Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 13th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Good evening, everyone. I call the meeting to order. Welcome to meeting number 83 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The committee is meeting today to study the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members.

As I've mentioned in the past, and mostly for our guests today, keeping your earpiece in is the best way. If you choose not to keep your earpiece in, because you know both official languages, just leave it to the side. As always, please answer in the language of your preference. If there is time taken to listen to the interpretation, that time will not be taken away from you. It will be returned to the member. Just take your time to hear what is being asked of you and then respond.

What you have to offer is obviously really important to PROC committee members, because we've asked for you to be here. I want to thank you for responding so quickly to our request to appear. It means a lot to us. Your willingness to be here in the evening definitely demonstrates that you recognize the importance of the work we are doing.

Tonight we have with us, from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, director, and Cherie Henderson, assistant director.

Mr. Vigneault, I believe you're bringing opening comments. You have up to 10 minutes to share those comments.

The floor is yours. Welcome to PROC.

[David Vigneault, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Madam Chair, members of the Committee, good evening.

I am pleased to join you again today, with my Assistant Deputy Minister Cherie Henderson to continue our discussion on foreign interference.

Since my last appearance in March, media reporting on this topic has continued. The release of information in this way can create misunderstanding, confusion, and fear among victims of foreign interference. It also makes it more difficult for CSIS and our partners to do our jobs, which is exactly what our adversaries want.

Today, I would therefore like to provide the Committee some insight on the business of intelligence and to reassure you and Canadians of CSIS’ commitment to countering foreign interference.

As you know, CSIS has long advised Canadians of the threat from foreign interference, and from the People's Republic of China in particular. We have reported on foreign interference in every annual operational and public report for the last 30 years, and published unclassified reports, including “Foreign Interference and You”, in over seven languages. It has been the focus of extensive outreach and awareness efforts with communities, universities and the research sector. In short, foreign interference is not a new phenomenon to CSIS or to the Government of Canada.

As foreign interference threats have grown and evolved, so have our responses. We know that Canada's democratic institutions are targeted more now than they were 20 years ago. To effectively counter these threats, CSIS has leveraged the full suite of its authorities to investigate and reduce threats and advise government. It is also an active participant in the security and intelligence threats to elections task force, or SITE, working with federal partners to combat foreign interference targeting our elections.

Importantly, intelligence must be shared to have an impact. CSIS is mandated to advise the government on threats, and it does just that. CSIS has produced thousands of intelligence reports on foreign interference and briefed extensively on this threat.

CSIS has also prioritized equipping elected officials with the information they need to identify foreign interference, so they are better prepared to protect themselves. We do this by providing briefings that are tailored to the individual circumstances and provide detailed information on the tactics, tradecraft and methodologies used by foreign states against elected officials in Canada. We strive to provide them with as much detail as they need to mitigate the threats they face. Any threat to the personal safety of an individual is always immediately referred to law enforcement and the proper authorities.

CSIS began these efforts in earnest in 2015 and has significantly expanded them since 2021. In 2022 alone, CSIS conducted 49 briefings with federal elected officials and has briefed numerous provincial and territorial premiers, mayors and officials at all levels of government. The CSIS Act, however, prohibits the disclosure of classified information in these briefings. This is a legislative gap that must be addressed.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians has recognized CSIS's track record on foreign interference. Its 2019 annual report found that “CSIS has consistently conducted investigations and provided advice to government on foreign interference.”

The committee has referenced our briefings on foreign interference to numerous ministers, federal partners and other public and private institutions. The committee also noted the considerable resources and wide range of tools that CSIS employs to investigate, report on and counter foreign interference threats.

CSIS does not hesitate to deploy the other tools at our disposal, including investigations, threat reduction measures and cooperation with our domestic and international partners to counter foreign interference. While what I can say about such operational matters is limited, I can assure you these efforts are robust.

CSIS is committed to continuing these efforts, in accordance with the Minister of Public Safety’s recent direction that threats to the security of Canada directed at Parliament and parliamentarians continue to receive CSIS’ highest attention.

Intelligence is a complex business. In our line of work, an organization's credibility is developed over years and is closely and delicately guarded by the rigorous practice of intelligence tradecraft. Protecting sensitive sources and methods ensures the safety of those sources and preserves our ability to continue to collect intelligence and protect Canadians.

CSIS collects intelligence from open sources, technical intercepts, human sources, partners, interviews and other investigative techniques. Intelligence professionals continuously assess the information and build an intelligence picture over time. The source of the information and its reliability, our ability to corroborate the information, and historical trends and context are just some of the considerations that are weighed in assessing intelligence.

The threshold for sharing intelligence and advice is not an exact science. Some intelligence that is shared is called “raw” intelligence, which may be uncorroborated by other information or may come from a new and untested source. Uncorroborated intelligence may prove to be highly credible in time, but requires rigorous validation.

All intelligence products include appropriate caveats and reliability assessments to inform the recipient. By pulling all the individual pieces together, we have a better understanding of the threat picture, including any intelligence gaps that remain.

Assessed intelligence products are shared to inform decision-making by the Government of Canada. We are highly responsive to the government's intelligence priorities and requirements, and we adjust our collection according to changing threats to ensure we meet the government's needs. My colleague, the national security and intelligence adviser, recently noted to this committee the importance of having decision-makers not only read intelligence but also receive advice on how to act on it.

The appropriate response may vary in any given scenario and must always consider the need to protect highly sensitive sources and investigations. It is also important to remember that intelligence is not evidence, although it can provide important information for law enforcement action.

It is essential that intelligence meets the needs of its clients and consumers. The national security and intelligence adviser also noted that there are improvements to be made to continually refine how intelligence remains a pillar of decision-making. My officials and I are committed to getting this right.

Foreign interference is a perennial problem that has grown in scale and complexity in our digital world. Canadians are not alone in facing this threat. The world is changing, with a return to states exercising hard-power interests and attacks against democratic values. A weakened rules-based system increasingly characterized by disruptive events is just as ripe for exploitation by state influencers as it is by extremists. As security practitioners, we are acutely aware of these connections. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence will only further exacerbate these challenges.

Protecting our values and prosperity in this new world is the priority of Canada and our allies. The stakes are high. This is a fight for democracy, which requires us to build societal resilience against foreign interference and bolster our democratic institutions. To do this, we need the appropriate tools and authorities to counter threats and protect Canadian values.

Informed and trusted discussion among communities, academia, businesses and governments at all levels is necessary to properly calibrate our responses and ensure our tool kits are fit for purpose. Addressing foreign interference and protecting Canada's national security requires input from all corners of Canadian society. Countering this systemic, national threat requires partnership with all Canadians.

CSIS is a committed partner in this effort and will continue to fulfill its mission to keep Canadians safe and secure.

With that, I will be pleased to answer your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Vigneault.

I appreciate the pace at which you were speaking. I know in the past when you've joined us, you've spoken quickly. That has not helped with the two official languages. I would appreciate that we continue that pace.

As always, regardless of the language in which the question is posed, you have the ability to answer in the language of your choice. When it comes to interpretation, that time will not be taken away from the member. If we can just maintain that pace to ensure that anyone listening.... I'm sure that there are many people listening, because this is a very important topic, and it's important that we maintain the pace.

I would also appreciate it if all members remembered, when switching from one language to another, to slightly pause between one language and the other. It allows people watching virtually, online or later.... It would be appreciated.

Thank you for providing me those 45 seconds back from your 10 minutes.

Now we will enter into six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper and followed by Mrs. Sahota, Madame Gaudreau and Mrs. Blaney.

Mr. Cooper, go ahead through the chair.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Vigneault, for appearing once again, and thank you, Ms. Henderson, for being here this evening.

Mr. Vigneault—through you, Madam Chair—on page 27 of the Johnston report, Mr. Johnston states that an issues management note was sent from CSIS to the then minister of public safety, Bill Blair, his deputy minister and his chief of staff in May 2021, warning that member of Parliament Michael Chong, another MP and their families in China were being targeted by the Beijing regime.

Is Mr. Johnston's report accurate in that regard?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, the report is indeed accurate.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. Johnston further states on page 27 that the IMU was not seen by the minister, his chief of staff or the deputy minister, because they did not have access at the time to what he called the “Top Secret Network e-mail”.

Is Mr. Johnston correct in that regard?

[David Vigneault]

Madame Chair, that's the understanding I have from what Mr. Johnston said after having a discussion with Minister Blair. That is the understanding I have of the report.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Do you have any knowledge or information that Minister Blair had knowledge of that IMU at the time?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, I did not have any specific discussions with Minister Blair about that note.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister Blair has a very different version of events.

He said, first of all, that there is no email account. That is precisely contrary to what Mr. Johnston states in his report. How can what Mr. Johnston concludes be reconciled with what Mr. Blair told this committee on June 1?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, my understanding of how the information flows from an agency to a minister is that this is sent to the department. In this case, the Department of Public Safety was the department supporting the minister. That would be one of the most usual ways that information reaches a minister on a topic like this.

It would be unusual for the minister to receive classified information directly through electronic means.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

It was sent by electronic means. Is that right?

[David Vigneault]

Yes. The way that we, CSIS, would be communicating this information to the department for onward transmission to the minister is by secure electronic means.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

That's presumably why, for example, his deputy minister would have been sent the IMU, in addition to the minister and his chief of staff.

Again, Minister Blair says there's no email account. He further stated that whatever is brought to his attention is determined by you, the director of CSIS. That's exactly what he said. Is that accurate?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, I think it is true that a lot of the information that is exchanged between CSIS and the minister comes directly from me or from one of my senior officials in different organized briefings.

However, I think it's important to note here that we also have a lot of exchanges of documentation. The exchanges of documentation come, as I mentioned earlier, mostly through electronic means to the department, so that it is able to be printed and made available to the minister.

These would be the two most common ways that we exchange information.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister Blair went further. He said that you, as the director of CSIS, would decide what to brief him on, and that he would wait for you to advise him.

Secondly, he said, “The director determined that this was not information the minister needed to know, so I was never notified of the existence of that intelligence, nor was it ever shared with me.” That's what he said on June 1.

Did you determine that this was information—that information being the IMU—the minister did not need to know?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, in this specific case, there are two ways that the information will be shared. One is when we have intelligence reports. Those intelligence reports are written and shared with the department to be curated for the minister. It will depend on the department's decision from time to time to see what the minister will have access to.

It's also important that when we see we have something of high importance...we have instituted this process called an “information management note”. That would be shared to bring attention to something more specifically. That was the purpose of this note. It was to bring it to the attention of the people to whom it was destined to go.

I would like to add, Madam Chair, that it's clear that Minister Blair in his testimony mentioned that he did not see that note, and I have no reason to doubt that.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

However, he said you determined that the information was something he didn't need to know. From what I understand from the answer you just provided, that's not the case, and you didn't make that decision.

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, that could be an accurate description. I think the fact that we did an issue management note speaks to the notion that we wanted to highlight the information.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

I hope that hearing the beep, and the fact that we had another question following that beep, has demonstrated my intentions, as chair, to show that if one person speaks after the other, I will also be courteous in providing it.

I will return the courtesy if it is given to the chair. If the courtesy is not offered to the chair, it will not be returned, so the onus is on members to have the courtesy returned. I hope that is understood by my comment at the top of this meeting.

Go ahead, Madame Sahota.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

My first question for Mr. Vigneault is with regard to the new ministerial directive that was given in May by Minister Mendicino. The directive given to CSIS means that you'll now have to investigate and, in addition to that, disclose—I guess you're generally investigating—any foreign threats against parliamentarians and/or their families.

There has been some talk by other witnesses, as well, about what this would mean. We have many questions as to whether you have started to undertake that work.

Have you started to contact parliamentarians? When would this new expanded process begin? If it has already begun, what does that process look like?

The follow-up question to that is what concerns or comments you might have regarding that, because there have been some concerns brought up that perhaps briefing us on every matter may also lead to some confusion at times.

[David Vigneault]

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, CSIS has been investigating foreign interference since its inception in 1984. It's part of the act. That includes foreign interference directed at elected officials. We have reported on this publicly, as I've mentioned, for over 30 years.

The ministerial directive I think is a helpful tool to help clarify the intent of the minister in how we are exercising these authorities. I can tell you that it has already been put in motion. We are developing plans and approaches to talk to other elected officials.

With that ministerial directive, it is also important to take into consideration...the limitations that I have mentioned. The CSIS Act is clearly limiting the ability of CSIS to share classified information. Between an act that is showing its age in terms of the ability to exercise our authorities and share information and the new ministerial directive, I think it's providing better clarity. We hope it will be helping CSIS's ability to share that information that is crucial for members of Parliament to have.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Mr. Vigneault, are you suggesting that relevant updates need to be made to the CSIS Act as well, so that it goes hand in hand with the new directive?

[David Vigneault]

It has been recognized by a number of experts outside the government, and it has been recognized by Minister Mendicino and Minister LeBlanc as recently as a couple of weeks ago in their comments, that there is a need to review the CSIS Act. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP, has noted the fact that the CSIS Act needs to be updated. Commissioner Rouleau in the commission of inquiry that took place last year noted that even though it was not in his terms of reference, he thought it was important to have clear reflection on the CSIS Act to make sure it's relevant for today. The Federal Court has also mentioned that the CSIS Act may be showing its age.

So I believe that, yes, indeed, having a modernized CSIS Act would be an opportunity for CSIS to respond much more fully to the wishes of parliamentarians.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you.

You said that processes have been undertaken. Have you briefed any parliamentarians under this new process?