Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 8th, 2023

[Michel Bédard]

We can read and store them as a hard copy, but discussing top secret documents requires other measures, which we don't have right now.

We can therefore receive documents, consult them and allow other people to consult them, if it's authorized, but we can't have any discussions about them.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Can you explain to me the process by which you determine which passages of a document require redaction? I imagine more than one person is involved, and you must have discussions. Do you go to another location to have those discussions and decide which parts of a document require redaction?

[Michel Bédard]

Mr. Fergus, my understanding is that you are referring to a motion before the committee. It compels the production of documents, and would require my office to redact them. To my knowledge, the motion has not yet passed.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

I'm not referring to any motion. I just want to know if you've been through that kind of situation before and what you did in those cases.

[Michel Bédard]

It depends on the information's confidentiality level. In the past, we never had information classified as top secret. It also depends on the volume of the information.

Following a motion passed by the House of Commons in October 2020, tens of thousands of pages were sent to my office for redaction. Information contained in those documents was not classified as Secret or Top Secret. We therefore used computer systems that meet confidentiality standards for those types of documents.

So, we have to adjust our methods to the nature of the documents.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

What you just said indirectly is that, until now, you've never had to redact Top Secret documents.

Your predecessor said the same thing in 2021.

Regarding the ability of your office to redact documents, he said that there “may well be some factual information and knowledge that the government or other entities have that we don't have, because it's their information and their concerns”.

In light of that quote, how does your office and how do your colleagues know what must be redacted? Which aspects do you consider relevant to national security?

[Michel Bédard]

You must understand that, to my knowledge, the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel redacted documents for the first time in 2020. In the beginning, during the first mandates we received, we had little contextual information from the department or agency that had given us the information. Now, when a motion for the production of documents gets passed, we consult with different caucuses and parliamentarians to suggest best practices. One often-accepted recommendation is for the entity that generated the documents to also suggest redactions.

With a document containing proposed redactions and one without, we're able to compare and analyze them much more easily. Indeed, some information could reveal intelligence sources without us being aware of it, because we lack context. That's why we asked for proposed redactions and a line of communication with the entity or department that generated the document; to get more context if needed.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Mr. Nader had six minutes and seven seconds, so your turns were similar.

Ms. Gaudreau, it is your turn.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I thank the witnesses. It's always an honour to have them.

I'd like to better understand the present and look into the future. Having had the opportunity to meet with the United Kingdom's legislative assembly—I know you did too—, I'd like to draw a parallel between our practices and theirs so we can talk about them in the report.

You may be aware that in January 2022, the British MI5, which is responsible for domestic security, sent a note to all members of Parliament reporting a threat against a woman lawyer. This information came from a security intelligence agency. That's like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service flagging a threat to the official presidency, and then sending that warning out to all elected officials.

How does it work here in Canada?

[Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer, House of Commons]

Through you, Madam Chair, yes, it would be much like the model in the U.K. If information came to light that affected all MPs and was a concern of all MPs, CSIS would likely go through my office to warn the MPs of any potential interference.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I want to be sure I understand this. If CSIS determined that a member could not exercise their parliamentary privilege because threats had been made against the member, your office would be notified, and you would then advise that individual.

Is that how it currently works in Canada?

[Patrick McDonell]

It's a hypothetical question, so I'll do my best to answer it.

CSIS is responsible for the first communication with an individual MP. If they have a concern regarding foreign interference, for example, with that MP, that MP's office, that MP's staff, that would be CSIS reaching out to the MP first. They wouldn't go through a third party, which would be us. We would become aware of it at some point, depending on the circumstances of the interference.

My job, my primary role, is to do my best, and my folks do their best, to ensure the physical security of members of Parliament and their staff and this place. That's our primary role. Foreign interference is something new on our plate, in the last few months.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you. I feel that my physical security is protected.

Our counterparts across the pond have a much clearer protocol than we do when one of their members is the target of a threat. The information doesn't go to deputy ministers or a national security adviser to the prime minister such as Jody Thomas. There is direct communication with the individual.

Going forward, should you automatically be among the first to be notified of something that's going on, on the same basis as the Prime Minister?

[Patrick McDonell]

Through you, Madam Chair, currently, we have a memorandum of understanding with CSIS and their integrated threat assessment centre. As I mentioned the last time I appeared here, that was signed on March 30.

We're still developing our model, our way forward and our process, and we're doing that also in consultation with Five Eyes. In particular, we've had in-depth discussions with the U.K. on several occasions. We hope that our model, once it's in place, will be reflective of what our members expect.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

That's reassuring, and that's why we are having these meetings.

Are there other things we should include in our report? We talked about a direct line whereby information would be shared regarding a threat against a member. Are there other powers you should have so that you're aware of possible interference?

[Patrick McDonell]

Nothing comes to mind at this time, Madam Gaudreau.

[Eric Janse]

I would add that, if decisions are made or an intelligence agency has information to share with all members, the House administration could help to coordinate that flow of information, through the offices of the Sergeant‑at‑Arms and the Speaker.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I want to stress how important it is to ensure impartiality and to not filter the information. I would be more reassured knowing that you were aware and would be passing the information on to us.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to those who are testifying today. I want to start off by saying how much I appreciate all the work that you do for this place. It is incredibly difficult and challenging, and I appreciate the non-partisan people who get the work done while we do our political work, so I want to thank you all for that first.

What I'm trying to wrap my head around is this. We know that foreign interference is ever-changing and it is a considerable issue, and we need to figure out the best pathway forward.

We heard from Mr. Chong. He raised a powerful question of privilege, and he has suggested that maybe CSIS should tell the Speaker about any sort of threat activities and then have the Speaker inform members at will. He used the example from the U.K. Parliament to illustrate the process that is taking place in other countries.

I'd like to ask all of you for your thoughts on that process. Knowing that there's something fundamentally broken in the system, we need to find a way to make sure that members of Parliament and parliamentarians are made aware of any threat that's coming toward them, and what that means for them in taking the next steps to protect themselves.

Also, one of the things I've left this process with is an understanding of what's coming at us and being able to observe the world, perhaps, in a different way so that we can better see what is coming. We can reiterate that back to all the relevant departments to make sure that we're all collectively working together to make sure there is no foreign interference.

I'll leave it to you, Mr. Janse, to start us off. Do you feel there's a key role in the office and the work that you do that we could be exploring? Are there other countries that are doing a good job that we should be looking at? Of course, if any of your colleagues are willing to answer that question, I would deeply appreciate it.

[Eric Janse]

Thank you very much, Ms. Blaney, for the question. I'll start, and then I'll turn it over to the Sergeant-at-Arms.

As it was just mentioned, obviously, yes, this is an important issue, which is why, in part, there has been a memorandum of understanding signed between the House and CSIS. As it was just explained, the details of how to operationalize that agreement are still being determined now, so any recommendations from this committee, of course, would be very timely.

I'll turn it over to Pat to provide a few more details on timelines as well.

[Patrick McDonell]

Through you, Madam Chair, we've been in discussions with CSIS over the last couple of weeks about how to come in, or even virtually, to best inform our members of Parliament in groups. We have 338 members of Parliament, so one large group would be rather difficult if you're going to a Q and A session.

We've discussed possibly bringing in CSIS and approaching the parties' caucuses to see if they would be interested in having a CSIS briefing at their caucuses, as well as doing one generally. That's the stage we're at now. “Generally” means all MPs, all at once.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you. I really appreciate that response.

I am just trying to figure out, too, what department.

To come back to the Sergeant-at-Arms, I understand you've signed this agreement and I understand that you're in the process of unfolding what this is going to look like in the future.

One of the things we have also heard from Mr. Chong is that there was an orientation for him about what foreign interference looks like. That information was extremely helpful for him in being able to assess and see things that may have been a threat. He said that before that training he may not have noticed those particular nuances.

I am wondering if there are any discussions at that level that you're working in about making sure that members of Parliament have better awareness and understanding so that we can assess what might be a threat, and alert the appropriate people. How will you be working with CSIS to perhaps implement that into the future?

[Patrick McDonell]

There have been those discussions much along the same lines. My role and the role of my folks would be as logistics officers and bringing CSIS in and facilitating their briefing the members of Parliament on foreign interference or threats.