrister and Solicitor, Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute
Well, as to influence and interference, I'm not too sure there's much difference. I think the distinction is probably whether it becomes criminal at some point.
I don't have the answer and the facts in that particular case. However, what I did say in my opening remarks, and I think it's of interest, is that when we talk about money laundering, we talk about the proceeds of criminality. When we're talking about election influence and when we're talking about anti-terrorist financing, we're talking about money being used for a purpose. It's at the beginning as opposed to being the endgame.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Thank you so much.
This is one of those panels for which we wish we had a lot more time, and that's why I'll say to witnesses, first of all, on behalf of PROC committee members, thank you so much for your time today. Thank you for your patience at the beginning of the meeting. If there is anything else you would like to send to committee and would like us to consider, please share it with the clerk. We'll have it translated into both official languages and shared.
We really appreciate your insights today, and we wish you a good rest of the day. Thank you for the work you do. We look forward to keeping in touch. Please keep well and safe.
The meeting will suspend as we bring in the next panel. Thank you so much.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
I call the meeting back to order.
In our next panel, we have Nancy Bangsboll, independent researcher, by video conference. We have Thomas Juneau, associate professor, graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Ottawa, in person. Finally, we have Christian Leuprecht, professor, Royal Military College of Canada, by video conference.
You will each have up to four minutes for your opening statement, after which we will proceed to questions from committee members.
Ms. Bangsboll, the floor is yours. Welcome to PROC.
Nancy Bangsboll Independent Researcher, As an Individual
Thank you.
Good morning. My name is Nancy Bangsboll, and I'm an independent researcher located in southwestern Ontario.
Research has proven that the Tides Foundation U.S. provided a substantial amount of foreign funds to organizations in Canada, including Dogwood, Leadnow, The Council of Canadians and many others. They registered as third parties and then worked together to influence the results of the 2015 election.
My research has been focused on the riding level, on the influencers involved in cities and on how these foreign-funded organizations and campaigns have affected not only our election results, but also, more importantly, government policies since 2015.
The recipients of these foreign funds in Canada included organizations that openly declared a commitment to defeating Conservative candidates, and a commitment to working together and voting together in order to achieve their various goals. They repeatedly did so in print, in video and in robocalls in advance of and during the 2015 election. Significant evidence of the advantage given to the endorsed candidates was detailed in Leadnow's “Defeating Harper” report and in notes from the wrap-up meetings of Leadnow.
I submitted a large complaint to Elections Canada in the summer of 2016 requesting that the commissioner fully investigate and prosecute the violations of the Canada Elections Act and any other offences the commissioner's own investigation exposed. In the winter of 2016, two investigators from Elections Canada visited my home and spent two and half hours reviewing the evidence provided in the complaint. Investigator Tim Charbonneau and I continued to correspond by email and phone until October 2017, when I received my last email from him. He informed me that he was continuing his inquiries and that he made considerable progress. He reminded me that in any case involving allegations of collusion, it was very important to speak to all parties involved, and given the scope of this investigation, they had to talk to a lot of people. He thanked me for my patience.
In May 2018, I reached out to him again with more information, but he did not respond. Weeks later, I read a statement by Marc Chénier, the lawyer for the Chief Electoral Officer who was testifying on June 6 before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. I was stunned to hear him say that the investigation into election interference was closed. This is how it was ended, according to Mr. Chénier:
We had to interrupt some of the commissioner's investigations because it was impossible to obtain the evidence we needed. In the political world, there are often allegiances. People provide mutual support to each other and that is normal.
Apparently, all of the evidence provided meant absolutely nothing unless those committing the offences admitted it.
I have only concentrated on Tides here, but there are many other influence groups doing the same things. There are so many of these highly funded organizations and activists now involved in our elections and in government policy development that it's impossible to count them. Sadly, the average Canadian doesn't even know they exist.
Thank you. I cut my statement short because I was trying to get under four minutes.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
You did a wonderful job. I look forward to questions and comments from members.
With that, we will now proceed to Professor Juneau.
The floor is yours.
Dr. Thomas Juneau Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you.
The focus of my remarks will be on the response: what Canada can do to better counter foreign interference, with a focus of transparency. It's not the only element of our response that we can improve, but it is a central one that we underexploit. Basically, I will make a pragmatic case, or instrumental case, for why the lack of transparency has been counterproductive.
The starting point for any discussion on foreign interference has to be the reality that the targets are often diaspora communities. Among those communities, mistrust towards government and national security agencies is often high. That can also be true among Canadians as a whole.
That is often one of the chief obstacles to better countering foreign interference. It makes co-operation and information sharing more difficult. Failing to understand and address this limits the effectiveness of our efforts. Societal resilience has to be one of our first lines of defence against foreign interference and the other threats we face today, such as economic espionage, disinformation and others. However, mistrust, compounded by poor transparency, unnecessarily lowers the ceiling for successful responses.
Second, there are a lot of misconceptions in the national security community about what transparency is. Too often, transparency is viewed as an either-or proposition: It's transparency or national security. Transparency is additional work. It's costly. It's an irritating bureaucratic box to tick. These are all misconceptions.
Transparency is, or at least should be, an enabler of national security. Less transparency amounts to fighting foreign interference and other threats with a hand tied behind our backs. In fact, it should be one of our key strengths or assets in the fight against non-democracies. Too often, this is misunderstood and that's a missed opportunity.
Very quickly—and we can further discuss this—what can be done? We need more briefings and better briefings for parliamentarians and political parties, and also training on how recipients of these briefings can use that information, because often it is poorly understood. We can do more engagement, including through the development of specialized engagement units, with minority communities; better engagement with the media, which the intelligence community does not do well enough, including local and ethnic media; and better liaison with universities and the private sector. Communication here is much better than it was just a few years ago, but there are still a lot of obstacles to effective co-operation. That would include a better understanding within the intelligence community of the interests of stakeholders, their culture, their needs and how they might use that information; and better engagement with the public in general, through speeches, outreach, social media, parliamentary testimonies, public reports and annual reports, with actual substance as opposed to jargon.
By the way, one of the major obstacles to doing all of this is the epidemic of overclassification in the intelligence community. Also related to this is transparency in the way that I frame it here—as engagement in a sustained matter. That implies better information sharing and better coordination between the intelligence community and non-national security departments in Ottawa, as well as with provincial and municipal levels of government, which have a key role to play. We see that now in the context of foreign interference. We saw weaknesses at that level in the context of the convoy last year. There has been much improvement, but there is still a long way to go.
To conclude, having more transparency and more engagement is a lot of work for an intelligence community that is already overstretched. It requires specific skills that are not fostered enough in the intelligence community. It requires more people, simply. It means that you have to define the parameters of the mandate of engagement units regarding what they can say, what they cannot say and to whom and in what context they can say it. It means that you need political cover, because engagement, especially in contexts with minority communities, can be sensitive.
I'll conclude on this. It is a necessary investment, if looking forward we want to be serious in countering foreign interference and other threats we face. Thank you.
Dr. Christian Leuprecht Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
Madam Chair, thank you for the invitation to come today.
The Chinese Communist Party's ultimate goal is to constrain Canada's capacity to make sovereign decisions. Foreign interference is fundamentally a matter of Canadian sovereignty. Too many Canadians and MPs are taking democracy for granted. Instead, a government that claims to have a values-based foreign policy should be defending and protecting Canadian democracy and freedoms and our way of life.
Subversion by Beijing is the single greatest threat to Canada's sovereignty and democratic way of life today. Canada needs a coherent deterrence strategy that imposes cumulative costs on hostile state actors.
One, lower the threshold for investigations by following the lead of our allies and establish, in law, clear thresholds for foreign interference, as well as punitive consequences.
Two, delineate foreign interference, subversion and subterfuge. When a foreign hostile actor intentionally, deliberately and repeatedly violates Canadian law and resorts to prima facie illegal and criminal conduct, that amounts to subversion and subterfuge.
Three, foreign interference in Canada appears to be concentrated in large metropolitan areas, so task the integrated national security enforcement teams, which have already proven themselves effective against terrorism, with foreign interference investigations and resource them accordingly. At a minimum, activities directed against MP Chong, his family and, ostensibly, other MPs amount to conspiracy and harassment, which are Criminal Code offences and thus readily meet even the exceptionally high threshold for the expulsion of diplomats the Prime Minister has laid out.
Four, in effect, the CCP's United Front Work Department behaves like a state-sponsored transnational organized criminal syndicate, so let's treat it as such and shut down these thugs and their club of secret police stations.
Five, the UFWD is enabled by China having the second-largest foreign diplomatic service in Canada. Why is Canada accrediting so many more Chinese diplomats than Canadian diplomats are accredited in China?
Six, explicitly restore CSIS's subversion mandate, which was abandoned after the Cold War.
Seven, having just retasked NSICOP with yet another study, for the purpose of this one study only, the Prime Minister could opt to turn NSICOP from a committee of parliamentarians into a parliamentary committee, while giving Canadians public assurance that there would be no executive interference in the study. That would give NSICOP, rather than the political executive of the day, latitude to decide on the content and timing of matters it feels would be in the national interest to report to Parliament.
Eight, build a cross-party agreement on an integrated national security strategy the way some of Canada's key allies have long done.
Nine, now that it appears the Prime Minister may have misled Parliament, which is a very serious matter in a Westminster constitutional democracy, there is yet more reason for an independent public inquiry.
Canada needs to draw red lines and stand up to bad actors by sending a cordial yet clear message that breaking Canadian law to constrain Canadian sovereign decision-making is unacceptable and will have real consequences.
Thank you.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Thank you.
We will now enter six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper.
Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I'm going to start out by directing my questions to Ms. Bangsboll.
In its report “Defeating Harper”, Leadnow claims credit for defeating 24 Conservative incumbents in the 2015 election.
Can you summarize how, in that election, Leadnow used funds and in-kind support from the U.S.-based Tides Foundation and other foreign actors and organizations?
Independent Researcher, As an Individual
Yes.
The first thing you have to recognize is that money coming in through Tides U.S. or any other foreign foundation is delivered to Tides Canada or many other foundations here that support activism, so you don't really, at the end of the day, always find out who's supporting whom or which activist group is getting money from where.
I can tell you that in the study of one riding, when we looked at the costs that gave advantage to certain candidates, we covered flights, because we knew in some cases where people were flying from as members of a team. We covered travel, whether it was by car or whatever else from Toronto to London. We also covered signs, banners, flyers, advertising material, radio time that they didn't have to pay for, food, T-shirts, rent locations and phone banks.
The Leadnow office was in the Centre for Social Innovation in Toronto. I don't know how they paid for that, but that's where their main office was. Polling is expensive. Any candidate is going to have to pay for all these things, but this was given freely. There were Facebook ads and online ads. David Suzuki was involved in a number of these campaigns and travelled with the crew to many different locations. That's hotel rentals and whatnot.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Thank you, Ms. Bangsboll.
Do you believe that any candidates received this kind of support in the 2015 election and did not report it to Elections Canada? Do you have evidence of that?
Independent Researcher, As an Individual
We couldn't find any evidence that anyone reported in-kind expenses from activist organizations, yet at least 11 were targeted with full staff. I mean, here we have seven staff members. They're all on salary. They're not volunteers, but they're dressed like volunteers. They all had to get here, and they're working with Mr. Suzuki and a member of Mr. Suzuki's staff, so when you have that—
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Ms. Bangsboll, 11 candidates received in-kind support with full staff and did not report that.
Independent Researcher, As an Individual
According to the “Defeating Harper” report, 11 cities or campaigns were targeted with staff. A lot of other cities did not have the staff. Those were where they had a primary interest in defeating the Conservative candidate and thought they had the best chance.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
You reported this to Elections Canada. Is that correct?
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Elections Canada wasn't able to do anything about it.
Will you undertake to provide this committee with the supporting documentation you have?
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Thank you very much for that.
I'm going to turn my attention and ask a question of Dr. Leuprecht.
You referred to the United Front Work Department. At the ethics committee, the brother of the Prime Minister, in respect of a $140,000 so-called donation to the Trudeau Foundation, said that there was no possibility of foreign interference and that the donation came from a Canadian company, a shell company based in Montreal out of a house, that is controlled by a company called the China Cultural Industry Association, which is part of the United Front Work Department.
Do you agree that in that context, there's no possibility of foreign interference, or would you say there was?