Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Oct. 17th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Good morning, everyone. I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 88 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

The committee is meeting today to study the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members.

As a reminder to all members, because we've just returned, the earpiece and the microphone should not interact because they cause a feedback loop for interpreters. If you need the earpiece, keep it in your ear. If you don't want to use it, leave it to the side.

The clerk and I, as always, will maintain a consolidated speaking list for members wishing to speak.

Before I go to our guest, I see Ms. Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you so much, Chair.

I wanted to have a quick moment to ask a question about what the schedule will be in committee for the next couple of weeks. I know we have a matter that we still need to discuss and finalize, and I'm just wondering whether there will be time in the next week or so to do that work.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I appreciate that. Based on the comments we've been hearing and discussions that have been taking place, I think members have an appetite for what study we want to move on to after we conclude this one.

Today, as we know, we have two hours of witnesses.

On Thursday, we will have Rob Stewart, who's the former deputy minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, for the first hour. We do not have anyone for the second hour, so we could consider doing business to discuss where we're going after that for that second hour.

Next Tuesday, the first hour is vacant. In the second hour, we will have the Honourable Bill Blair, who is the minister we requested to appear. On Thursday, October 26, for two hours as members requested, we will have the Honourable Erin O'Toole appearing. That will exhaust our list of witnesses, so everyone who is supposed to come will come. It will then bring us to the end of that study, as per what the committee has decided.

I could offer, if you would like, that in the second hour on Thursday, we go into committee business and we can discuss where the committee wants to go. We would adjourn that meeting to ensure that on the Tuesday, the Honourable Bill Blair can appear, as he has confirmed his attendance, but we could use that first hour if it's not rectified on Thursday to continue committee business to figure out what we are doing while the report is being drafted.

As committee members have asked of us, the moment the draft is available, we'll have it circulated and give you enough time—at least a few days—to review it before we go into the draft consideration of it. We can then return to the study that we want to move to.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that, Chair. I hope we can take that time to figure out committee business, but of course, that's up to the committee as a whole. Hopefully we can do that, and I support that.

The other question I have is how long the analysts think it will take to get all the information together on the privilege motion.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

The analysts would like to get back to us. We have the summary of witnesses, so a lot of the work has been done, but it depends on what we hear over the next four meetings. That will determine what they need to add. We'll get that answer back to you.

I think Ms. Blaney is signalling an approach that she would like to see. If others are in agreement, perhaps you can have those conversations and we can find that way forward. I'm seeing support on one side, and others will consider. Thank you for that.

With us today, from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Tara Denham, director general of the office of human rights, freedoms and inclusion.

Ms. Denham, you'll have up to five minutes for an opening statement, after which we'll proceed to questions from the committee members.

Thank you for making yourself available, and thank you for responding as quickly as you did. You're a frequent flyer here and it means a lot. We haven't started an official program, but we will consider it. We thank you, not only for your service but for your time and attention.

Welcome to PROC.

[Tara Denham, Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you. It's always a pleasure to come and appear before the committee.

As you know, previously I have appeared with other members of the SITE task force, but I thought that today it would be helpful to just do a quick recap of some of the work we do at the rapid response mechanism Canada, and then particularly focus on some of the recent work we have been doing since your summer break.

As you know, in 2018, Canada championed the creation of the G7 rapid response mechanism, the RRM, to work with G7 and other partners to strengthen our collective understanding of foreign threats to democracy and our respective capacities to counter these threats. Canada leverages our leadership in the G7 RRM to share information, improve understanding of malign tactics in the information environment and learn from the experiences of our allies. The G7 RRM is led by Canada on a permanent basis and supported by a secretariat at Global Affairs Canada.

During the two previous elections, the RRM Canada team supported the critical election incident public protocol—the protocol—by monitoring the online information environment for signs of foreign information manipulation and interference and providing regular updates to the SITE task force.

To do this, the RRM uses open-source intelligence techniques, which means that only public information is used to support the analysis of the team. We also have an ethical and methodological framework, which is available online and outlines our key protocols and principles of the work and how it is undertaken with an approach that supports and upholds human rights. Of note, RRM-related work continues outside of the writ period of a general election.

To be clear, the role of the RRM Canada team is to identify potential tactics or campaigns, to identify information and to provide updates to the SITE task force during writ periods, and to the panel during writ periods, as part of the public protocol.

Moving on to our more recent work, in the summer of 2023, for the first time the SITE task force was stood up to monitor and report on potential issues of foreign interference and violent extremism related to by-elections. As a member of SITE, RRM Canada monitored the information environment and provided daily updates to the SITE task force. Following the June by-elections, the SITE task force issued an unclassified report on its work during the four by-elections as well as key observations related to foreign interference and violent extremism. As indicated in a publicly available report, there were no observations of foreign interference or violent extremism in those by-elections.

However, while monitoring for the June 2023 by-elections, the RRM Canada team discovered activity that was not related to the by-elections but had some indications of potential information manipulation targeted at a Canadian member of Parliament, Mr. Michael Chong, representing Wellington—Halton Hills.

Within the mandate of RRM Canada, the team investigated the activity in order to validate initial indications of suspicious activity and alerted our colleagues within Canada's security and intelligence community. These efforts culminated in the August 9 Global Affairs Canada statement: “Rapid Response Mechanism...detects information operation targeting member of Parliament”.

As described in the statement, the activity sought to spread “false or misleading narratives about Mr. Chong” and “displayed several indicators of foreign information manipulation and interference, including: coordinated content and timing, highly suspicious and abnormal shifts in the volume and scope of engagement [and] the concealment of state involvement”.

The department assessed that it was highly likely that the Government of China played a role in the information operation. The statement and the key details of the analysis done by the RRM team are available online.

While the publication of the GAC statement about the WeChat activity was a key component of our response, our strategy included a number of other elements. We conducted a briefing on the activity with Mr. Chong. We raised concerns about the activity with the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Canada. We engaged with Tencent, which is the parent company of WeChat, about the activity. These steps are an illustration of some of the tools available to Global Affairs Canada to address malign behaviour in the information environment.

Our efforts to call out this behaviour are not conducted in a vacuum. Canada's allies are also increasingly reporting publicly on these threats to democracy. I would like to specifically recommend the work of our colleagues at the U.S. State Department's Global Engagement Center and their recent report, “How the People's Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment.” We're pleased to see that the report also included a case study about the GAC statement on WeChat activity.

In conclusion, as you have heard, the RRM Canada continues to contribute to the broader efforts of the Government of Canada to bring information to light in the public sphere through the SITE by-election reports and the GAC statement about WeChat activity. When it is appropriate and when we are able to do so, we will continue to report publicly on issues related to foreign interference to contribute to widespread awareness of these threats amongst Canadians.

I'd like to close by noting that the Government of Canada is paying close attention to the outcomes and recommendations of multiple reviews, including that of your committee.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We will now enter into six-minute rounds starting with Mr. Cooper followed by Mrs. Romanado.

Then, we will go to Ms. Gaudreau, followed by Ms. Blaney.

Mr. Cooper, go ahead, through the chair.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.

Thank you, Ms. Denham, for appearing once again before our committee. With regard to the disinformation campaign that the RRM detected concerning MP Chong, which involved a coordinated network of WeChat news accounts, including Beijing state media outlets and accounts, that took place between May 4 and May 13, 2023. RRM detected it in June, MP Chong was briefed about it and it was made public on August 9, 2023.

That was two months after this information was detected and three months after it took place. For a rapid response mechanism, that doesn't sound like a very rapid response, I would submit respectfully. Can you explain why it took three months before this disinformation campaign was made known to MP Chong and made public to Canadians?

[Tara Denham]

Thank you for the question.

Madam Chair, as I noted, we were actually instructed as part of SITE to monitor the by-elections. RRM Canada doesn't monitor the information environment on an ongoing basis. We were instructed, for the by-elections specifically, to look for foreign interference. Again, that was taking place in June, in advance of the by-elections. We weren't monitoring the space in May. When we put the tools in place, we were actually using certain keywords. In this case, we were seeking “member of Parliament in Canada”. When we did that and we started bringing in the information while we were looking at the by-elections, other information actually did come up.

In terms of timing, while the activity took place during a very specific time, from May 4 to May 13, we did not actually start to see it until June.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I appreciate that, and that partially answers my question as to why you didn't see it in May, but it doesn't answer the second part of my question, which is why it took, in this case, two months before MP Chong became aware of this and was briefed about it and it was made public to Canadians.

[Tara Denham]

Again, our primary focus was the by-elections. Once those were completed, we were actually able to focus our energies on trying to understand the activity, and because WeChat is not an open platform—it does not proactively share information as some other platforms do—really looking into the breadth of it is actually a very time-consuming activity. It involves looking at the different accounts.

In terms of timeline, just to answer the question, once it was identified in June, it took approximately the month of July to do that work, to do the research, because we had to really understand the network and scope it out. Once that was completed in July, we shared our research through the intelligence community and different security organizations. By the end of July and the start of August, we were able to brief up and then organize the call with Mr. Chong on August 9 when he was available.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that, but, again, the by-elections were in mid-June. That means it really took about two months, so, to my point, that was hardly a rapid response. In order to counter disinformation, particularly in the context of elections, it's important that information be shared as close to real time as possible.

Would you concur with that?

[Tara Denham]

Actually, our objective isn't to counter disinformation. Our objective is to understand the information environment and the tactics that are being used, and to then shed light on those tactics and amplify understanding.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Certainly part of your mandate is to make that information known—is it not?

[Tara Denham]

Yes, it is, which we did do in August.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

It is.

If it takes two months to detect and make public disinformation, as was the case in this instance, then how can Canadians have any confidence in the RRM in the context of an election or in the lead-up to the issuance of a writ?

[Tara Denham]

I think, actually, this was an illustration of the ability of the RRM to bring information forward, to do the thorough research that's required to understand the tactics at play, and to then share them with Canadians and make the MP aware. I understand some of the nuancing of needing to make sure that any research done is thorough because you actually want to make sure that what you're putting in public has been thoroughly researched. In our perspective, it was actually a positive story. The RRM was able to map it, was able to bring that forward, was able to put it in the Canadian public and was also able to talk to the parent company of WeChat.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Well, I would submit that a two-month window is too long and that the RRM has some work to do to actually deliver a rapid response to disinformation.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I'll give you 30 seconds because you have three seconds.

I just want to say—I'll pause really quickly—that, when we are actually having an opportunity to ask questions and answer questions and are on a good pathway, I will then not be as tight. It's when we are interrupting each other that I just want it to be over. As I think that was quite civil and informative, I will then be generous with time.

Mr. Calkins, if you want to take the 30 seconds, go ahead.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Yes.

On a follow-up to your response to Mr. Cooper's question, you said that no action was taken and that you waited until the by-elections were over. If the purpose is to interdict activities that are going to change the outcome of an election, why would the protocol be to wait until the election is over before advising anybody? Is it because Michael Chong wasn't directly involved in the by-election process? I'm confused about the priority.

[Tara Denham]

I'll just clarify. The activity itself, the information campaign, was in no way related to the by-election. We were mandated to look at the by-election and to find out if there were any indications of foreign interference. We did not find any. However, in the information environment as we were looking at the by-election.... That is when we actually discovered this campaign that had already been completed. It was time-bound between May 4 and May 13, but of course, in the information environment, you can still find information post facto.

We did find it at that time, but it was not related to the by-election at all. At that point, our objective was to understand that tactic, to understand the environment and to make that public if we could.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mrs. Romanado, you have six minutes.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

To the witness, thank you again for joining us. It's a pleasure to hear from you again.

This has actually been very helpful because you've identified how it actually worked. I think it's an improvement from what saw in the 2021 election.

Just to clarify.... Four by-elections were happening June. Mr. Chong was not a candidate in any of those by-elections. Once the mechanism went into place and information of misinformation was coming forth, because there was not an immediate threat to a current election happening, that was worked on in parallel. It was being monitored but being looked at in parallel while you were continuing to monitor the four active by-elections. You're confirming that there was no inference in those four by-elections. After the by-elections, the RRM was able to collate that information and analyze it properly to find out where it was from and so on and so forth. Then, once that was properly done, the RRM notified the person—in this case, MP Chong—as well as the necessary authorities.

Based on that information, would you say that it might be a good recommendation that constant monitoring—and I don't know if it would be by the RRM—occur outside of election periods? The reason I'm saying that is that we never know when an election will happen. We're in a minority Parliament. In the event that an election is called whenever, only then would the mechanism be triggered, but should we be looking outside the writ period and be actively monitoring for misinformation campaigns about sitting members of Parliament? Do you have any suggestions for us on that? If so, what would that look like, and what resources would be required?

[Tara Denham]

Thank you. Your summary was perfect of how the mechanism worked, so I'm glad that came through.

In terms of recommendations.... Again, I work at Global Affairs Canada. I am mandated to look for foreign interference. We don't look at the domestic environment, except when triggered for election periods.

In terms of what a mechanism could look like in Canada, I would leave others to reflect upon that, but this committee has heard from a lot of witnesses. I think there is a combination of.... You've heard from academics, researchers and others who have capabilities to monitor. A lot of countries are asking the questions, “What are all of the layers of research that are required?” and “Is there a role for government?”, and are considering those roles and what they should be.

However, as it is defined for foreign affairs, that is not the information environment that we should or would be looking at on a constant basis.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

You also mentioned that analyzing WeChat was very time-consuming, and you were only able to finish the analysis at the end of July. Using other channels of communication is perhaps the reason why the PRC is using WeChat. It's because it knows full well that it is actually much more difficult to do the analysis versus other means of communication.

Could that be a tactic? If so, could we be working more closely with WeChat to make sure that any analysis we need to do can be done and done much more quickly?