Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 1st, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We'll go to Madame Gaudreau.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Thomas, we certainly hope that you'll be on the job as long as possible for the sake of all the changes you're making.

The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs has been studying foreign interference since November, and I've come to three conclusions. A number of witnesses told us or confirmed that the thresholds for reporting cases of interference were much too high. They told us that there was no culture of sharing intelligence, as we talked about earlier. In any case, sharing intelligence is obviously not the mantra here, in Canada. They also told us about the chaotic manner in which the various departments and security mechanisms carry out their intelligence analysis, something we also discussed.

We want to get to the bottom of the situation and bring in legislation to protect the integrity and credibility of our democracy. This morning, we are finding out about a new protocol and new measures in order to keep the same thing from happening again. We are finding that out only because we asked the witness to appear before the committee.

I also want to talk about the culture of silence. The media are watching, and thanks to them, the public will be informed. It's a fact that two out of three people in Canada think the Chinese government is trying to interfere in our elections.

Do you think it's appropriate for parliamentarians to call for an independent public inquiry, so that you can enshrine the process you're undertaking and ultimately reassure the public?

[Jody Thomas]

There are lots of questions there, Madam Chair.

First of all, our threshold is too high, potentially. It is something that has to be examined. Again, CSIS is limited by the act. I know the director will have a view of this for you when he is here.

The culture in the intelligence community is to protect information and to continue to collect more information. I think that changes to the CSIS act, working with RCMP, perhaps, and the ability to move intelligence from intelligence to evidence will aid in our ability to do something of consequence with this intelligence.

I don't agree with chaos as a characterization. There are some extraordinarily good, analytical minds working on intelligence analysis in CSIS, CSE, the Privy Council Office and other departments. What we do with that analysis is where we need to raise our level of sophistication and our level of clarity.

I agree that we need to speak more about national security. We have to do it in a manner that is transparent, clear and understandable in French, English and other languages. We are not good at that, because we are protecting information all the time. That leads to my concern about a public inquiry. There would be very little more than what I've said here today that I would be able to say in a public inquiry. The Security of Information Act protects it. Protecting the sources of the intelligence is critical. Protecting the techniques in terms of how we collect intelligence is critical.

I think, with the hearings that Mr. Johnston has recommended and will be undertaking, it's really important that they be as open and transparent as possible with stakeholders, with diaspora communities and with you, about what the next steps are.

I think an inquiry could mean that we are examining this rather than moving forward with change. I think we have an opportunity right now to make change in how we do things that would be very important to the national security discussion and the level of understanding and sophistication of Canadians about national security issues.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I just want to clarify something, Madam Chair. When I referred to chaos, I really meant chaos. I wasn't characterizing the expertise of the people doing the analysis. Rather, I was referring to a missing link, a void, information that's overlooked because someone is taking a well-deserved vacation, as was the case for the witness. When people hear that, they think two things: one, changes are needed, and two, the general public needs to be made aware.

I'm a member of Parliament, and even I don't know what's going on right now. That is why I am making this appeal. It's only right for us to want to see this through and call for an independent public inquiry so we can get to the bottom of what's going on. My constituents tell me that they know what's going to happen and that nothing will change when it's all said and done. That is deeply troubling. There's going to be another election, and it's not four years away. I am deeply concerned.

I'm going to use my last few seconds to ask you a question. You'll be going on vacation again soon, so what are you going to do to make sure nothing goes wrong while you're gone?

[Jody Thomas]

Again, if the intelligence that had been received when I was on vacation was pertinent to how we did our job in defence, it would have been actioned.

There is a difference between “must read” and “may read”, and that's really important to understand. I am being transparent with you when I say I was on that list in July 2021.

I think it's important for Canadians to understand that the work done by our security agencies and senior public servants, through the SITE committee and the panel of five, to ensure that elections are safe and sound is critical. It also has concluded that there was no—

I'm sorry, Madam Chair. I'll conclude. I will say that cleared parliamentarians in NSICOP have access to this material. NSICOP should be listened to and used to the benefit of all parliamentarians.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mrs. Blaney is next.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

You mentioned earlier that Mr. Wernick had suggested that the government should legislate the position, and you said that you thought that five years might be a little too long, which is fine.

You also spoke about how other countries give this role a bit more authority. I think, when Mr. Wernick was talking about this, he was talking about a higher level of accountability, especially in the giving and receiving of information, which seems to have a bit of a gap within the system.

If you look at what other countries are doing—and I expect that you're focusing on our Five Eyes partners—what kind of change in this role would you see making sense for us, moving forward?

[Jody Thomas]

I would like to say, first of all, that I am accountable, and I take my accountability very seriously. If there is a failure—

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

I'm sorry, but I want to interrupt you on that. I apologize. I'm not talking about your accountability.

I think what Mr. Wernick was saying was that by legislating it, there would be a formal process of accountability that would track the exchange between information given and how it's received. One of the challenges we are hearing very clearly, from your testimony today and from other people's testimony, is that sometimes things don't go where they're supposed to go, and that's causing this problem.

You're also saying that you're working very diligently to fix that issue. I want to make it clear that I'm not calling you personally into question about accountability. That can be a conversation for another day.

What I'm trying to get, firmly, is what we need to have within the role you now fill so that we have some accountability that we can measure. Right now, it feels like we're trying to get to a moving target, instead of having something very clear and precise, so that accountability can be there.

I hope that helps you.

[Jody Thomas]

It does. Thank you.

Deputy ministers have accountability as accounting officers in the department. That is, of course, different in the Privy Council Office, because the Clerk is the senior public servant. In my role, I think that more ability to direct within the national security community would be useful.

The Privy Council operates under Crown prerogative. There's a whole series of things that need to be examined, and the Clerk has directed us to look at it.

After hearing Mr. Wernick's comments, I have not yet given it perhaps the thought it needs, as he said this just two days ago. I'd be happy to discuss it in the future with you, once we've had a chance to look at the range of options for what the structure of this job should be.

I will note that the Prime Minister announced yesterday a deputy national security and intelligence adviser, so that we are able to operate at both the tactical level and the strategic level.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

You mentioned—and I just want to clarify—during your initial testimony that there will be new staff coming in for intelligence review and to provide advice. That seems to be one of the gaps. That advice has not necessarily been provided.

I'm trying to understand the structure better. Is this your team? Is it expanding the people who work with you directly? How does that relationship work? Again, I'm coming back to how we measure the accountability.

It is unclear, because of the way the information is being shared, where information is going, when it arrives, who sees it, and why they don't see it. I'm wondering, is this going to work, and is it working as a team, and what role do you play within that team?

[Jody Thomas]

Yes, intelligence collection, dissemination and analysis in Canada, and with all of our Five Eyes allies, is a team sport. Various agencies collect, analyze and make determinations about that intelligence.

In my team, we have directed what information needs to come to deputy ministers for discussion and advice, so that it is not, as I said, a single point of failure when something isn't briefed, and that it is not only one person's view of what we should do with that intelligence.

We've also recently—today—given direction to agencies and collectors of intelligence on how it will be disseminated and logged in terms of who has read it. There's an accountability framework that we're putting in place for the individuals who are named who should read a piece of intelligence to ensure that they have or have not...and so that we have a weekly report that tells us who's reading, who isn't, and what has happened to that particular document.

It is a system that has operated for years, and we're bringing more structure to it.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that.

One of the things we're trying to figure out.... I understand now that you're saying MPs will be briefed immediately. My question is around the threshold level. We've heard again and again that sometimes the threshold level is far too high and it doesn't really meet the needs that we have within our systems.

I'm wondering, with MPs now being briefed immediately, does that mean you're changing the threshold, or is it specifically just for this? How are you going to manage educating members of Parliament and other parliamentarians about how to receive this information in a way that is helpful to them?

[Jody Thomas]

If I said “immediately”, I apologize. They will be briefed, but there will be a period of analysis about what can be briefed and what should be said. The threshold can be too high, and that's a limitation within the CSIS Act. As I said, there is work to be done on that front.

The education element that you raised is, I think, the most critical in all of this. We do not brief members of Parliament frequently enough on national security issues, foreign inference and their own threats.

You saw yesterday an article in the CBC about ministerial security and public official security. It's not just ministers, by a long shot.

Another thing that we don't talk about enough is the physical threats to members of Parliament.

We are embarking upon a transparency regime to share more information and to talk about this differently in Canada.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We will now go to Mr. Berthold.

After him will be Mrs. Romanado.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good morning, Ms. Thomas.

Ms. Thomas, my fellow member Mr. Cooper asked you earlier who was ultimately responsible for the failure to alert Michael Chong that he was being targeted? If I'm not mistaken, this is what you said:

no one person is responsible for the failure.

Is that correct?

[Jody Thomas]

I'm sorry. I didn't hear the last part.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

You said that no one person is responsible for the failure.

Is that correct?

[Jody Thomas]

I said, “There's no single point of failure.”

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

I've heard that before, Ms. Thomas.

I represent the riding of Mégantic—L'Érable, the site of the Lac‑Mégantic disaster that cost 47 people their lives. After extensive study and analysis, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada determined that the process had been riddled with mistakes, but no one ultimately took responsibility for all of those failures.

How has the situation in the country come to this? No one has the courage to accept responsibility for their failures.

[Jody Thomas]

I will say that if a lack of information flow to the Prime Minister were to happen while I'm the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, it is my accountability.

I will not speak to what happened in the past, but I can speak about what happens during my tenure working for the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Prime Minister.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Nevertheless, you do acknowledge that, ultimately, certain individuals are responsible for these failures. Imagine if something had happened to Mr. Chong or his family when he was unaware of the threats against him. We would all feel very guilty today for not doing something.

[Jody Thomas]

If the intelligence collected had indicated that there was going to be imminent action, Mr. Chong would have been briefed under the CSIS Act threat reduction measures.

Should he have been briefed on the information that was available at the time? I think the conclusion now is yes. There was no physical threat to him, and I want to make that very clear. That doesn't mean this is not serious.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

However, we can't assume there was no such threat. We can't assume that CSIS has access to every measure that's employed or every discussion that takes place on foreign soil.