Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 18th, 2023

[Stéphane Perrault]

There's a shift, of course in demography. What we're seeing, though, is that the electronic lists are a real opportunity to make the voting process more efficient.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

That was excellent and so concise.

We're going to do part of the second round. We will go with five minutes to Mr. Cooper, followed by five minutes to Mr. Turnbull.

After that, Ms. Gaudreau and Ms. Blaney will each have two and a half minutes.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

Mr. Perrault, with respect to digital voter lists you indicated, as I understood you, that these would be piloted in the event of by-elections beginning in the fall. Hypothetically, if there were no by-elections and we went to a general election, would Elections Canada deploy the digital voter list system?

[Stéphane Perrault]

I would only deploy it, first of all, if I'm very confident in the security and reliability of the solution, following a thorough engagement with the advisory committee of political parties and, hopefully, through this committee as we indicated earlier.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, and I appreciate your acceptance to come back to this committee before the system is deployed or piloted.

You mentioned that a robust security assessment has taken place or is in the process of taking place. Can you elaborate a bit on what steps are being taken in that regard? What's our our timeline?

[Stéphane Perrault]

Yes there are different components to the system. In terms of hosting on the cloud solution, that cloud solution has been tested. It is in use right now for other services that we use, and it is monitored by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. That part of the solution is secure.

In terms of the hardware, we will ensure that there is a supply chain integrity check on whatever hardware is used at the polling locations. We have not procured the software. This is a procurement that will be launched next fall. We have some devices that are checked and secure for our pilot project, but a larger scale procurement will need to take place, and supply chain integrity, as always, will be part of that.

In terms of the software, it will be robustly tested prior to being deployed.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Supposing that cloud storage doesn't raise any significant security concerns, what about when data finds itself on devices at thousands of polling stations across the country? Steve Waterhouse, a former information systems security officer at DND, acknowledged before this committee that this increases the security risk.

Can you elaborate or comment on that?

[Stéphane Perrault]

There's always security risk. There is in the paper process as well. We have lists that are circulating in the campaigns and at the polls, and we have guidelines in place to make sure that they are recovered.

Electronic lists of voters and voters who have voted are also supplied by us to political parties. It's the entire environment that needs to be examined.

However, you're absolutely right that one of the aspects is making sure that there's good control on those devices once the information is loaded, when it's accessed and when it's recovered after the election process. That is integral to the security of the e-list solution.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that, because it's 338 ridings and 200-plus polling stations on average per riding.

In line with that, how is Elections Canada going to reliably vet staff who are handling this data right across the country in 338 ridings and hundreds of polling stations per riding?

[Stéphane Perrault]

Madam Chair, the data that is on that list is the same data that is currently used by poll workers and by campaign volunteers. It is basic information that includes the voter's name and address, as well as a unique identifier that is used by parties to make sure that they are looking at the right person when they harmonize their lists.

That is the very same information that is circulating right now with the parties, with the campaigns and with the poll workers. There is no change in that regard.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Where did this idea originate? Was it a directive from a minister, or was it an initiative of Elections Canada?

[Stéphane Perrault]

I have to say, Madam Chair, that we are one of the last jurisdictions in Canada to rely solely on paper lists. Provincially and territorially, electronic lists are the norm now. Quebec is moving towards that. They are, with us, one of the late jurisdictions to do so. It's been demonstrated to be highly effective in managing the service to voters much more fluidly, providing better service with a reduced workforce.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. Turnbull.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Perrault and team, for being here today.

I have two or three lines of questioning. We'll see how far I get. I know the chair will cut me off if I get beyond my time limit.

We had some conversations in our foreign interference work about non-tagged attack ads from previous campaigns. I have a general concern about misinformation, disinformation during elections. Obviously it falls outside elections as well, which is deeply concerning.

How do we prevent these things from happening? Do you have the resources you need?

[Stéphane Perrault]

I'll come back to the preamble of your question regarding non-tagged attack ads. One of my recommendations last June—and I do look forward to the opportunity to go through those recommendations—was to expand the requirement to identify the source of the communication, whether it's advertising or text messages or emails, to make sure that all electoral communications are identified by their source.

I think that is an important aspect of increasing the transparency of the electoral—

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

If I may follow up on that, is there a way that you propose to be able to identify those sources? Is it an investigative body? What type of mechanism would be required?

[Stéphane Perrault]

My recommendation would be to require political parties, third parties and candidates to have an identification, whichever form of communication they use to reach out to electors.

It's a regulatory requirement. If there is a failure to identify, then it is enforced through penal mechanisms under the act by the commissioner.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Our government already passed the Elections Modernization Act to make some of these things contraventions of the Canada Elections Act.

[Stéphane Perrault]

Bill C-76 did increase transparency by requiring a digital registry of online advertising. Again, I do have recommendations in my recommendation report to expand and build on that in terms of the digital world.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you very much.

One of the questions that have come up in past conversations is about when parties sometimes knowingly distribute false information during the election period. Is that a contravention of the Canada Elections Act?

[Stéphane Perrault]

There are current offences—for example, for impersonation, if that is used to prevent electors from voting.

There are no offences if the goal is to undermine the trust in the results or the trust in the process. That's why I have made a recommendation to expand that.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

This is exactly my concern. In the 2019 election the Conservative Party of Canada actually paid for flyers that went to every house in my riding claiming that the Liberal government was implementing a capital gains tax on the sale of primary residences, which they knew to be false, because the government had denied that measure multiple times and made it very clear.

I'm wondering whether this is a contravention of the act currently or whether we need to change it in order to prevent parties from doing those kinds of things. They are a form of domestic interference, in my view.

[Stéphane Perrault]

This is a very complex area, Madam Chair.

I have not recommended, and would not recommend, rules regarding the truth of campaign speech. I think that is not an area for me to delve into and for the commissioner to enforce. That would be highly problematic. However, there are some rules in the act right now for false information. They tend to relate more to the process, but there are some on candidates and campaigns. I think that is something that should be examined by this committee.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

I think knowingly sending out false information is, and should be, something that we have very clear guidelines and rules for to prevent those things from happening, and to have real repercussions when people do not follow those guidelines.

Would you not agree with that, Mr. Perrault?

[Stéphane Perrault]

Again, my recommendation is that if, knowingly, someone presents false information in order to disrupt or discredit the voting process, then that belongs in the act as a prohibition. I'm not recommending that there be sanctions for false information in campaigns, but that is, of course, something the committee may wish to examine.