Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 13th, 2023

[D/Commr Mark Flynn]

I would say seven or possibly eight. You'll have to understand that there are intermingling elements to things.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay.

The June 1 CBC report that I cited in my previous questions noted two sites that have been identified as illegal police stations in Montreal. One is situated in downtown Montreal and the other is situated in Brossard. The organizations connected to those police stations or alleged police stations indicated that no police action has been taken in respect of those sites.

Is that correct?

[Commr Michael Duheme]

I can assure you, Madam Chair, that we are investigating the sites in Montreal.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Those are in downtown Montreal and Brossard.

[Commr Michael Duheme]

The sites that you've just mentioned are. That's correct.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Fergus, you have the floor.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses who are here today.

I'm going to ask a few questions that follow on from the answers you've given.

First of all, did I understand correctly that there are a hundred ongoing investigations into foreign interference?

[D/Commr Mark Flynn]

Madam Chair, that is correct. There are over a hundred.

I do want to add some clarification to that, though. Foreign interference is a broad problem, which in our investigative efforts would be characterized as intellectual property theft as well, from the different academic institutions, etc. that are targeted.

That is correct. That is over a several-year period.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you for this very important clarification. I couldn't agree more.

This leads me to ask my second question: Does this interference come from a single country, or does it rather come from several countries or foreign actors?

[D/Commr Mark Flynn]

We are seeing it from several different foreign actors. I also want to be precise in that we believe much of it is tied to specific entities within foreign countries and governments. We look at that interference as entities, as well.

We are not in a position to connect this to leadership of particular regimes around the world.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Perfect.

Let me just dig a little further without you revealing any sensitive information.

Could you give this committee an estimate of the number of countries that are the source of these activities? Are we talking fewer than 10 or more than 10?

[D/Commr Mark Flynn]

It's fewer than 10.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Is it more than five?

[D/Commr Mark Flynn]

We're starting to get fairly precise, but I would say more than five.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

That's fair. I just wanted to get it to that.

Another question I would like to follow up on, which I think was from Mr. Cooper and actually it came out in a couple of other questions, as well.... You had indicated that you have not received this famous memo, which ends up being the subject of our study here on the question of privilege in regard to Mr. Chong.

We've heard from other folks as well that they didn't receive this memo. What recommendations could you make to ensure that information doesn't fall into a black hole?

[D/Commr Mark Flynn]

It's a tough question.

When I look at what we have done, Madam Chair, within our efforts with the service, we undertook the operational improvement review that was meant to solve many of the challenges that we've had between our two organizations alone.

When we're looking at these types of problems, hindsight always brings 100% clarity. We need to, as a community, undertake internally to have discussions about what has occurred here. We need to learn the lessons moving forward in what we can do and still respect and not react to the situation and the pressure that's coming today. I don't mean that with disrespect. We have to understand the importance of this.

We also have to look at Canada as a society and what we need to do to maintain public safety here and ensure we're respecting all sides of that equation.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

With that, Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, on behalf of PROC committee members, I really do want to thank both of you for, I feel, a very honest conversation.

I think the comments that you just ended with, Deputy, are quite accurate. We don't want to just be reactionary, but there do come times where we need to be honest about where we as lawmakers can help our agencies and organizations do the work they need to do, because no one of us is in this alone, and when it comes to our democratic institutions, every single one of us has a responsibility.

I know that was a tough question posed by Mr. Fergus, but at any point, if there is an opportunity to provide some suggestions as to what can we do to actually allow you to do the work that we entrust in you and that we need you to do, we would welcome that feedback. I don't think that speaks to what you're not doing or what you haven't done. I think that speaks to us wanting to strengthen our institutions, all of us together, because I think that as Canadians we have that responsibility.

I think our rights and freedoms come with responsibilities, and the insights that you have, I know I would never have, and I know many of us won't, but there are people who have served. If something comes to mind, please talk to your teams and let us know. We are at a moment where I think most people are taking this very seriously, and we want to ensure that we're laying a stronger foundation for the future.

I want to thank you for your time and attention. I want to thank you for your service. I wish you a really good rest of the day, and we look forward to seeing you again. Thank you. Keep well and safe.

The meeting is suspended. We'll get ready for our next panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I call the meeting back to order.

As we continue meeting number 82 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs in studying the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members, today we have with us, from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs David Morrison.

Deputy, welcome to the committee. We appreciate your response and your finding the time for us. We do have a bit of extra time together today. We appreciate your generosity in satisfying the wishes of the committee.

You will have up to 10 minutes for your opening comments. Then we will proceed with questions.

Welcome to the procedure and House affairs committee.

[David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good morning to the members of the committee.

Thank you for inviting me this morning.

Foreign interference is an important issue that continues to be at the heart of our national agenda and deserves our constant attention.

Madam Chair, I know that at least part of the reason you invited me here today is that I was acting national security and intelligence adviser from early July 2021 through to early January 2022.

It was, of course, during this period that a July 20, 2021, CSIS report on Chinese foreign interference was produced and disseminated. It's a report that has proven to be quite controversial since key aspects of it were published in The Globe and Mail on May 1 of this year.

Privy Council Office records show that the report in question was in my reading pack on August 17, 2021. For the record, I have no recollection of receiving it or reading it then. Like Jody Thomas, I was, at the time, fully occupied with the evacuation from Afghanistan, as Kabul had fallen only two days before.

I believe I did read the report when the dust from Afghanistan settled because I was interested enough to have commissioned a follow-on piece by a different group within our intelligence community in an attempt to gain the fullest possible picture of Chinese foreign interference in Canada. I would be pleased to come back to this point if members of the committee are interested.

There are two important aspects of the July 20, 2021, CSIS report that seem to have been widely misunderstood.

First, the report was never intended to spur action by readers, whether around the targeting of MPs or any of the other examples of foreign interference it lists. In its own words as published in The Globe, the report was intended to establish “a 'baseline for understanding the intent, motives and scope' of Beijing's foreign interference in Canada.” It was not a memorandum for action. It was a report for awareness.

Intelligence agencies in Canada and elsewhere produce a range of products for consumers. These products are short reports containing fragments of information, sometimes from a single source, that tend to be concise and timely; as well as longer, periodic assessments that often rest upon earlier intelligence and are designed to build understanding of complex issues. It is like the difference between the kind of breaking news that appears on the front page of The Globe and Mail and the deep-dive reports that often appear in the middle pages of the weekend edition.

The July 2021 CSIS report was very much a deep dive. It was not intended to spur action by me, as acting NSIA, or by anyone else. It was certainly not something that I would have rushed to brief up the Prime Minister on.

Importantly, as reported by the Globe and repeated by Jody Thomas, the report did not name Michael Chong or any other MP. Indeed, it would have been highly irregular for this kind of piece to go into that kind of detail.

The second key aspect of the July 2021 report that seems to have been widely misunderstood is that anyone reading such a report could have safely assumed that any necessary action on any of the specific points raised had already been taken. Indeed, this was the case for the reference in the report to Chinese actions against Canadian MPs.

To recall for the committee.... As reported in the Globe, the targeting of Canadian MPs by China was linked to a February 2021 parliamentary motion, sponsored by Michael Chong, condemning Beijing's oppression of the Uyghurs and likening this oppression to genocide.

You will recall that, after the motion and subsequent sanctions imposed several weeks later by Canada on people and entities in China, China responded by sanctioning Michael Chong and the entire membership of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

It was in this context, as shown in David Johnston's report, that China built “profiles” and “contemplated action” against Michael Chong and other MPs. It was in response to that Chinese activity that in May 2021, CSIS wrote the issues management brief, referred to in the David Johnston report as an IMU, to the Minister of Public Safety.

If you look at page 27 of the Johnston report, you will see that this was not an action note seeking a decision from the minister. It was an information note telling the then minister that CSIS intended to provide defensive briefings to MPs who, intelligence showed, China had intended to target.

Now, I know that there have been questions about how this issues management note was sent, who received it and so on. I'm aware that you have already asked Minister Blair about this. I know that you will be raising these questions with my colleague David Vigneault when he appears before you this evening. But the larger picture is this: Intelligence emerged in the spring, around the time of the Uyghur motion, that the Chinese government was looking for information on parliamentarians, and in particular on Mr. Chong and his relatives.

That intelligence was actioned, in that it led to an information memo to the Minister of Public Safety and then, in June 2021, to a defensive briefing to Mr. Chong and another MP. All of this is on page 27 of Mr. Johnston's report.

Madam Chair, some may find that all of this took too long. The point has already been made that if the then Minister of Public Safety was not aware of the intelligence with respect to Mr. Chong and other MPs, there were obviously deficiencies. But I would submit that the system did function according to the protocols that were in place back in 2021. Importantly, as you are aware, the system has now been changed. The new ministerial directive issued on May 16 of this year means that, in the future, any intelligence received with respect to specific MPs will be briefed up to ministers.

Getting back to where I started, Madam Chair, all of this is to say that in my view, the focus on the 2021 CSIS report—who the NSIA at the time was, who else read it, whether it went into a black hole—has been misplaced. Action by the relevant authorities with respect to the targeting of MPs had already been taken before the report was even published.

Before closing, Madam Chair, allow me to make two final points. First, much has been made of the term “target” in the sense of being a “target of Beijing”. I do not intend to diminish for one moment how unsettling it must have been for Mr. Chong and other MPs to learn that China had been building profiles on them and possibly preparing to take action, including against their family members living abroad. At the same time, as Jody Thomas, Wesley Wark, Thomas Juneau and others have already indicated, there is nothing inherently nefarious about foreign governments discussing members of Parliament or anyone else in Canadian society. Members of the committee should be aware that all embassies, including Canadian embassies around the world, create influence maps that list individuals through whom they intend to pursue national objectives. The important thing to keep in mind is whether the activity in question is clandestine, deceptive or threatening to an individual or an institution. As previous witnesses have stated, intent and capability are key.

For the record, while governments with values that differ from our own do not always appreciate Canada's activities abroad, Canadian diplomats do not engage in foreign interference. Everything they do is overt and above board.

This brings me to my second and last point, Madam Chair. While our focus recently, and appropriately, has been on members of Parliament, in the case of China, many of the Canadians on lists, whether you wish to call these individuals "targets" or part of larger "influence maps", will be ethnically Chinese. These diaspora members are, in my view, the most vulnerable populations when it comes to China's interference in Canada. They are Canadian citizens and permanent residents. They deserve the same protections as everyone else living in Canada.

When it comes to foreign interference, I view this as an area of the greatest long-term threat. We need to know more about ongoing foreign interference in these communities, what form it takes, and how it can be combatted.

Public hearings with these communities were to have been included in the second part of the process led by David Johnston, and I hope that the importance of this focus does not get lost in whatever process is agreed to in the future.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Deputy Minister Morrison.

We will enter into six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mr. Fergus and Madame Gaudreau, and then Ms. Blaney.

I will remind all members that we had a really good first session, and I would like to maintain that. I will also remind members that by having a decent exchange, back and forth, we actually had more time. I would appreciate it if we would continue with that right now. I would appreciate it if I do not need to interrupt to and remind members how we can function, because we just had a good hour of that. You know how it works. Excellent.

Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mr. Morrison, through you, Madam Chair, I am absolutely astounded and, frankly, disturbed by your testimony and your singular refusal to accept responsibility as the then national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister on what amounts to a colossal breakdown, to put it charitably.

You cited page 27 of Mr. Johnston's report in which an IMU, noting that MP Chong had been targeted by Beijing, had been sent to the Minister of Public Safety, except for the fact that the Minister of Public Safety didn't receive that IMU, nor did his deputy minister and chief of staff.

In fact, Mr. Johnston, at page 28 of his report, which I hope you have bothered to read, characterized it as the most prominent example of poor information flow. You said in your testimony that the system functioned properly.

How can you say that in the face of that?

[David Morrison]

I did have some caveats to how I described how the system functioned. I also pointed out that it was an information memo, not an action memo, and that with 20/20 hindsight, I think folks probably wish that it had reached the relevant minister.

The larger point I was making is that something disturbing came to light, and the relevant authorities in our system took action as they deemed best.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

That isn't so. In fact, the IMU went into a black hole, and it appears that the July 2021 CSIS memo went into a black hole as well.

You claimed, again, that the system functioned well. If that were the case, why was MP Michael Chong not informed that his family was being targeted by Beijing?

[David Morrison]

Madam Chair, I would suggest that question be put to the director of CSIS who will be here tonight.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that.

You said—