Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Oct. 17th, 2023

[Tara Denham]

I can't speak to the intents or the strategies of the PRC, but what I would say and why I mentioned that we reached out to Tencent was that it is part of the tools that we use. It's not only Tencent but other platforms. We engage with them so that, when there are instances, we can engage with the company.

What that looks like is us typically indicating that we've seen this type of behaviour and asking if they've seen this type of behaviour. More often than not, this type of behaviour violates their terms of service and their terms and conditions. What we want to do is to make sure that various platforms are aware of the activity. Should they take action, it should be their responsibility to adhere to their terms and conditions.

That's another piece of the work that we do. We want to also hold social media platforms to account in implementing the monitoring of their platforms.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

In terms of the by-elections, could you give us any insight into lessons learned on how you would improve monitoring? Like you said, the rapid response mechanism kicks in when the writ is dropped for the by-election. Having now gone through this successfully in a by-election and having been able to monitor it quickly, had one of the candidates in these by-elections been a target of misinformation, I would assume that the necessary communication to the candidates and/or political parties and/or the SITE task force would have happened.

Do you have any recommendations for us going forward with the RRM, having just gone through these by-elections?

[Tara Denham]

I thought you started by asking about an ability to monitor the landscape on an ongoing basis. That would be something for this committee to explore in more detail.

Again, that moves into domestic authorities, but I think that would be an interesting exploration because, again, to monitor the social media landscape, when the RRM is triggered—just again to explain some of the work—to understand if there is a spike in activity, you have to understand what a normal level of activity looks like. When we are looking at by-elections, we do and we have strong capabilities, but those capabilities would be augmented if you understood what the baseline was.

That has to be balanced against all of the authorities that are in place to make sure that they adhere to human rights and rights to privacy on any monitoring of the social media landscape.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Gaudreau, you may go ahead for six minutes.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'm hoping you can clarify a few things. It would be great if we could speak in French just so everything is clear. I do want to say, though, that the interpreters do a great job, so thank you to them.

I want some clarity on the issue before the committee.

In your opening remarks, you talked about Global Affairs Canada's rapid response mechanism and the fact that it relied on public information. If I understood correctly, the mechanism uses information that is widely shared on popular platforms. We saw that in 2017.

Conversely, the interference we saw this year, the subject of today's meeting, was very targeted. That makes me wonder whether we are equipped to act and react and whether we shouldn't go further. When we see an open door, we can close it, but there may be other ways in that we, as parliamentarians, aren't even aware of.

I'd like more information on the current situation.

[Tara Denham]

Thank you.

Forgive me, but I just want to be sure I understand your question.

If I understand fully, just to really see if we're properly equipped to address some of these issues—because the social media landscape is quite open—there are a lot of layers to actually address disinformation and some of the activity on the platforms. I think as this committee is doing, and with the conversation that's happening in Canada, we have to understand all of those layers and make sure we're actually coming at them from multiple perspectives.

I would say that one is a role of the RRM, which is to monitor and understand what's happening. However, as I alluded briefly, I also think a lot can happen around the engagement with the platforms in terms of making sure content moderation is done in a transparent way and that we're able to engage with those platforms.

Also, just recently Canada signed a declaration of information integrity, which we led with the Netherlands. That is also about calling on states to not adhere to or promote disinformation campaigns and inviting companies to be more transparent in how they handle it.

I guess my answer would be that we're using a lot of tools. Understanding disinformation and trying to find ways to address it is one, but there are many layers we have to focus on to actually address the issue.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

If I, as a member of Parliament, notice something I'm not sure about, what mechanism can I use to educate myself and recognize potential interference, versus considering the need to go further?

We all know that a major shift has been under way for a few months, but parliamentarians may not have the expertise to figure out what's what. Is there adequate monitoring? Will action be taken quickly, not in two months?

[Tara Denham]

I had trouble understanding the question.

Just to be sure, were you asking what we as individuals and MPs can do when we're actually seeing activity that impacts us individually?

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Yes.

If we don't have enough information, should we do something right away and report the situation? We shouldn't close our eyes. The matter has to be considered.

[Tara Denham]

I'll speak first to what individuals can do and then MPs and Canadians.

I think people are becoming more aware of the Canadian cyber centre and the tools and resources that are there. That's an excellent resource to actually report activity. They collate that and also track and understand issues. There's a lot of support provided there. Social media platforms also have recourse mechanisms whereby you can report the activity. As much as they are monitoring their information environment as well, they do also rely on consumers of and individuals on their platforms to report activity.

That's at the level of an individual. I think we all have to increase our understanding of what it takes.

For MPs more broadly, I think this is where we all have to think about the tools at our disposal. How can we actually shed as much light as possible on the activities that are taking place so that we increase the collective understanding? I do feel that this is a very live conversation right now in Canada. I don't think we are a population that has been as exposed to disinformation campaigns as other countries have, so I think the more we can collectively understand that and the more we can bring it to light and call it what it is, the more beneficial that will be. Again, that was where the RRM started from; we wanted to actually be able to share information and share it more broadly. Again, that's why we use only open-source information.

It's about continuing to explore what tools we have and how we can use them as effectively as possible.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Ms. Gaudreau.

Ms. Blaney, you have six minutes.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you so much, and welcome back. It's always good to visit.

I'm trying to get little bit more clear here. I think I understand, but it sounds like your department was watching during the by-elections. I want to clarify. Does that mean that during elections is the only time that this has been requested and that, outside of any kind of election, the work isn't being done?

[Tara Denham]

In terms of monitoring the information environment on threats to elections, it has been during a writ period, so during the 43rd and 44th parliaments. Then, this summer was the first time that it was initiated for by-elections. That is when we are initiated to look within election periods.

However, as I indicated, RRM Canada is always working, but again, driven by our mandate, we're looking to understand what that information environment looks like more broadly in terms of threats to democracy and threats to advancing our foreign-policy priorities.

I'll give you an example of how that would usually look. If there's a major international event, we would be looking at the information environment to see if there are indications of artificial amplification that may have links to a government trying to use the information environment to drive their foreign-policy priorities. I'm not sure if that's clear enough, but for Canadian electoral processes, we are initiated during writ periods and as directed by the SITE task force and the panel, which was for during writ periods and elections. However, we are always looking at understanding the information environment, just not within the Canadian context.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that because one of the things I found interesting about your testimony was that your department, the group, was looking at the by-elections and then found something about another MP. That's a bit concerning to me because it's sort of like, if there were not any by-elections, that information could have been out there and we would not have been aware of it. We wouldn't be sitting where we are right now. In fact, MPs would still be under a level of threat that, I think, is concerning.

I'm just wondering if there are any recommendations that you have around how we can be gathering that information so that we're not put into this position as a Parliament. It is important that this place actually protect its members.

The other part is that it took quite a while. I'm curious about.... With a much larger election, instead of just a few by-elections, if it takes two months to get that information clarified—and I understand that you don't want to just throw it out there and create chaos without having that clarity of information—how is this place, or Canada, going to be able to do it so that, during an election, information is made clear so that this doesn't take over an election and cause people to lose because of massive misinformation? I would hate to be going through the incredible work of an election in any role that you play and then finding out at the end that there was a targeted attack that created so much misinformation that your election was then questionable.

[Tara Denham]

I think I understand which questions were in there. I'm going to try. If I miss anything, please let me know. Let's start at the end, maybe, and go back in terms of the information environment during an election and protecting MPs.

When the writ period is in place, we do report the activity to SITE, and the SITE task force up to the panel. As part of that work, there were also briefings of political parties. There are a few mechanisms in place where, if there are indications of activity, that information can be shared up.

As this committee has also heard many times, disinformation or information operations in and of themselves do not mean they're significant enough that they could impact the results of an election. That is a very.... That's a high threshold, I would say. While we're always wanting to understand the information environment, there's also a lot of research under way into “does a disinformation campaign actually change people's behaviour?”

I can't speak to that, but I flag it because I think we've made progress in having ways that we can trigger information, share that with political parties and share that with the panel. Just because there's disinformation—of which there's a lot—and misinformation in an election period does not in and of itself mean that it's going to potentially impact the results of an election.

Also, then, you were talking about how we can protect parliamentarians.

Again, during the writ period, there were briefings to the political parties. I think there are probably recommendations of how those can continue to be strengthened, because it is part of the protocol: How can those briefings continue? Then, I think, as I mentioned, there are a lot of resources available for parliamentarians to actually report any activity they see and get advice on what's there.

I think I would finish on that one by saying that our motivator and our mandate is to understand that information environment not only to protect parliamentarians but also so Canadians writ large can understand that information environment, because there are a lot of people in Canada who may be impacted.

Perhaps I'll stop there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Now we'll go to Mr. Cooper for five minutes, who will be followed by Ms. Sahota and then Madame Gaudreau and Ms. Blaney for two minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Through you, Madam Chair, Ms. Denham, you stated in an answer to my question in the previous round that part of the mandate of RRM is to make disinformation public so that Canadians know about it and individuals targeted know about it. Consistent with that, MP Chong was briefed, and a statement was issued by Global Affairs Canada on August 9. That's a good thing.

However, on October 18, 2021, the rapid response mechanism prepared a report that also identified a disinformation campaign through Beijing-based state media accounts targeting former members of Parliament Kenny Chiu and Erin O'Toole and the Conservative Party, among others. That was not made public.

Why was the disinformation with respect to MP Chong made public a good thing, but Canadians were kept in the dark with regard to the October 18, 2021, RRM report?

[Tara Denham]

October 18.... Again, that was during the writ period and, as a SITE member, we did report that up to the panel as part of the task force, but in that report, which you've read or have with you, it was very clear that we did.... Again, we were notifying that there was particular activity that we had seen, but at that time, we were unable to determine direct linkages between the CCP and the rest of the network that we were identifying. What we were flagging was that we could see disinformation and that there was some coordination of accounts, but we were unable to make that determination at the time. That's what we reported up to the panel.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

You reported it to the panel, but that would have been provided to the panel in September, during the election. The election date was September 20, 2021. The report prepared was on October 18, 2021, so that was after the election.

In other words, RRM would not need to go through the election panel because the election was over, and the report of October 18 does make clear.... Although you weren't able to completely verify it, it's unequivocal that CCP state media accounts were spreading disinformation against MP Chiu, Erin O'Toole and the Conservative Party. Again, why was that not made public? There was no election concerning MP Chong when that was made public, but here, we have this report after the election, so I really don't see the distinction.

[Tara Denham]

To clarify, there were the CCP-related news sites that were included in that report, and there are many news sites that, at times, have disinformation on them. We were not able at that time.... I believe the wording is that we were unable to determine coordination with the CCP and the news sites.

Again, we're looking for foreign information manipulation, and we are always looking to see if there are strong enough indications of a link to a government entity. At the time, we were not able to fully assess the network. When you then look at disinformation—and disinformation can be on certain platforms—that's where I come back to an important point, which is that when there is disinformation, another avenue is to raise that to the awareness of social media platforms and ask them for content moderation.

Again, at that time, we didn't have sufficient information to report.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

The report refers to Chinese Communist Party media accounts on Douyin that have published videos repeating a Global Times headline published on September 8 that suggests the CPC's platform would lead China to break off relations with Canada. It refers to a Douyin account involving another CCP media outlet.

Very clearly, the report establishes that this disinformation was being shared by CCP-controlled media accounts in the same way that the August 9 statement makes this clear. With respect to MP Chong, one-third of the accounts through which the disinformation was shared were on state media accounts.

Again, I'm not following how it's possible in light of that, but there was a distinction made between August 9 versus back in October 18, 2021. I would put it to you that what changed is that this interference on the part of Beijing became public because of whistle-blowers and because of media reports putting pressure on the government to be more transparent—not sufficiently transparent, but more transparent—than the previous approach, which was to cover this interference activity up.

[Tara Denham]

There is a distinction between the two. You're correct. In the report, it indicates the state media news sites that had the content on them. When we're looking for disinformation campaigns, what you would typically see or what we've seen could start with a news site that may have affiliations with the government. In that case, it did.

What you're watching for is how that's interacting with other accounts. Is there coordination, for example, of timing and content? That's when you start—I've spoken to the committee about this before—to look for that artificial amplification of content to try to make it sound louder and to try to make it look like a more natural conversation.

At that time, we were able to see certain accounts and news sites that were state-affiliated, but we could not see a corollary with other accounts that were putting up similar content. We couldn't find that linkage.

What I am trying to clarify is that, yes, at times, you can see state-affiliated news sites that have information on them, but if they're not linked and trying to amplify in a coordinated attempt to have inauthentic amplification, that's where we are not able to make the link. That was very different in the more recent situation.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mrs. Sahota.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

This is very interesting. What I want to ask you is in line with the questioning that we've had. You were talking about coordination and having to find coordination. There are many sites out there that we know will put things out that they think might be sensational or might be of interest to community groups. They will check out or test whether they can monetize off of certain information. The Prime Minister of Canada is a perfect example. Social media accounts around the world are starting to find that they can monetize by spreading disinformation about the Prime Minister. It's quite lucrative.

I want your recommendation on this. Do you think the RRM should perhaps be looking at not just coordination all the way through from a foreign state-sponsored media source, but also how the interest that's built through monetizing off these platforms can really propel that initiated or state-sponsored disinformation campaign? They may not realize how far it would go, and it's perhaps not coordinated all the way through, but the result or impact of it could be really great. The impact could be devastating to democracies around the world.

What are your thoughts on that? What more could we do? Do you have further recommendations? Do you think we should be looking at that and not just a coordinated attack that has coordination at the beginning but then authentic misinformation spreading?