Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 13th, 2023

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you.

That seems to coincide with multiple ministers and deputy ministers who were on the critical election incident public protocol, the national security and intelligence adviser and you. There seems to be a corroboration of at least four, five or maybe more sources that agree with the interpretation of the facts in these particular matters. I think that's important.

Mr. Vigneault, do you think partisanship has had a negative impact on the national security and intelligence community within the last few months as a result of these parliamentary proceedings?

[David Vigneault]

It's a very important question. I'll limit my comments to my position as director of CSIS.

I would say the politicization of national security is not just recent; it has taken place for a number of years now. It is not conducive to having the most significant and beneficial discussions to be able to put the country in the best possible position to defend itself against increased threats.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Therefore, when leaders are offered opportunities to review the facts in these matters, i.e. the annex to Johnston's report, would you say that it would be a good way to take out the partisanship, getting fundamentally related to the facts?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, I would argue that any opportunity to better understand the threat picture that Canada is facing is an important opportunity.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

If you had to compare the foreign interference attempts of Russia and China, who attempts to interfere more? How do their tactics differ?

[David Vigneault]

As I've said before, and I want to be respectful of committee, I am limited in what I can say in a public setting. However, I think there is a fundamental difference between the PRC Communist Party activities and Russia. The most fundamental one is the fact that, since the arrival of Xi Jinping as the president of China and the leader of the Communist Party, we have seen a growth in the ability and the budgets of the United Front Work Department.

The UFWD is a tool that was created at the inception of the Communist Party in the 1940s and has existed in Canada for a long, long time. Xi Jinping has described it as one of his magic weapons. The UFWD's main goal is to interfere in other countries' affairs. I would say that this is one of the most significant differences between the PRC and other countries.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

You would agree that Russia still presents a threat.

[David Vigneault]

Russia has extremely advanced capabilities to engage in foreign interference activities. They are doing the same thing on espionage. The question may be: What is the intent behind those capabilities, and what are their specific objectives? Sometimes, Canada may not be the main objective.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you.

Would you agree that, whatever form the public review process takes, whether it's a public inquiry or some other form of public process, public hearing, etc., we should do a comprehensive review of foreign interference, including China, Russia and other state actors?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, I think, as an intelligence organization, of course, we look at foreign interference irrespective of the source of that interference. We look at the threats to Canadians. Of course we're going to be focused on that.

I can assure the committee, through you, Madam Chair, that CSIS will support any process that Parliament and the government decide to put forward. I think it's a critical issue for the government and for Canadians.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Madame Gaudreau.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

As an intelligence officer of a member state of the Group of Five, you are aware of what's happening in interference matters elsewhere in the world. We've seen that interference has been intense, organized and planned, particularly in the United Kingdom, France, Australia and the United States. You just discussed that.

Consider France as an example. Mr. Macron, a candidate in the 2017 presidential election, had his campaign hacked. You'll see what I'm getting at. It was orchestrated by Russia. The Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure, the DGSI, which is France's counterintelligence service, opened an investigation, and the French public was extensively informed about the situation.

Why, in Canada, did information have to be leaked for CSIS to urge the government to do the intensive work it's now doing?

[David Vigneault]

The member has brought up a good point.

That specific case of foreign interference in France occurred a year or two after the foreign interference in the American elections was revealed. It drew very keen attention, which encouraged Canada to establish the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, or SITE, to coordinate all intelligence. I think the necessary lessons have been learned.

I would draw your attention to the fact that CSIS provides many details on foreign interference in its annual reports and communications. I don't think that likely had the same media impact as the leaks, but a lot of unclassified and very specific intelligence has nevertheless been published.

If I may, I would also say that Canadian parliamentarians, media and universities weren't necessarily paying the same kind of attention to this issue as in other countries, although I believe their attention is now sharply focused and intense. I really hope that the committee's proceedings and the information that CSIS provides it will be useful in ensuring that Canada is better prepared in future.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I hope we all stop burying our heads in the sand.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Blaney,

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

I'm going to come back to my last question, because I didn't hear anything about rural communities. I also thought I heard somebody say, “May I add...?”

If there's something that I missed, I would enjoy hearing it.

[Cherie Henderson, Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Absolutely. Thank you very much.

I think it was a very important point that we were discussing, which was raised by the member, Madam Chair. What I wanted to pick up on was the point made in regard to that ongoing communication. When we go out and provide those defensive briefings, the intent is to allow the individual to become aware and to create that awareness of what they might be seeing that they would not normally recognize, potentially, as foreign interference. It's to increase that awareness.

It was also so that if they became aware, they could talk to us as well and get that back-and-forth. By being able to provide that information back to us, we can continue to make those briefings that much more valuable for all Canadians, all of our members of Parliament and all of the levels of government.

I think it's fundamentally important that this is not something we can do alone, and that everybody needs to support, engage and understand what the threat is. That's where those ongoing defensive briefings we were providing and will continue to provide can help create that greater engagement across the board.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you so much.

I want to come back to the diaspora communities that have been calling out and ringing the alarm bell for a great many years. We have heard from witnesses at this committee that many from those communities feel ignored and unsafe when they've gone to the RCMP. They have case files, but they just don't hear back.

I heard you talk about a stakeholder engagement group. Are there terms of reference? What is the strategy of that group? Could we see the terms of reference, if that's possible?

[David Vigneault]

I'll make an undertaking to bring back some more specific information about this group. It's a very important tool.

This is an area that I think is very important. CSIS is an intelligence organization that operates in a democracy governed by the rule of law. In other countries.... We're not independent and trying to behave in different ways. Our engagement with those communities is critical, and I welcome the work of this committee to do more of that in the future.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Vigneault, following up on my line of questioning and that presented by Mr. Berthold, I want to make sure that I fully understand what you have said with respect to the IMUs.

As I understand it, there are intelligence reports that are produced in the thousands each year, and then there are IMUs, of which, on average, two to three are produced a week. IMUs are produced because—and I am quoting you—you see “something of high importance”.

Is that correct? Do I understand you correctly?

[David Vigneault]

That would be accurate.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay. Thank you for that.

When you see something of high importance by way of an IMU product that is addressed to a minister, that is because you would want the minister to see that IMU. Is that correct?

[David Vigneault]

The IMU is sometimes directed at the minister, but also sometimes it will be directed to other officials in the government as well.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

When it is addressed to the minister, it would be because you want the minister to see it. Is that right?